Why physicalism is FALSE

[Laird]

It's an impressive bit of computational linguistics, but I still don't think there is any genuine understanding going on.

But I'd need to actually see how the code works, which I assume no company is going to put out.

I've responded to this in the general-purpose AI thread.

While this does generally reflect my sentiments, it might underplay Michael's concept of agency a little more than I intended to. As I interpret Michael, he sees the possibility for hidden, unexpected properties of the Platonic forms "pointed to" by physical embodiments to unfold in a way that - in part given its unexpectedness - is in effect purposeful. While I agree with Grok's chastisement that this is hardly "triangles plotting embodiment", it nevertheless seems to be more consequential and exciting an idea than "cells navigating morphospace", although agency on Michael's conception is that too, and that idea too is already consequential and exciting enough.

Levin never says triangles plot embodiment, rather than natural selection can produce pointers to the Platonic Space.

He does say:

In colloquial terms, triangular objects are haunted by the spirit of relevant rules of geometry while brains are able to pull down and force the incarnation (literally, “bringing into meat”) of patterns of a very different kind and sophistication. I propose that the objects on which we often fixate in physics, biology, and AI – the embryos, machines, language models running on PCs or in robots, etc. are just pointers (or, per Hoffman, interfaces [104, 160-162]) to the deeper space of patterns. Every analogy has limitations and no doubt the pointer metaphor will fail at some point, but the aspects of the pointer analogy I wish to emphasize are: 1) as with pointers into a rich informational medium, you get more out than you put in, 2) the mapping between the interface you make and what comes through it is not linear or simple and must be investigated, and 3) in order to learn to call up the patterns we
want, we will have to look beyond the pointer toward the structure of the space into which it points.

Specifically, I propose that the interface between mathematical truths and physical objects is precisely the interface between non-physical mind and its physical embodiments. The soul of the triangle and the way it relates to real triangular objects is a minimal, basal version of how complex living beings are “ensouled” by cognitive patterns.

[Laird]

Levin never says triangles plot embodiment

Right, but that's what I interpreted you as saying, which I lightly pushed back on, and which Grok was paraphrasing while endorsing my pushback.

[Laird]

To clarify: I didn't necessarily interpret you as saying that exactly; my light pushback was more general. That, though, does seem to be how Grok has paraphrased you.