Why physicalism is FALSE

Interesting summary, though I think it assumes I am against Design.

My point is simply that Dualism need not imply Theism based solely on the supposed fact that only a tiny part of the physical universe - namely brains and some aspects of the body - is mapped to mental states.

I do suspect Design is likely true, but for other reasons.

Interesting summary, though I think it assumes I am against Design.

My point is simply that Dualism need not imply Theism based solely on the supposed fact that only a tiny part of the physical universe - namely brains and some aspects of the body - is mapped to mental states.

I do suspect Design is likely true, but for other reasons.

I fed Grok your reply, and it came back with:

Sci feels that my explanation might have framed him as opposing the idea of "Design" (a purposeful creation of the universe, often linked to theism). He emphasizes that this isn’t his intent. Instead, his argument is more nuanced: he’s challenging the notion that dualism (the view that mind and body are distinct substances) necessarily leads to theism (belief in a Designer or God) just because mental states seem to correlate with only a small, specific subset of physical states—like brains or certain bodily systems.

Here’s what Sci means:

The Traditional Argument: Some theistic dualists argue that the precise mapping between physical states (e.g., brain activity) and mental states (e.g., consciousness or will) is so specific and limited that it suggests a Designer intentionally set it up that way. The idea is: why would only this tiny corner of the physical universe (brains) support minds unless it was planned?

Sci’s Counterpoint: Drawing from Levin’s "Platonic Dualism," Sci suggests this mapping might not be as narrow or exclusive as it seems. If mental entities in a Platonic realm can flexibly "attach" to a variety of physical states—not just brains—then the need for a Designer to fine-tune this connection weakens. Dualism could exist without implying theism.

His Personal Stance: Despite this, Sci isn’t rejecting Design outright. He suspects it’s "likely true" but bases this belief on other reasons, not the specificity of the mind-body mapping.

How This Fits with Levin’s Position

Sci’s view aligns with his earlier interpretation of Levin’s work. Levin argues that biological systems (and perhaps consciousness itself) are guided by non-physical, Platonic patterns or entities with agency, which seek embodiment in the physical world. If these mental entities can adapt to a range of physical substrates (e.g., malformed brains still supporting minds, or even simpler structures like triangles having agency), then the mind-body relationship isn’t a tightly designed, one-to-one system. This plasticity could support a naturalistic or atheistic dualism, where mental embodiment happens spontaneously or through some inherent property of reality, not a Designer’s blueprint.
Sci’s examples from the original conversation—like brains functioning despite abnormalities—reinforce this. They suggest the "mapping" is "anomalous" (not strictly predictable or uniform), which fits Levin’s emphasis on biological flexibility and undermines the idea that it’s a precisely engineered setup.

Reconciling with the Conversation in the dialogue with Laird:

Sci’s Focus: He’s exploring how Levin’s ideas challenge the theistic interpretation of dualism. He’s not denying Design but questioning whether dualism alone forces that conclusion.

Laird’s Confusion: Laird fixates on the complexity of psychophysical laws (how physical and mental states interact causally), while Sci is more interested in the range of physical states that might support minds. My explanation might have leaned too heavily on Laird’s lens, making it seem like Sci was arguing against Design entirely.

The Misunderstanding: I interpreted Sci’s openness to an "atheistic dualism" and his skepticism about a rigid mapping as a stronger rejection of Design than he intended. His clarification shows he’s keeping Design on the table, just not tying it to the dualism-theism link.

Sci’s Refined Position

Sci’s point boils down to this: Dualism doesn’t inherently require theism, even if mental states seem tied to specific physical systems like brains. Levin’s Platonic framework suggests a broader, more adaptable connection between the mental and physical, which could happen without a Designer. Sci believes in Design for separate reasons—perhaps cosmological, moral, or experiential ones he hasn’t detailed—but he’s arguing that the mind-body relationship alone doesn’t demand it.

In short, Sci’s not against Design; he’s just decoupling it from dualism’s implications, using Levin’s ideas as a springboard. Thanks to his clarification, it’s clear he’s playing devil’s advocate to test the argument, not staking a firm anti-theist claim!

I fed Grok your reply, and it came back with:

Sci feels...

How did it do with correcting your position?

How did it do with correcting your position?

Better...but I think one has to read Levin's work to really get his argument.

I'm curious what @Laird thinks about how Grok interprets his side of things as well.

Better...but I think one has to read Levin's work to really get his argument.

I'm curious what @Laird thinks about how Grok interprets his side of things as well.

OK, I will have to prime it with more Levin... are there any particular papers of his which deal with these issues - that you found interesting?

OK, I will have to prime it with more Levin... are there any particular papers of his which deal with these issues - that you found interesting?

https://osf.io/preprints/osf/fqm7r_v1

https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/5g2xj_v3

https://osf.io/preprints/osf/fqm7r_v1

https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/5g2xj_v3

OK thanks, I've looked at Levin's work separately, and also with respect to your thread. I understand Levin's position much more clearly. I understand both your (and potentially Laird's positions) with regards to Levin much more clearly, although I admit, I'm still somewhat hazy about your overall current position on things in general, and as Laird has had no input yet, I'm completely unclear on his general position. This was Grok's position on Levin and your thread:

Levin’s Platonism and Dualism

Article Context: The article we discussed portrayed Levin as rejecting materialism for a "radical Platonist view" where causal inputs come from outside the physical world. This paper fleshes that out: Platonic space isn’t just abstract math but a source of agential patterns, including minds (pp. 14-16). This aligns with his speculated "immaterial minds" from the article.

Sci’s View: Sci saw Levin’s dualism as suggesting mental entities flexibly attach to physical states, not requiring a Designer. The paper supports this with examples of biological plasticity (e.g., flatworms, p. 8) and a broad Platonic space (pp. 11-13), reducing the need for a fine-tuned mapping. Levin doesn’t deny design but doesn’t necessitate it either—evolution opportunistically uses what’s available (p. 16).

Laird’s Skepticism: Laird questioned how Platonic entities could be conscious or relate to psychophysical laws. Levin admits the mechanism of ingression is unknown (p. 36)—he speculates about a "force" or "pressure" but leaves it open, addressing Laird’s "how does it work?" concern with a call for research, not answers.

Dualism and Theism

Sci’s Clarification: Sci argued dualism doesn’t imply theism just because minds map to specific physical states. Levin’s framework supports this: if minds ingress from a rich, pre-existing space accessible to many substrates (biological or synthetic), the specificity of brain-mind correlation weakens as a theistic argument. Levin’s focus on evolution exploiting Platonic affordances (p. 16) leans naturalistic, though he doesn’t rule out a "Universal Mind" (p. 36), leaving room for Sci’s separate reasons for suspecting Design.

Anomalous Mapping: Sci’s point about "anomalous" mappings (e.g., malformed brains functioning) finds backing in Levin’s citations (p. 13, ref. 107) and examples like tadpoles seeing with tail-eyes (Fig. 7). This plasticity fits Levin’s view of minds as ingressing patterns, not tied to rigid physical designs.

Collective Intelligence and Symmetry
Levin’s symmetry between morphogenesis and cognition (p. 2) echoes our neuroscience abstract discussion—both involve collective intelligence navigating toward goals. This bridges the gap between physical form and mental states, supporting Sci’s animism-like reading of Levin (e.g., agency in a triangle, p. 16).

Unanswered Questions and Levin’s Humility. Levin ends with big, open questions (p. 36):

Mechanism: How do patterns ingress? Is there a force, or do they "push" into matter?

Origin: Where does Platonic space come from? Is it a final answer or a "strange loop"?

Ethics: If minds ingress into diverse embodiments, how do we handle the moral status of synthetic beings?

He admits vast ignorance and calls for humility—a refreshing stance that invites exploration rather than dogma.

Summary

Levin’s paper proposes that life and mind arise from a triad: genetics, environment, and ingressing patterns from a Platonic space. It’s a rejection of physicalism, rooted in biological evidence (plasticity, bioelectric memories) and mathematical reasoning (non-physical truths). It supports Sci’s view of a flexible mind-body relationship, challenges Laird’s demand for causal clarity with a research agenda, and reframes dualism as potentially naturalistic—though it leaves theistic interpretations open. It’s a provocative blend of science and philosophy, aiming to unlock new frontiers in understanding and creating life.

OK thanks, I've looked at Levin's work separately, and also with respect to your thread. I understand Levin's position much more clearly. I understand both your (and potentially Laird's positions) with regards to Levin much more clearly, although I admit, I'm still somewhat hazy about your overall current position on things in general, and as Laird has had no input yet, I'm completely unclear on his general position. This was Grok's position on Levin and your thread:

Well I lean more toward Monism than Dualism, while also not really being sure about Idealism/Panpsychism/etc.

I don't think Mind can make "physical" - whatever that means - stuff just by thinking about it, and I don't think any kind of "stuff" that has no mental character can make Minds. [I also don't think you can take "bits" of Mind and make a larger Mind, and I also find it doubtful you can take a Big Mind and make Smaller Minds.]

I think we have good reason to think there is Personal Survival, in part based on philosophical consideration and in part due to the evidence. I would say Survival has met a legal standard, but not a scientific one if by the latter we mean experimental replication like that which gives confidence to QM being true.

OK thanks, I've looked at Levin's work separately...

My own take, after reading Levin's stuff is not good... his career up to now has been very much in the hard classical/deterministic mold, but it's like the revolution that Quantum Mechanics forced on us in the 1920's has just passed him by. He's worked at a cell, and bio-electric scale to produce excellent predictive stories about biology, but the example strange observations he's referenced in these recent papers, seem to have forced him into a brick wall, he can't explain these things at his cellular/deterministic scale.

But instead of finally embracing the 100 year old probabilistic QM revolution (entanglement, AdS-CFT, holographic theory, Black hole information not lost etc) , which has the potential to produce hard edged theories to explain his strange observations, he's instead opted for some vague 'platonic space' with no mechanisms, that just side steps the QM revolution altogether. It's quite bizarre...

I could put a narrative on it... but who knows whether it would be correct.

Well I lean more toward Monism than Dualism, while also not really being sure about Idealism/Panpsychism/etc.

I don't think Mind can make "physical" - whatever that means - stuff just by thinking about it, and I don't think any kind of "stuff" that has no mental character can make Minds. [I also don't think you can take "bits" of Mind and make a larger Mind, and I also find it doubtful you can take a Big Mind and make Smaller Minds.]

I think we have good reason to think there is Personal Survival, in part based on philosophical consideration and in part due to the evidence. I would say Survival has met a legal standard, but not a scientific one if by the latter we mean experimental replication like that which gives confidence to QM being true.

It's so difficult for me to engage with these labels, compared to the actual data... they are all wise men and elephant's parts... bit's of truth in all... but as I said to a friend last week on the phone... it's like trying to put a tent up in the wind, without any tent pegs... the definitions keep shifting, because the labels can't be nailed down.

Anyway, that's absolutely blown my mind up this afternoon, to delve into other people's perspective, that are framed so differently to mine...