Neuroscience and free will

I think the circuits in a CPU are pretty good examples of cause and effect explanations of deterministic processes, down to the quantum mechanical aspects of the circuits. We even have a good understanding of random effects on the circuits and how to compensate for them.

Then, the agent selects one of the two remaining choices by . . .
~~ Paul

The determinism of the circuit is created by quite a bit of rational work.  It is the abstract information that is fixed, not any outcome.  This is what the halting problem is about.  Even so - with the structure of the flow of electrons organized into logic gates - it is the information that is fixed in structure.  You, yourself point out that there is propensity for the physics to put noise into the picture.

When an agent selects an outcome, there is added structure to the informational environment.  The agent has naturally effected the probability of future events, mentally, by eliminating possible pathways.

Perhaps I'm misreading your post but I would think the way in which  "cause" is different from "determinism" as being the central to the discussion?

To me Determinism is just an assignment of 100% probability, an indication of our knowledge about what we think happens now and into the future.

Cause would be about the actual "something" about cause A and its relationship to effect B.

Perhaps both questions are central, now that I think about it. I was focussed on whether or not there is some sort of third way of having an influence where "free" will could fit - between Determinism, and an assignment of 100% probability, and Random, where multiple events share the total probability.

I sorta thought it was a given that your will would not be considered causal when the influence was Random, and the type of cause associated with Determinism is unpalatable. So whether or not our will is "free" comes down to whether or not there is some third way of having an influence - one we are comfortable attributing to our will (i.e. our will is causal), but isn't deterministic or random.

So we can discuss what a "free" cause would look like and go looking for it. Or we can discuss what determinism says about cause and look in there for something which is palatable. 

Linda

If something follows a causal chain then it adheres to rational rules of logic and is repeatable and - with sufficient computation and knowledge of initial conditions - deterministic and is able to be examined scientifically as a mechanism. If something truly doesn't have an explanation then insanity/creativity/magic has entered the universe

Without a God exercising mastery over the fate of things isn't this picture of causal chains itself an example of insanity/magic?

Isn't determinism that happens without explanation, attributed to mere brute facts like "Natural Laws", just randomness of a special kind -- and doesn't randomness violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason?

I see a good deal of argument for determinism being that things happen for a reason, but I find this odd as this only paints a partial picture. It's not enough to note consistency, there must be an explanation for why something happens which would explain why something else doesn't happen.

Ok - how does it work? Best to figure this out before worrying about Prime Movers or anything else.

It works according to the descriptive laws of physics. I must not understand what you're looking for.

Even if you are looking for some kind of quasi-philosophical description of what is happening below the quantum mechanical level, why do we need that? We can describe how it works well enough to build stunningly complex modern chips that operate according to strict specifications, even to the point of repairing random errors. All I'm asking for regarding the third way of making decisions is a high-level handwaving description; nothing even close to the level of detail we can specify for computers. I'm really just asking for an informal logical description of a process/procedure/method/scheme/way of making decisions that isn't entirely deterministic and random.

I don't think saying "well, we don't know why billiard balls do what they do" is a reasonable excuse for not offering some sort of description. Nor do I think that asking "are there really random events?" is an excuse; if you don't think there are, then they simply won't be part of the description.

~~ Paul

When an agent selects an outcome, there is added structure to the informational environment.  The agent has naturally effected the probability of future events, mentally, by eliminating possible pathways.

Is that elimination (a) deterministic, (b) random, or (c) something else?

~~ Paul

I see a good deal of argument for determinism being that things happen for a reason, but I find this odd as this only paints a partial picture. It's not enough to note consistency, there must be an explanation for why something happens which would explain why something else doesn't happen.

I don't think you're going to get the explanation you're looking for. All we can do is observe what does happen and then compose laws that describe what we see. We can then use those laws to rule out things that can't happen under the same conditions, such as the two billiard balls occupying the same space, or the struck ball moving backward toward the striking ball.

But for the third way of making decisions, we don't even have observations, let alone descriptive laws, let alone derived technology. If we could observe the third way of making decisions, we wouldn't be having this conversation. True, we don't observe the decision being made purely by deterministic + random methods, either, but we know those processes exist outside our minds, so we can:

Suggest that mental decisions are made using the same two methods (at least in part).

Then ask if anyone can even imagine a third method.


~~ Paul

[Laird]

I don't think you're going to get the explanation you're looking for.

And this is exactly what we've been saying to you regarding free will choices, for what I imagine is a very, very similar if not identical reason.

All we can do is observe what does happen and then compose laws that describe what we see.

Precisely. Now say the same of free will choices (albeit that the "laws" of free will choices are more varied, less generalisable, and are instantiated by consciousnesses in the act of making choices rather than by who-knows-what in the case of the laws of physics) and we can all agree and go home!

Is that elimination (a) deterministic, (b) random, or (c) something else?

~~ Paul

Mental selection is participatory.  It is part of nature; and not well-described by any abstract epistemological category.  

Bob Doyle has thought this out; far better than I could.  

 Since the physical world is irreducibly indeterministic at the base level of atoms and molecules, there is actually no strict determinism at any "level" of the physical world.

With random motions at the base level, what emerges at the higher level of the macroscopic physical world and the human mind is adequate determinism. Determinism is an abstract theoretical idea that simplifies physical systems enough to allow the use of logical and mathematical methods on idealized abstract "objects" and "events." The apparent "determinism" of classical physics is the consequence of averaging over extremely large numbers of microscopic particles.

Adequate determinism "emerges" when we have large enough objects to be averaging over vast numbers of atoms and molecules.

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/fr...inism.html

And this is exactly what we've been saying to you regarding free will choices, for what I imagine is a very, very similar if not identical reason.


Precisely. Now say the same of free will choices (albeit that the "laws" of free will choices are more varied, less generalisable, and are instantiated by consciousnesses in the act of making choices rather than by who-knows-what in the case of the laws of physics) and we can all agree and go home!

I can't say it, because I cannot observe any sort of events pertaining to libertarian free will. There is no data from which to derive laws. But for events we can observe, we have plenty of data suggesting that there are deterministic events and random events. And so we have laws of that sort.

In other words: All we can do for libertarian free will is make the logical attempt at describing how it might work. Heck, you could even decide what you want for dinner, assume it was a true free choice, and then derive some laws about how you did it. I challenge you to be able to come up with any laws.

~~ Paul

Mental selection is participatory.  It is part of nature; and not well-described by any abstract epistemological category.  

Bob Doyle has thought this out; far better than I could.  

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/fr...inism.html

I agree it's participatory, but I'm not sure how that implies true free will.

I like Doyle's description. I'm not sure what it does for the free will advocate.

~~ Paul