Is the Filter Theory committing the ad hoc fallacy and is it unfalsifiable?

Uh, when one uses a comparison between A and B, that does not mean he thinks everything about A applies to B.

Do you agree that the fact that raw materials are unable to do what smartphones do is not a valid reason for believing that smartphones do not exist?

Then you must agree that the arguments of the form "atoms cannot do A; therefore combinations of those atoms cannot do A" is not always valid.  But Skiborg used that logic. It is faulty logic. That was my point.

You say "Nobody can describe how unconscious matter can produce consciousness". Of course not. But there was a time when nobody could describe how unconscious matter could make smartphones. If nobody can describe it yet, that does not make it impossible.

Not sure who Skiborg is but he sounds like a sharp character. I get the sense he's also very, very good looking.

But in seriousness - The argument is not about how the description of getting consciousness from that which is non-conscious is currently unknown, the argument is that there will never be an explanation because it is logically not possible.

If it were just a question of nobody understanding it currently, Harris wouldn't compare the idea of non-conscious information processing producing consciousness to "round squares" and "2 + 2 = 7".

Similarly when Tallis says:

We could, of course, by all means change our notion of matter; but if we do not, and the brain is a piece of matter, then it cannot explain the experience of things. Those who imagine that consciousness of material objects could arise from the effect of some material objects on another particular material object don’t seem to take the notion of matter seriously.

He is talking about something that cannot ever happen, rather than something that is currently mysterious.

Could they be wrong? Sure, and they acknowledge as much in one way or another. But they both are asserting the logical impossibility of getting Something (Mind) from Nothing (Non-conscious Matter) rather than merely a current lack of scientific knowledge such as how GR & QM can be reconciled.

Thus what @Brian was pointing out is that nobody would claim that some smartphone like communicator was logically impossible. That's why the comparison is fatally flawed because no one thinks there is a logical, Something From Nothing problem to the development of smartphones.

Perhaps another Harris essay will provide some clarity:

...Doesn’t vision emerge from processes that are themselves blind? And doesn’t such a miracle of emergence make consciousness seem less mysterious?

Unfortunately, no. In the case of vision, we are speaking merely about the transduction of one form of energy into another (electromagnetic into electrochemical). Photons cause light-sensitive proteins to alter the spontaneous firing rates of our rods and cones, beginning an electrochemical cascade that affects neurons in many areas of the brain—achieving, among other things, a topographical mapping of the visual scene onto the visual cortex. While this chain of events is complicated, the fact of its occurrence is not in principle mysterious. The emergence of vision from a blind apparatus strikes us as a difficult problem simply because when we think of vision, we think of the conscious experience of seeing. That eyes and visual cortices emerged over the course of evolution presents no special obstacles to us; that there should be “something that it is like” to be the union of an eye and a visual cortex is itself the problem of consciousness—and it is as intractable in this form as in any other.

But couldn’t a mature neuroscience nevertheless offer a proper explanation of human consciousness in terms of its underlying brain processes? We have reasons to believe that reductions of this sort are neither possible nor conceptually coherent. Nothing about a brain, studied at any scale (spatial or temporal), even suggests that it might harbor consciousness. Nothing about human behavior, or language, or culture, demonstrates that these products are mediated by subjectivity. We simply know that they are—a fact that we appreciate in ourselves directly and in others by analogy.

Here is where the distinction between studying consciousness and studying its contents becomes paramount. It is easy to see how the contents of consciousness might be understood at the level of the brain. Consider, for instance, our experience of seeing an object—its color, contours, apparent motion, location in space, etc. arise in consciousness as a seamless unity, even though this information is processed by many separate systems in the brain. Thus when a golfer prepares to hit a shot, he does not first see the ball’s roundness, then its whiteness, and only then its position on the tee. Rather, he enjoys a unified perception of a ball. Many neuroscientists believe that this phenomenon of “binding” can be explained by disparate groups of neurons firing in synchrony. Whether or not this theory is true, it is perfectly intelligible—and it suggests, as many other findings in neuroscience do, that the character of our experience can often be explained in terms of its underlying neurophysiology. However, when we ask why it should be “like something” to see in the first place, we are returned to the mystery of consciousness in full...

Tallis would disagree that the Binding Problem can be solved by neuroscience but will save that for another time...

Yes. You and I agree that the brain has a purpose.

I was responding to a person who seemed to be saying the brain does not read inputs from the body and does not send signals to the body. Thus,  my question about what that person thought the brain actually did was appropriate.


Wouldn't it be great if we ever got back to discussing the filter theory? That is what I thought I was here for. But people started insisting that we talk about consciousness, and then insisted that we talk about whether brains can even have thoughts about things, and this thread got way off the rails. How about we get back to the filter theory?

Again, I explain my view of why the filter theory is inadequate at https://mindsetfree.blog/if-only-souls-had-a-brain/ . Where do you disagree with what I write there?

I don't think the "filter" model is very good. The best technological analogy to the very complex functions of the brain that occurs to me at the moment is the combination of a modern aircraft avionics interface unit, flight computer, cockpit controls and displays, and aircraft mission computer, which includes the following product as a major part:

ARIU (Avionics Remote Interface Unit)
The Avionics Remote Interface Unit is a real-time and high-reliability independent unit included in the mission system in aircraft. ARIU processes discrete and analog control and data signals coming from and going to sensors and actuators and pilot controls and displays, and communicates with the Mission Computer using the MIL-STD-1553B interface.

Top-level breakdown of major elements and subfunctions of the entire aircraft digital control and communications system:

Mission computer + ARIU + flight computer
MIL-STD-1553B communications
discrete output interfaces
discrete input interfaces
analog output interfaces
analog input interfaces
interface management and monitoring
sensors
controls
displays

In this still very rough, inaccurate and incomplete analogy the "pilot" is the controlling spirit inhabiting the brain. The "pilot" has many capabilities that can't be expressed through the aircraft interfaces, like playing tennis or enjoying a glass of wine. Similarly, the spirit has many capabilities that can't be expressed through the physical body and that are unavailable in normal consciousness, hence the very limited "filter" analogy.

If those atoms do it by physical laws that are not currently known to us, that would not be magic.

Again, one needs to clarify what is meant by magic. I am following the philosopher Hilary Putnam that what is "magic" in the pejorative sense is that which is an unintelligible brute fact.

AFAIK there is no actual explanation yet for how the oddities & observed indeterminacy of the QM level end up reconciling to the level of our everyday experience which is much more "ordered". So what "physical laws" really add to an explanation is unclear to me.

Are they just names we give to observed regularities?

Or do they have some power to [make] something happen?

In the first case I don't see how a new law of physics would overcome the logically impossible Something from Nothing issue of getting consciousness from the non-conscious constituents of the universe.

In the latter case we'd be back to how a law of physics can make something happen. And I would contend this is in fact "magic".

I can cut and paste this a thousand times if you want: My money is on it being physical, not magic.  My money is on it being physical, not magic. Should I copy that ten thousand times for your benefit? A million times? I have cut and paste. Please let me know how many times you need me to repeat this for your benefit.

As per these aforementioned Adam Frank essays, the "physical" - as defined as what physics tells us -  may even include consciousness as one of the fundamental constituents of the universe. So I am not sure what the point of copy-pasting this slogan you mention is meant to convey?

I do agree that consciousness being a fundamental constituent of the universe is not magic in the philosophically pejorative sense because nothing new is added inexplicably by brute fact assertion. We already know consciousness exists because we have it.

But if the point is asserting that somehow a future physics will show a means of getting past the Something from Nothing problem...that just seems like an expression of religious faith in the Physicalist/Materialist metaphysics?

Yes, Aplysia delivers signals that are simple, (I have already mentioned Kandel), but the chain of physical actions, cannot account for the personal context and functional logic displayed.  They are variables with a separate route of actualization in outputting instructions from the mind.  There is not a chemical formula with reference to environmental awareness and need for self-preservation.  The "magic" is claiming these are physical outputs instead of informational outputs inspiring physical responses.

I don't know if you and neuroscientist-philosopher Tallis are looking at the same issue from two different angles, but in What Neuroscience Cannot Tell Us About Ourselves he differentiates habit memory and explicit memories with mental content:

...Kandel, like many other researchers, seems to assimilate all memory into habit memory, and habit memory in turn into altered behavior, or altered reactivity of the organism. And altered reactivity can be correlated with the altered properties of the excitable tissue in the organism, which may be understood in biophysical, biochemical, or neurochemical terms — the kinds of chemical changes one can see in the contents of a Petri dish. But these changes have nothing to do with memory as we experience and value it, though they have everything to do with overlooking the true nature of memory.

This is because habit memory is merely implicit, while human memory is also explicit: the former sort of “memory” is merely altered behavior, while the latter is something one is aware of as a memory. Those who think this a false elevation of the human must address not only the fact that there are two broad categories of memory to be found among animal species, but that both of these types of memory coexist in human beings. We not only have uniquely explicit memory, but also have the same sort of implicit memory as Kandel’s sea slugs. Moreover, we can have both of these types of memory about the same event: After a spark from a doorknob shocks my hand as I close the door during the winter, I will instinctively flinch from touching it again, and will then stop and explicitly remember that I had previously received an electrostatic shock. This time, I will explicitly plan to shut the door with my foot, an act that will itself after a few repetitions become instinctive or implicit, until I again stop to recall the explicit memory of the event that led to the habit. The neurophysiological account fails to address these distinctions.

To get to the bottom of the fallacies that underlie the very idea of a “neurophysiology of memory,” we need to remind ourselves that the nervous system is a material object and that material objects are identical with their present states. A broken cup is a broken cup. It is not in itself a record of its previous states — of a cup that was once whole — except to an outside observer who previously saw the cup in its unbroken state and now remembers it, so that he or she can compare the past and present states of the cup. The broken cup has an altered reactivity — it moves differently in response to stimuli — but this altered reactivity is not a memory of its previous state or of the event that caused its altered reactivity, namely its having been dropped. Likewise, although the altered state of the sea slug is, as it were, a “record” of what has happened to it, it is a record only to an external consciousness that has observed it in both its past and present states and is aware of both. And this is equally true of the altered reactivity of neurons exposed to previous stimuli in higher organisms.

Indeed, just as a conscious observer is required for the present state of the broken cup to be regarded as a “record” or “memory” of its having been dropped, so it must be a consciousness that identifies the particular piece of matter of the cup as a single object distinct from its surroundings, having its own distinct causal history, of which there is one special event among all others of which the cup is a “record”: its being dropped. From a consciousness-free material standpoint, the cup is but an arbitrary subset of all matter, and its present state owes equally to every prior state of the matter that composes it. The cup would have to be at once a “memory” of the moment it was dropped and of the innumerable moments when it sat motionless in the cupboard — with the former in no way privileged. In fact, if you believe that the present state of an object is a record or memory of all the events that brought it to its present state, you are committed to believing that, at any given moment, the universe is a memory of all its previous states...

I mention it because it might help bridge the gap between your Information Science and Philosophy of Mind.

You write this in response to, "What does the matter in the brain do? It consumes a large portion of the body's resources. Does it even have a purpose?"

Really? Are you going to write off the entire field of neuroscience and the medical discipline of neurology as mere speculation? There is a vast amount of research in this field. It is not simply speculation.?

Who said that I'm writing off the entire field of neuroscience...? Not me.

I'm writing off Materialism and Physicalism, perhaps. But not neuroscience as a whole ~ knowing how the brain functions as an organ is perfectly okay.

My contention is merely the tall claim that the brain *generates* consciousness. Study of the brain I have no issue with.

So you can stop conflating neuroscience with Materialism / Physicalism, if you please.

That's it? You deny that the brain observes inputs or sends signals to the body. And when I ask you what it does, we find all it does is somehow limit consciousness?

Why do we have optic nerves, if the brain is not reading inputs from the eye through that nerve?

Again, your error is that the brain, in your interpretation of it as a purely physical system, is the sole originator. You even imply through your wording an intelligence and awareness to it. Only consciousness can observe. Purely material entities cannot "observe" anything. All they do is... chemical reactions, blindly. Consciousness, however, is a guiding force that can direct and control.

The brain's primary function is to limit or restrict the scope of consciousness somehow. Beyond that... it is not the brain, as a purely material entity, doing anything. The brain is merely a tool which the unconscious aspects of mind, consciousness, wield to direct the brain to do the things that it directed to do ~ sending signals. Consciousness is the one that observes inputs, and uses the brain, or rather, the entire body, to send signals in return.

If one had a brainectomy, would his consciousness become unlimited?

Well... then individual would be dead, so yeah, I guess. They would no longer be inhabiting a body, after all.

Does this mean that all animals have souls, and all the brains of all the animals are only there to limit the consciousness of those souls?

We are animals, after all... so... yes?

How is it that those animals with smaller, less complex brains apparently do a much better job of limiting consciousness?

You seem to be almost presuming that a smaller, less complex brain means less consciousness or something...

In my conception of brains, the brain's secondary function, overall, is to allow a consciousness to control a physical form, and so, the brain must be suitably complex in relation to the complexity of the rest of the body. That is, it is a central control center of sorts. It allows consciousness to unconsciously regulate and maintain a body in a healthy state.

I don't think the "filter" model is very good. The best technological analogy to the very complex functions of the brain that occurs to me at the moment is the combination of a modern aircraft avionics interface unit, flight computer, cockpit controls and displays, and aircraft mission computer, which includes the following product as a major part:

Do you consider the "filter" model to be analogous to the "limiter" model? I am in agreeance that a secondary function of the brain is to act as a central control center ~ or an aircraft with a pilot controlling it via all of the complex mechanisms provided, as it were.

Who said that I'm writing off the entire field of neuroscience...? Not me.

Full stop. Go back and read this post.

Are you now denying you wrote it? Or have you changed your mind?

Full stop. Go back and read this post.

Are you now denying you wrote it? Or have you changed your mind?

I have no idea how you even read any of that as me "denying" neuroscience...

Again, you conflate neuroscience with Materialism / Physicalism...

The argument is not about how the description of getting consciousness from that which is non-conscious is currently unknown, the argument is that there will never be an explanation because it is logically not possible....

Tallis says...

Perhaps another Harris essay will provide some clarity:

Again, you simply assert that it is logically impossible for consciousness to come from material things. You never attempt to prove this assertion. All you can do is repeat this argument from authority that some famous person(s) wrote something that appears to agree with you. That is not how science is done. Science is done by looking at evidence and reason. Is there any reason to believe that it is logically impossible for matter to produce consciousness?

I certainly don't see that Harris asserts that it is logically impossible. In the work you cite, he says,

• we do not know why it is “like something” to be what we are. The fact that the universe is illuminated where you stand—that your thoughts and moods and sensations have a qualitative character—is a mystery, exceeded only by the mystery that there should be something rather than nothing in this universe. How is it that unconscious events can give rise to consciousness? Not only do we have no idea, but it seems impossible to imagine what sort of idea could fit in the space provided. Therefore, although science may ultimately show us how to truly maximize human well-being, it may still fail to dispel the fundamental mystery of our mental life.
  

In what sense does, "may fail to dispel the fundamental mystery of our mental life" mean, "it is logically impossible for science to dispel the fundamental mystery of mental life [consciousness]"? I don't see anywhere that Harris says that it is impossible. Why do you use him as evidence it is impossible?

Harris is talking about experience, about the fact that it is like something to be human. He admits that he has no idea why this is so. Nobody understands why it is like something to be human. It is indeed a mystery.

How does any of this have anything to do with the original post I posted here:

There I said,

As I see it, the mind is nothing more than a set of actions, such as remembering, being aware, thinking, and deciding. 

What is doing these actions? Surely the brain is a key player. Are other physical entities involved? Perhaps. Are other non-physical entities involved? I think we can rule that out be definition. After all, if any entity affects something physical, then it seems to me, by definition, that entity would be physical. (see https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/physical)

If there are other entities involved in the set of actions that we refer to as mind, I do not see that their contribution to any continuation of those activities after death would be significant. For, from all we can see, when the brain is damaged, it affects all those activities. One would think that death, which is the ultimate in brain damage, would be the ultimate in shutting down all mental activities.

That has nothing to do with what it means to have human conscious experience. So why are we having endless discussion of what it means to have conscious human experience? That has nothing to do with this thread as it is titled, or with my point I am making on this thread.

Even if it is logically impossible for physical brains to experience consciousness--an assertion you never proved--how does that in any way negate that, "If there are other entities involved in the set of actions that we refer to as mind, I do not see that their contribution to any continuation of those activities after death would be significant"?

All of your arguments seem to insist that there is something beside the brain that is involved in consciousness. But you are notoriously vague on what you think this something is. From the beginning, I have acknowledged that such a thing might exist. Whatever it is, you have not shown that this could continue the activities that my mind does after my brain is gone.

Again, you simply assert that it is logically impossible for consciousness to come from material things.

In what sense does, "may fail to dispel the fundamental mystery of our mental life" mean, "it is logically impossible for science to dispel the fundamental mystery of mental life [consciousness]"? I don't see anywhere that Harris says that it is impossible. Why do you use him as evidence it is impossible?

Harris is talking about experience, about the fact that it is like something to be human. He admits that he has no idea why this is so. Nobody understands why it is like something to be human. It is indeed a mystery.

How does any of this have anything to do with the original post I posted here:

All of your arguments seem to insist that there is something beside the brain that is involved in consciousness. But you are notoriously vague on what you think this something is. From the beginning, I have acknowledged that such a thing might exist. Whatever it is, you have not shown that this could continue the activities that my mind does after my brain is gone.

Harris doesn't address these head-on as you request.  I don't want to draw your attention from Sci's response, but I will try to frame the issue from my personal point of view.

The question of consciousness being fully casual from physical processes is dead in the water, as soon as science started to measure information.  The "something else" that is involved with awareness and functional biological information processing is the objective meanings in an informational environment.  It is not an object structured by materials and energy, it is an object structured from bits and bytes in the local environment and the ability for a logical response to personalize outcomes.  The activity is not measured by electro-chemical charges, but by the structuring of relations.

This is a methodological argument.  It reduces the fine argument of Chalmers, et all -- to a simple statement.  You will not get a restructuring of probabilistic outcomes, different that predicted by physics/materials science -- without a change in the informational states of the system.  Changes measured in information science units. 

Living things do exactly that when customizing to address their own needs.  They change probable outcomes to match an inner environment of states.  You cannot have a strictly limited field of physical measurements (SI units) and expect a direct change in intentional actions.  For that, you need a separate set of variables and equations.  The tools of information science parse behavior and intelligence.  Ecology of a real environment can be measured and their informational actions are mapped to causes.  The keystone of energy is the physical observation of applied force.

The keystone of information science is the observed outcomes from structuring a decision, based on learning.

There is no way to go from a data-set of positional locations, material properties and ambient forces and get a direct quantum answer of "move now is best for me".  Measure the information and meaningful relations in the environment, contrast with expected outcomes and - voila' - a science method that can predict outcomes where mind has changed events from natural and inanimate - to natural outcomes from the information processing native in living things.

You need units of measure from logical inference, of mutual knowledge and understanding, as well as from thermodynamics.  Thermodynamics is where the changes in local probability are quantified after learning has taken place.