Why physicalism is FALSE

OUTLINE

0:00 Intro
0:15 Physicalism
3:10 Non-physicalism
5:50 Many-subjects argument
30:20 Sensory awareness arguments
36:31 Conceivability arguments
51:48 Inconceivability argument
56:58 Knowledge argument
1:08:07 Explanatory gap arguments
1:12:51 Arguments from personal identity
1:20:07 Mereological nihilism argument
1:28:38 Just too different!
1:32:07 Other arguments
1:33:06 The best argument against dualism?
1:46:17 Conclusion

RESOURCES

(1) Cutter, "The Many-Subjects Argument against Physicalism", https://philpapers.org/rec/CUTTMA-5

(2) Cutter, "Three Roads from Sensory Awareness to Dualism", https://philpapers.org/rec/CUTTRF

(3) Cutter, "The Inconceivability Argument", https://journals.publishing.umich.edu...

(4) Cutter, "The modal argument improved", https://philpapers.org/rec/CUTTMA-4 (

5) Cutter & Crummett, "Psychophysical Harmony: A New Argument for Theism", https://philarchive.org/archive/CUTPHA

(6) My other live interview with Brian Cutter:    • Does this philosopher have the BEST a...  

(7) Cutter's PhilPeople profile with his papers: https://philpeople.org/profiles/brian...

(8) Bailey and Rasmussen, "A new puppet puzzle", https://andrewmbailey.com/PuppetPuzzl...

(9) Rasmussen, "Building Thoughts From Dust: A Cantorian Puzzle", https://joshualrasmussen.com/articles...

(10) Rasmussen and Bailey, "How to Build a Thought", https://andrewmbailey.com/HowToBuild.pdf

(11) Rasmussen's popular explanation of the counting argument:    • Introducing the Counting Argument aga...  

(12) Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism (2018): https://www.amazon.com/Blackwell-Comp...

(13) The Waning of Materialism (2010): https://academic.oup.com/book/12724

(14) Chalmers, "The Conscious Mind", https://personal.lse.ac.uk/ROBERT49/t...

(15) Searle, "Mind: A Brief Introduction", https://coehuman.uodiyala.edu.iq/uplo...

(16) My Springer book:

(a) https://www.amazon.com/Existential-In... (b) https://link.springer.com/book/10.100...

THE USUAL... Follow the Majesty of Reason podcast! https://open.spotify.com/show/4Nda5uN... Join the Discord and chat all things philosophy! https://dsc.gg/majestyofreason My website: https://josephschmid.com My PhilPeople profile: https://philpeople.org/profiles/josep...

[Laird]

Great share, Sci. I got a lot out of that.

The many-subjects argument was new to me, but it makes a lot of sense.

I appreciate Brian's insight that many of the other arguments - conceivability; knowledge; explanatory gap - are all just different ways of getting at the basic intuition (per the "Just too different!" section in the video) that physical stuff - neurons firing, etc - simply is different to subjective experience - thoughts, feelings, perceptions, etc.

I think he's also probably right that the best response to the problem of the complexity of psychophysical laws is theism or something theism-adjacent.

Great share, Sci. I got a lot out of that.

The many-subjects argument was new to me, but it makes a lot of sense.

I appreciate Brian's insight that many of the other arguments - conceivability; knowledge; explanatory gap - are all just different ways of getting at the basic intuition (per the "Just too different!" section in the video) that physical stuff - neurons firing, etc - simply is different to subjective experience - thoughts, feelings, perceptions, etc.

I think he's also probably right that the best response to the problem of the complexity of psychophysical laws is theism or something theism-adjacent.

I think part of the challenge there is he's assuming dualism requires specified psychophysical laws that map complex neurology to mental states?

But not only is this mapping ultimately "anomalous" I don't think it's required. Levin's Platonic Dualism suggests there are far more physical states that map to mental states, even down to triangles.

IIRC you proposed an animism that would be similar?

Or am I just missing the point? 

[Laird]

Or am I just missing the point? 

At least one of us is, because I'm not quite sure what you're saying and why. For example, what do you mean by psychophysical laws being anomalous, and how do you think their being anomalous negates the need for their existence altogether? Too, how does there being multiple (maybe many multiples of) physical states that map to a mental state bear on the supposed lack of necessity of/for psychophysical laws altogether?

To be clear, we're really talking about laws of causal interaction. Perhaps you're contending that while the independent physical and mental states are complex and innumerable, the causal laws that shuffle information and action between the two need not be nearly as complex and innumerable, with only a small number required to account for the shuttling of information and action between the two domains?

At least one of us is, because I'm not quite sure what you're saying and why. For example, what do you mean by psychophysical laws being anomalous, and how do you think their being anomalous negates the need for their existence altogether? Too, how does there being multiple (maybe many multiples of) physical states that map to a mental state bear on the supposed lack of necessity of/for psychophysical laws altogether?

To be clear, we're really talking about laws of causal interaction. Perhaps you're contending that while the independent physical and mental states are complex and innumerable, the causal laws that shuffle information and action between the two need not be nearly as complex and innumerable, with only a small number required to account for the shuttling of information and action between the two domains?

The argument from Dualism to Theism, as I understood it, was that there is a very specific set of physical states that correlate with mental states/willing. And because this is such an isolated set of states, it makes sense this was set up by a Designer.

But I think that *if* there was a Dualist Animism, similar to what Micheal Levin has suggested in his work, then the Mental Realm may attach itself to a variety of sets of physical states that would serve as bodies.

Depending on how this works, I could see it being a Naturalistic - or at least Atheistic - Dualism.

Additionally, it isn't clear to me that the set of states is perfectly mapped because there seem to be cases where malformed brains still map to mental states. Additionally it seems the set of states is "anomalous" even in healthy brains, where the mapping is not one-to-one. This to me suggests there may simply not be Design, but rather just some means mental entities have of choosing embodiment that doesn't need a Designer.

All that said, I do lean toward a Designer...just not sure if Dualism - even when includes Survival - necessitates Theism...

Hopefully that's clearer!

[Laird]

The argument from Dualism to Theism, as I understood it, was that there is a very specific set of physical states that correlate with mental states/willing. And because this is such an isolated set of states, it makes sense this was set up by a Designer.

Oh, I understood the argument differently. It was not with respect to the isolation of the set of states, but with respect to the complexity (including the apparently vast number of them required) of the causal laws between them.

We'd have to go back and review that section of the video to resolve our different understandings.

But I think that *if* there was a Dualist Animism, similar to what Micheal Levin has suggested in his work, then the Mental Realm may attach itself to a variety of sets of physical states that would serve as bodies.

Isn't that something different though? The argument at issue is about the causal laws between the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) - or similar for sentient organisms without brains - and mental states. In contrast, you're referencing the relationships between body plans and Platonic forms (or something like them).

Is your suggestion that the two are analogous in some way?

Isn't that something different though? The argument at issue is about the causal laws between the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) - or similar for sentient organisms without brains - and mental states. In contrast, you're referencing the relationships between body plans and Platonic forms (or something like them).

Is your suggestion that the two are analogous in some way?

Well it's more Levin's argument that the Platonic Space has conscious entities that seek to embody themselves in our physical world. To him, as I understand his position, even the Platonic Triangle has some agency.

He seems to be leaning toward Survival, or at least straddling the gap between Physicalism and Dualism, in his essays.

[Laird]

Well it's more Levin's argument that the Platonic Space has conscious entities that seek to embody themselves in our physical world. To him, as I understand his position, even the Platonic Triangle has some agency.

Really? That sounds odd. Conscious concepts are perhaps even less plausible than conscious matter (physicalism).

I'm still not really sure though what bearing this has on the argument against substance dualism from complexity of psychophysical laws, and whether or not theism or something theism-adjacent is the best answer to that argument.

He seems to be leaning toward Survival, or at least straddling the gap between Physicalism and Dualism, in his essays.

OK. I've opened his co-authored Robustness of the Mind-Body Interface paper in a browser tab and will let you know if I get through it.

I sometimes try to read some of these philosphical threads, but I don't take much in, as I don't actually understand either of your positions at all... I think the language is too obscure for me, as it's not tied to anything I can pin down as observations I can investigate, and compare to my own understanding. Today I stuck a couple of Levin's essays into Grok to prime it, than asked it to explain your positions in this thread... to see if it could help me to understand... it came up with...

Key Themes and Interpretations

Levin’s Platonic Dualism: Sci interprets Levin as proposing that consciousness or agency exists in a non-physical "Platonic Space" and can flexibly connect to various physical forms. This challenges traditional dualism’s need for strict, designed laws and opens the door to a more naturalistic view where mental entities "choose" embodiment.

Psychophysical Laws: Laird focuses on the causal interaction between physical and mental realms, wondering if Sci thinks these laws can be simple despite complex states. Sci, however, seems more interested in the flexibility of the mapping itself, not the laws’ complexity.

Theism vs. Naturalism: Sci explores whether Levin’s ideas undermine the theistic argument (a Designer is needed for precise mind-body connections) by suggesting a broader, less designed relationship. Laird remains skeptical of how this resolves the original debate.

Anomalous Mapping: Sci uses examples (e.g., malformed brains functioning normally) to argue that the mind-body link isn’t as fixed or "designed" as some dualists assume, aligning with Levin’s emphasis on biological plasticity and adaptability.

What’s Happening in the Conversation?

Misalignment: Sci and Laird are talking past each other to some extent. Sci focuses on Levin’s Platonic framework and its implications for embodiment and theism, while Laird fixates on the complexity of causal laws from a different argument they’ve both encountered.

Levin’s Role: Sci sees Levin as offering a radical rethink of consciousness and embodiment, blending animism (agency in all things) with dualism. Laird struggles to connect this to the specific dualism-theism debate they’re referencing.

Unresolved Tension: They don’t fully clarify their differences or agree on Levin’s stance, leaving the conversation open-ended.

In essence, Sci is excited by Levin’s idea that consciousness might not need a tightly designed physical substrate, using it to question theistic dualism. Laird, meanwhile, wants to pin down how this relates to causal laws and remains puzzled by the leap to conscious Platonic entities. It’s a thoughtful but slightly disjointed exchange about big ideas!

I stuck a couple of Levin's essays into Grok to prime it, than asked it to explain your positions in this thread... to see if it could help me to understand... it came up with...

How correct did it get it?