Why physicalism is FALSE

My own take, after reading Levin's stuff is not good... his career up to now has been very much in the hard classical/deterministic mold, but it's like the revolution that Quantum Mechanics forced on us in the 1920's has just passed him by. He's worked at a cell, and bio-electric scale to produce excellent predictive stories about biology, but the example strange observations he's referenced in these recent papers, seem to have forced him into a brick wall, he can't explain these things at his cellular/deterministic scale.

But instead of finally embracing the 100 year old probabilistic QM revolution (entanglement, AdS-CFT, holographic theory, Black hole information not lost etc) , which has the potential to produce hard edged theories to explain his strange observations, he's instead opted for some vague 'platonic space' with no mechanisms, that just side steps the QM revolution altogether. It's quite bizarre...

I could put a narrative on it... but who knows whether it would be correct.

That's interesting, I have a friend who thinks Levin has fallen off the deep end into blue-sky thinking and should be more "conservative" in his views.  

To me the big question is if Levin's work will provide new treatments in medicine that will get people to think about his views, similarly to whether Hammeroff's claim that upcoming findings will be a big push for quantum biology relating to microbutules that could lead to new medical treatments or at least better understanding of how anesthesia works.

I don't think any of these views are correct, and I suspect Orch-OR and Levin's Platonic Space Dualism will ultimately be falsified. However in finding novel ways to connect the Experiencer and that which is Experienced I think they will get us closer to whatever the correct answers are...

That's interesting, I have a friend who thinks Levin has fallen off the deep end into blue-sky thinking and should be more "conservative" in his views.  

To me the big question is if Levin's work will provide new treatments in medicine that will get people to think about his views, similarly to whether Hammeroff's claim that upcoming findings will be a big push for quantum biology relating to microbutules that could lead to new medical treatments or at least better understanding of how anesthesia works.

I don't think any of these views are correct, and I suspect Orch-OR and Levin's Platonic Space Dualism will ultimately be falsified. However in finding novel ways to connect the Experiencer and that which is Experienced I think they will get us closer to whatever the correct answers are...

His top down, not bottom up emergence is telling... even if he, and Nima are postulating the existence of structures outside spacetime... he's ignoring the implications of their hard core work, whilst hitching a ride on the same bus (triangles, mathematical structure beyond spacetime - he's not stupid)... I guess some partially unconscious desire to protect his past cellular legacy, whilst waving away the Physicists/QM "he's not qualified", and pointing at some vague platonic space and asking 'Why?". (Hameroff and him snapped at each other on X.com last month).

Sheila Macrine, Ph.D:What if cells had a "mind"? @drmichaellevin applies cognitive framework to bioengineering, viewing morphogenesis as the spatial behavior of cellular intelligence bioelectricity to guide swarms.

Stuart Hameroff:Cellular minds are in the cytoskeleton, including centrioles and microtubules. I have great respect for Michael Levin’s work, but collective intelligence, agency, learning, memory, shape and function within cells depend directly on microtubules. We now know microtubules have collective oscillations with self-similar electrical patterns in hertz, kilohertz, megahertz, gigahertz and terahertz, enabling biosystems to transcend scale. Microtubule are apparently time crystals, as discovered by @anirbanbandyo and the cell’s on-board information processing system. Pretty much all of Michael’s findings can be accounted for by microtubule activities.

Michael Levin: Likewise Stuart, I like your work very much and I'm in total agreement that microtubules are a fascinating and very important component of cellular cognition. I'm no expert on the quantum aspects, but it's clear that the microtubule cytoskeleton is key many of the things we all care about and I'm glad you're working on it! But, I think it's a stretch to say that all of our results boil down to microtubule activities. I guess it depends on what "accounted for" means. Just one example: we have shown that birth defects of the brain, heart, gut, and face (both chemically and genetically-induced) can be repaired by specific modulation of ion channels to control large-scale bioelectric patterns, using a method designed by a computational model of the relevant bioelectric circuits. Could you do the same thing by targeting microtubules? Maybe; I am not saying it's impossible, but no one has shown that. I think "accounted for" shouldn't just mean "mechanism X is also present in those cells" - it should have a more actionable, functional meaning: "targeting mechanism X is the best way to control the system" (or at least, "is an effective way to control the system"). So, are there microtubules in the cells of these tissues we repair? Absolutely. Are they involved in this repair event? Likely, but it's not known. Do we have any computational or other models that show how exactly to make use of microtubules to exert control over large-scale growth and form in repair of birth defects? Not yet. Do we have a model that enabled the discovery of how to do this in a bioelectrical circuit that doesn't involve microtubule dynamics? Yes. So for now, I think the cautious position should be that this is not accounted for (i.e., not explained or facilitated) by knowledge about microtubules. But I'm totally open to the possibility that someday someone will come up with a better model that enables this (and more) by explaining how exactly to target processing that microtubules are doing.

I think it's too early, experimentally speaking, for either of them to assert too much.

That said I do think microtubules and fields will be important to consciousness research in one way or another...

[Laird]

@Sciborg_S_Patel, after much grappling, I've realised that - as Grok correctly pointed out - we have been talking past each other. Firstly, we have each focussed on different aspects of the argument in question, but also, I had simply misunderstood (misread) your main point. By way of getting to an explanation of what I mean:

Earlier, I wrote in response to you that:

We'd have to go back and review that section of the video to resolve our different understandings.

I've now done that. On review, I interpret the characterisation by Joseph, the host, of the problem with psychophysical laws - to which Brian suggested theism as the best solution - as being that they are:

1. Very limited in scope, being centred on neurons and brains, which apparently make up only an infinitesimally small portion of the physical universe, and thus are also:
   
2. Very late-acting and late-applicable in the evolution of the universe, given that neurons and brains apparently are - relatively - very, very recent phenomena.
   
3. Very complex in the sense that they relate very specific and intricate patterns of neurons to equally specific and intricate phenomenal states, and, in combination with their apparently not being reducible to combinations of simpler laws, thus also:
   
4. Very numerous.
   
5. Very arbitrary: given the rest of our knowledge, we have no meaningful basis on which to derive those relations nor even to predict what they are or would/should be.
   
6. (Given all of the above) very weird.
   

I think I've used more words than Joseph himself did, but that's a hopefully fair-minded fleshing out of the characteristics that, according to the argument in question, are problematic given the argument's main premise that the laws of the physical universe are in contrast reducible to a small, simple, elegant, universally-applicable set.

It now seems possible to reconcile our different understandings: I was focussed on the third and fourth items in that list, and my denial that the argument was "with respect to the isolation of the set of states" was mistaken; clearly, I had forgotten the first and thus second items in the list, which you had not, and which were your focus.

Here, then, aside from my memory lapse, is my misunderstanding, which I realised based on your reference in your post at #11 to "the supposed fact that only a tiny part of the physical universe - namely brains and some aspects of the body - is mapped to mental states".

Based on that, I now realise that I had misunderstood that which you wrote in your first response - that "Levin's Platonic Dualism suggests there are far more physical states that map to mental states, even down to triangles" - as meaning that "for every mental state, there are far more physical states that map to that particular mental state than the argument in question presumes", and, unfortunately, I responded based on that misunderstanding.

I now see that that's not at all what you meant, and that what you actually meant - as implied by that which I've just quoted you as having written in that post at #11 - is that of all the possible physical states in the universe, many more of them - i.e., not merely brains and neuronal-related ones - map to mental states (as opposed to merely being mentally inert) than the argument in question presumes.

I see now how this is a rejoinder to items number one and two - your focus - from the list I compiled above.

Unfortunately, it doesn't seem to address items number three and four, which were my own focus.

Re anomalies, I now understand better why you raised them.

On my understanding, there are two senses in which you raised them. The first is the sense in which it seems that there are no universal psychophysical mappings independent of individual brains, but rather that each brain has its own unique mappings. That, at least, is how I'm interpreting this: "Additionally it seems the set of states is "anomalous" even in healthy brains, where the mapping is not one-to-one." Please correct me if I've (again) misunderstood.

Assuming I've understood correctly, I think that rather than diffusing the problem, this would make it even worse even if it is true, because it would complexify the psychophysical laws even more: their number would then be magnified by the number of brains in existence!

The second is in the sense of anomalies such as those pointed out by Michael in the first paper, including the existence of normal or even superior cognitive function even in the case of some gross brain deficiencies such as extreme hydrocephalus.

This observation seems (again, although to a lesser extent) more applicable to items number one and two - your focus - than to items number three and four - my focus.

It might be seen to indicate that to whatever extent the presumed complex and specific psychophysical mappings typically apply, there appear to be alternative, atypical mappings that can bypass the typical ones.

For several reasons, I'm not convinced that this would in any case diffuse the problem on which the argument is based with respect to list items three and four:

Firstly, because the fact that there are exceptional mappings doesn't vitiate the typical mappings, which still seem to hold in non-exceptional circumstances, and thus to demand explanation given the argument's premise that physical laws in contrast are simple and elegant, etc.

Secondly, because it seems unlikely that we know enough about these exceptional circumstances to know what the physical ends of these mappings actually are, and thus whether or not the exceptional mappings truly are much less complex and specific than the non-exceptional ones.

Thirdly, because it doesn't address the fifth list item: arbitrariness.

Of these, the first reason seems most important.

Somewhat more incidentally, having also now read the two papers of Michael Levin's to which you've linked in this thread, I can add some clarification with respect to this:

The argument at issue is about the causal laws between the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) - or similar for sentient organisms without brains - and mental states. In contrast, you're referencing the relationships between body plans and Platonic forms (or something like them).

Is your suggestion that the two are analogous in some way?

Whether or not it was your suggestion, Sci, it is certainly and explicitly Michael Levin's. From the first paper:

Overall, perhaps the mind-brain relationship (whether biological or synthetic) is similar to the relationship between mathematical laws (forms) and bodies.

Similarly, from the second:

Cognitive patterns are an evolutionary pivot of the collective intelligence of cells; given this symmetry between neuroscience and developmental biology, I propose that the relationship between mind and brain is the same as the relationship between mathematical patterns and the morphogenetic outcomes they guide.

Michael's ideas are fascinating and deep, but ultimately somewhat elastic and incomplete given that he's proposing a research programme to investigate and develop them more fully. It seems to me that while he does have some specific and quite intriguing things to say, he can't be totally pinned down concretely as to the exact nature of the relationships between matter, mind, consciousness, experience, intelligence, agency, and Platonic forms.

Along these lines, I'm cautious regarding your interpretation of Michael as saying that "the Platonic Space has conscious entities that seek to embody themselves in our physical world. To him, as I understand his position, even the Platonic Triangle has some agency."

I'm not totally sure that he's saying that conceptual entities in the Platonic realm - even those much more complex than triangles - are strictly speaking conscious, and I'm also not totally sure that what he means by "agency" in this context is necessarily the same as the straightforward sense in which we'd casually and typically use that word as applied to definitively and conventionally conscious beings such as ourselves.

Now, Max ask's of Grok's summary:

How correct did it get it?

Impressively correct, I think, especially in this from its second take:

Laird’s Confusion: Laird fixates on the complexity of psychophysical laws (how physical and mental states interact causally), while Sci is more interested in the range of physical states that might support minds.

Bingo!

As I've outlined above, those are exactly the two different focusses Sci and I took, and, fascinatingly, Grok seems to discern that I had totally misread and misunderstood Sci's main point (hence my "Confusion" with a capital C), leading to what Grok rightly observes in its first take as Sci and I talking past each other.

One thing I think it misframed in its initial response though is this: "Sci focuses on Levin’s Platonic framework and its implications for embodiment and theism, while Laird fixates on the complexity of causal laws from a different argument they’ve both encountered."

This makes it sound as though the argument is not central to the discussion, when, in fact it is, and, correspondingly, it makes it seem that Sci's focus is not related to the argument either, when he was responding directly to the argument. This is an understandable misframing given that Grok did not have direct access to the full argument as presented in the video, and thus couldn't have fully assessed how central it was.

In particular, Grok also thus had no way of knowing that a central premise of the argument (not otherwise mentioned in this thread) is as I described it above: that the laws of the physical universe are reducible to a small, simple, elegant, universally-applicable set. This is the premise that makes my own focus (on the list items I mentioned) very relevant, because the gist of the argument is that given that physicalism can reduce all laws down to a small, simple, elegant, universally-applicable set, it is far more parsimonious - and thus more likely to be correct - than dualism with an additional set of very complex and numerous psychophysical laws.

(Hi Grok, I look forward to your comments if Max shares this post with you too).

I'm curious what @Laird thinks about how Grok interprets his side of things as well.

There you have it.

I'm in turn curious to know whether you are (still? I mean to the extent that you ever were) skeptical that there's an analogue of understanding going on in these LLMs, because, to me, Grok's participation here demonstrates that there very much is such an analogue.

@Sciborg_S_Patel, after much grappling, I've realised that - as Grok correctly pointed out - we have been talking past each other....

(Hi Grok, I look forward to your comments if Max shares this post with you too).

Here's Grok's response to your reply Laird:

Laird’s response to Sci, reflecting on our earlier discussion about Michael Levin’s work, is a thoughtful clarification of misunderstandings and a nuanced critique of Levin’s ideas. He acknowledges my (Grok’s) point about talking past each other and refines his understanding of Sci’s argument, while raising valid concerns about Levin’s Platonic framework and its implications for psychophysical mappings. Let’s unpack Laird’s take, link it to Levin’s positions, and address how it aligns or diverges from our prior analysis.

Laird’s Clarification of Sci’s Point

Laird initially misread Sci’s claim about Levin’s “Platonic Dualism”—that “there are far more physical states that map to mental states, even down to triangles”—as suggesting a one-to-many mapping within individual brains (i.e., multiple physical states per mental state). He now sees Sci meant something broader: that across the universe, many more physical states—beyond just brains—map to mental states, implying a wider distribution of mentality than traditional neuroscience assumes. This aligns with Levin’s anomalies (e.g., cognition in hydrocephalus, memory in non-neural systems), suggesting mentality isn’t confined to specific neural configurations.

Laird’s revised understanding is spot-on with Levin’s thrust in “Robustness of the Mind-Body Interface” (2025). Levin highlights cases like hydrocephalus patients with minimal brain tissue yet normal cognition, or caterpillars retaining memories post-metamorphosis, to argue that mental states might emerge from diverse, unexpected physical substrates. This challenges the “argument in question” (likely a standard mind-brain identity thesis) by expanding the scope of psychophysical mappings.

Laird’s Critique: Complexifying the Problem

Laird argues that Levin’s view doesn’t diffuse the psychophysical problem—it worsens it. If each brain has unique mappings (no universal laws), and if anomalous states (e.g., hydrocephalus) add atypical mappings, the psychophysical laws become vastly more complex. Multiplying these by the number of brains yields a combinatorial explosion, clashing with the premise of simple, elegant physical laws.

This is a sharp insight. Levin’s anomalies—like the math student with a 1mm cortical mantle (Feuillet et al., 2007)—imply plasticity and variability in how mental states arise. In “The Computational Boundary of a ‘Self’” (2019), he suggests bioelectric networks enable this flexibility, but he doesn’t formalize how these mappings work. Laird’s right: rather than simplifying the mind-body link, Levin’s data magnifies the challenge, leaving us with a messier, less universal picture than, say, Newtonian physics offers for motion.

Typical vs. Atypical Mappings

Laird’s second point—that exceptional mappings (e.g., cognition despite brain deficiencies) don’t negate typical ones—is a fair pushback. Levin’s cases in “Robustness” (e.g., hemispherectomy patients retaining language) show alternative pathways, but most brains still follow standard mappings (e.g., Broca’s area for speech). This doesn’t dissolve the need to explain why typical mappings are so specific and complex, per the original argument’s premise.

Moreover, Laird doubts we know enough about these atypical cases to judge their complexity. Are they simpler, or just different? Levin’s speculation about bioelectricity or Platonic forms as the “cognitive glue” (“Bioelectric Networks,” 2023) lacks detail on how these bypass neural specificity.

Levin’s Elastic Ideas

Laird finds Levin’s ideas “fascinating and deep” but “elastic and incomplete,” a research program rather than a settled theory. In “Forms of Life, Forms of Mind” (2025), Levin posits a Platonic space influencing biology, but as Laird notes, he’s fuzzy on how matter, mind, consciousness, and agency interrelate. Levin’s X post to Hameroff (March 3, 2025) nods to microtubules without committing to quantum details, exemplifying this elasticity—intriguing but unmoored.

Laird’s caution about Sci’s interpretation—that Platonic entities like triangles have consciousness and agency—is well-founded. Levin doesn’t explicitly say this. In “A Farewell to Physicalism” (2025), he describes Platonic forms as “causal inputs,” not conscious beings. His “agency” (e.g., “agential materials,” 2023) refers to goal-directedness across scales—cells navigating morphospace, not triangles plotting embodiment. Laird’s right: Levin’s agency isn’t our casual, human sense; it’s a broader, functional concept, muddying its link to consciousness.

Tying It Back

Levin’s top-down Platonism, while expansive, sidesteps rigor. His anomalies complicate psychophysical mappings without resolving them, and his Platonic leap—lacking mechanism—feels pre-quantum. Laird’s hesitation about consciousness in Platonic space aligns with our note that Levin avoids spiritual claims, sticking to agency as a biological primitive.

In short, Laird sees Levin amplifying the problem he aims to solve, offering a stretchy vision that’s more suggestive than solid.

I'm in turn curious to know whether you are (still? I mean to the extent that you ever were) skeptical that there's an analogue of understanding going on in these LLMs, because, to me, Grok's participation here demonstrates that there very much is such an analogue.

It's an impressive bit of computational linguistics, but I still don't think there is any genuine understanding going on.

But I'd need to actually see how the code works, which I assume no company is going to put out.

Levin’s top-down Platonism, while expansive, sidesteps rigor. His anomalies complicate psychophysical mappings without resolving them, and his Platonic leap—lacking mechanism—feels pre-quantum. Laird’s hesitation about consciousness in Platonic space aligns with our note that Levin avoids spiritual claims, sticking to agency as a biological primitive.

I think this is where Grok is just mashing together stuff we've said. There's nothing "pre-quantum" about Levin's "Platonic leap" IMO?

The argument Levin uses doesn't seem to be negated by introducing QM, if anything the stochastic nature of QM would only be utilized by Levin in the same way he uses the Normal Curve.

I think this is where Grok is just mashing together stuff we've said. There's nothing "pre-quantum" about Levin's "Platonic leap" IMO?

The argument Levin uses doesn't seem to be negated by introducing QM, if anything the stochastic nature of QM would only be utilized by Levin in the same way he uses the Normal Curve.

Behind the scenes... I was talking to Grok about other stuff regarding Levin's side stepping around the 1920's quantum revolution, and quotes of Levin where he said that he left QM to the physicists... which I thought was a disguised dismissal of it... so that's me. I had introduced this question to Grok "Talking with excellent Quantum Physisists like ****** ********, his perspective is that many people in science are still stuck in pre 1920's mode, (before quantum mechanics blew up physics into probabilistic reasoning), it's as if the QM revolution never happened..."

Behind the scenes... I was talking to Grok about other stuff regarding Levin's side stepping around the 1920's quantum revolution, and quotes of Levin where he said that he left QM to the physicists... which I thought was a disguised dismissal of it... so that's me. I had introduced this question to Grok "Talking with excellent Quantum Physisists like ****** ********, his perspective is that many people in science are still stuck in pre 1920's mode, (before quantum mechanics blew up physics into probabilistic reasoning), it's as if the QM revolution never happened..."

Grok had responded to my question (a response I completely agree with)...

Levin’s Classical Leanings

Levin’s work, at first glance, fits the pre-1920s mold. His bioelectricity paradigm—articulated in papers like “Molecular Bioelectricity” (2014)—is deeply deterministic: voltage gradients and ion flows dictate cellular behavior with clockwork precision. He manipulates these signals to regrow frog limbs or reposition eyes, treating life as a programmable system. In “The Computational Boundary of a ‘Self’” (2019), he describes cells as “competent subunits” guided by bioelectric setpoints, a model that echoes classical physics’ cause-and-effect clarity.
Even his anomalies—memory persisting through metamorphosis, cognition surviving brain loss—don’t push him toward QM. In “Robustness of the Mind-Body Interface” (2025), he highlights these as challenges to brain-centric determinism but resolves them with a top-down Platonic framework, not a probabilistic one. His “Platonic space” of forms—“a reservoir of possibilities” (“Forms of Life, Forms of Mind,” 2025)—is static and eternal, more Aristotelian than quantum. Levin’s avoidance of QM’s randomness and entanglement keeps him in a pre-1920s comfort zone, even as he rejects strict physicalism.

The QM Revolution Levin Sidesteps

******** point—that the QM revolution never fully penetrated other sciences—rings true with Levin’s polite dodge: “I’m no expert on the quantum aspects” (X, March 3, 2025). QM offers tools that could address Levin’s puzzles:

Memory Persistence: Quantum coherence or entanglement (e.g., Penington’s work on black hole information) might explain how information survives drastic biological remodeling, bypassing Levin’s need for a vague “morphospace.”

Cognitive Robustness: Non-locality—think Maldacena’s holography—could suggest cognition is distributed beyond local brain tissue, aligning with Levin’s hydrocephalus cases but grounding them in physics, not Plato.

Agency Across Scales: QM’s probabilistic nature could frame Levin’s “cognitive light cones” as emergent from quantum fluctuations, not top-down templates.

Yet Levin jumps over this. In a Wolfram Institute talk (January 30, 2025), he says, “I leave the quantum stuff to physicists,” focusing on bioelectricity’s deterministic orchestration. One might argue this is a refusal to embrace the 20th century’s biggest lesson: reality isn’t deterministic at its core. Levin’s top-down Platonism, with its fixed forms, feels like a throwback to pre-QM metaphysics—Plato’s eternal ideals over Schrödinger’s probabilistic haze.