The problem with the “hard problem”

The problem with the “hard problem”

Feser

...All the same, the so called “hard problem” is, in my view, a pseudo-problem that rests on a set of mistakes.  There is a reason why ancient and medieval philosophy knew nothing of the “mind-body problem” as modern philosophers conceive of it, and nothing of the so-called “hard problem of consciousness” in particular.  And it’s not because they somehow overlooked some obvious features of mind and matter that make their relationship problematic.  It’s because the problem only arises if one makes certain assumptions about the nature of mind and/or matter that ancient and medieval philosophers generally did not make, but modern philosophers often do make....

...On the side of the body, modern philosophy introduced a conception of matter that is essentially reductionist and mathematicized.  It is reductionist insofar as it essentially takes everyday material objects to be aggregates of microscopic particles.  A stone, an apple, a tree, a dog, a human body – all of these things are, on this view, really “nothing but” collections of particles of the same type, so that the differences between the everyday objects are as superficial as the differences between sandcastles of diverse shapes.  The new conception of matter is mathematicized insofar as it holds that the only properties of the microscopic particles are those that can be given a mathematical characterization.  This would include size, shape, position in space, movement through space, and the like, which came to be called the “primary qualities” of matter... 

...On the side of the mind, meanwhile, the modern picture makes of it the repository of these qualities that are said not truly to exist in matter.  Redness, coldness, and the like, are on this view not the qualities of physical things, but rather of our conscious experiences of physical things.  They are the “qualia” of experience.  Often associated with this view is an indirect realist theory of perception, according to which the immediate objects of perception are not physical objects themselves, but only mental representations of such objects.  For example, when you see an apple, the immediate object of your perception is not the apple outside you, but rather an inner representation of it.  The situation is analogous to looking at someone who is ringing your doorbell through a security camera that is generating an image of the person on a computer screen.  What you are directly looking at is the screen rather than the person, and the colors you see on the screen are strictly speaking features of the screen rather than the person (even if they are caused by something really there in the person)... 

Nice.  I like this Edward Feser guy!

The problem with the “hard problem”

Feser

At first thought, without having read Feser's piece, I'm really not impressed by this. It seems to me that the two according to Feser unjustified assumptions made by modern philosophers are very reasonable assumptions based on the evidence and the experience of humans in the world.

Matter has been shown by science to be composed of atoms and their constituent subatomic particles, down to quarks, and of course there is quantum mechanics. All these are "things" not thoughts. If thoughts were things then the world would be fundamentally different than it demonstratably is. Thoughts and qualia would somehow be visible objects or other detectable by instruments phenomena and have weight, physical dimensions, etc. They don't. Since thoughts are not things and things are what the objectively observed physical world consists of, then thoughts are not physical.

Qualia are just the elements of common conscious experience along with simple awareness, thought, emotion, etc. It is in vain that one can try to conceive of some way that these can be qualities of matter, since the qualities of matter are as a fact in experience objectively scientifically measurable, and thoughts and qualia are as a fact of experience not objectively observable or measureable. That clearly shows (at least to me) that qualia are not composed of physical matter or its constituents and the hard problem is real.

It's true that we don't know what physical matter really is in an ultimate sense, but the best we can do (other than speculate about it) is use our measuring instruments which show that physical matter in our world or level of reality is composed of objectively observed "things" not thoughts or awareness or qualia.

At first thought, without having read Feser's piece, I'm really not impressed by this. It seems to me that the two according to Feser unjustified assumptions made by modern philosophers are very reasonable assumptions based on the evidence and the experience of humans in the world.

Matter has been shown by science to be composed of atoms and their constituent subatomic particles, down to quarks, and of course there is quantum mechanics. All these are "things" not thoughts. If thoughts were things then the world would be fundamentally different than it demonstratably is. Thoughts and qualia would somehow be visible objects or other detectable by instruments phenomena and have weight, physical dimensions, etc. They don't. Since thoughts are not things and things are what the objectively observed physical world consists of, then thoughts are not physical.

Qualia are just the elements of common conscious experience along with simple awareness, thought, emotion, etc. It is in vain that one can try to conceive of some way that these can be qualities of matter, since the qualities of matter are as a fact in experience objectively scientifically measurable, and thoughts and qualia are as a fact of experience not objectively observable or measureable. That clearly shows (at least to me) that qualia are not composed of physical matter or its constituents and the hard problem is real.

It's true that we don't know what physical matter really is in an ultimate sense, but the best we can do (other than speculate about it) is use our measuring instruments which show that physical matter in our world or level of reality is composed of objectively observed "things" not thoughts or awareness or qualia.

He does cover this in the piece, but I'd say he would agree with you about thoughts but qualia would be part of the corporeal world that simply isn't amenable to mathematical quantification.

The aspect of qualia that is most suggestive of immaterialism in a stronger sense would be the 1st Person PoV experience of them, though the difference is made a bit complicated given "third person objective" is really just "agreement of experiences arrived at through arranging certain other experiences".

The problem with the “hard problem”

Feser

...All the same, the so called “hard problem” is, in my view, a pseudo-problem that rests on a set of mistakes.  There is a reason why ancient and medieval philosophy knew nothing of the “mind-body problem” as modern philosophers conceive of it, and nothing of the so-called “hard problem of consciousness” in particular.  And it’s not because they somehow overlooked some obvious features of mind and matter that make their relationship problematic.  It’s because the problem only arises if one makes certain assumptions about the nature of mind and/or matter that ancient and medieval philosophers generally did not make, but modern philosophers often do make....

I think that Feser misunderstands the Hard Problem... that it is entirely related to Materialism / Physicalism proclaiming that everything is material and physicalism or reducible to matter and physics, including mind. The challenge being that Materialism / Physicalism simply doesn't seem to be able to explain away mind or its contents as being epiphenomenal, despite efforts.

It baffles me how so many seem unable to properly comprehend the essences of the Hard Problem, mind-body problem or explanatory gap.

which show that physical matter in our world or level of reality is composed of objectively observed "things" not thoughts or awareness or qualia.

Our subjective experience tells us so anyway.  What you perceive is still a thought.  It is still your brain producing it from the signals and neurological interpretations of those signals.  We cannot see "out there" because sight is what our eyes, brains and minds collaborate to produce.  There is no distinction between object and observer nor can there be, therefore there is no distinction between mind, and matter and probably no distinction between matter and non-matter generally.

I think that Feser misunderstands the Hard Problem... that it is entirely related to Materialism / Physicalism proclaiming that everything is material and physicalism or reducible to matter and physics, including mind. The challenge being that Materialism / Physicalism simply doesn't seem to be able to explain away mind or its contents as being epiphenomenal, despite efforts.

It baffles me how so many seem unable to properly comprehend the essences of the Hard Problem, mind-body problem or explanatory gap.

I don't think he misunderstands it, I think you misunderstand him.

Our subjective experience tells us so anyway.  What you perceive is still a thought.

Subjective experience is all we have, frankly. Even so-called "objective" stuff is merely inter-subjective in nature ~ multiple subjects agreeing that they're having the same describable perceptions based on agreed upon definitions.

It is still your brain producing it from the signals and neurological interpretations of those signals.  We cannot see "out there" because sight is what our eyes, brains and minds collaborate to produce.

Brains don't "produce" anything. Brains, in some sense, rather structure our thoughts. Sight cannot be "produced" by brains or eyes, because NDErs report being able to see. Therefore... it is more intuitive that eyes and brains shape and structure how we perceive, and our minds take on that shape.

There is no distinction between object and observer nor can there be, therefore there is no distinction between mind, and matter and probably no distinction between matter and non-matter generally.

Nevermind that we clearly notice a distinction between the contents of our minds, and the physical qualia within sensory experience...

I don't think he misunderstands it, I think you misunderstand him.

Okay... in that case, please explain.

Our subjective experience tells us so anyway.  What you perceive is still a thought.  It is still your brain producing it from the signals and neurological interpretations of those signals.  We cannot see "out there" because sight is what our eyes, brains and minds collaborate to produce.  There is no distinction between object and observer nor can there be, therefore there is no distinction between mind, and matter and probably no distinction between matter and non-matter generally.

This seems clearly to proclaim yourself as a reductive materialist, since to you your thought, namely your consciousness, is one and the same basic substance as your brain's neurons or of the interactions and actions of these neurons, both of which are producing consciousness like bile by the liver, and there is no distinction between mind and matter generally.

Since this view comes up against a very large body of contradicting evidence from paranormal phenomena and psychical phenomena, and also comes up against a very strong set of logical arguments in the field of philosophy of mind that also debunk materialism, then you need to plausibly debunk every single case and incidence of this contradicting paranormal evidence, and also need to have strong arguments against the philosophical positions mentioned, to have plausibly debunked the so-called "hard problem".

But of course for you the issue is a done deal and settled anyway that the so-called "hard problem" is invalid, regardless of evidence and the logic of philosophy, since to you thoughts just absolutely are as a brute fact of the world the material productions of the brain's neurons and there is no distinction between matter and non-matter (meaning everything is material including thoughts and consciousness). 

I guess that's not the end of this particular discussion. We are still waiting for the plausible debunking of the paranormal evidence and for the demolishment of the philosophy of mind arguments.