Dualism versus (neutral) monism, consciousness, quantum mechanics [Night Shift split]

I can't imagine any science ever discovering any variety of any philosophy concerning mind because mind is not physical and, as you said, "all that science can do is perform physical experiments."  That doesn't prevent us discussing on a purely philosophical level the ideas that make most sense to us.  We can, however study the processes of the mind, such as the brain's extraordinary work while asleep, which is the title of this thread.

That was a line of thought that was running in my head as I wrote my previous contribution. However this is the point at which philosophy and science muddle together. I mean if we postulate that a brain thinks without a non-material partner, and we claim to believe in a Monism that contributes something essential to the operation of a brain doesn't that mean that there has to be an interaction between the part of the brain which is mental and the physical stuff?

In other words I suspect all the talk of Monism is more of a confusion made built out of renaming things (the non-material part of the brain) and the mental component of a Monistic brain.

I am now fascinated as to whether the concept of a Monsim is inherently contradictory, and I am the first to notice it - which seems kind of unlikely, I agree!

David

I like this view too.  I suspect that dualism supports defining and exploring but isn't literally true.  We tend to separate things because it is instinctive to do so and this creates models of reality that we take literally.  My tentative view at the moment is that all is information and is only experientially different.  How do you feel about information science?  I think it can explain a whole lot of stuff that would otherwise be difficult to explain.

It may well be a good instinct.  Carefully separating phenomena into two separate categories has served science at the highest levels.  Especially when they remain complimentary in predicting outcomes.  Science jumped ahead when energy and work got formal definitions in the early 1800's, cleaving them from particles and objects.  The materials science focused on objects, likewise got the focus it needed and "magical" substances fell out of view.

I am not a dualist, saying three or more environments can be apprehended.  I see information science describing one environment as does physics describe another.  Moral, aesthetic, and spiritual perception may well be the third.  Seeing the environments of the physical and informational as being analogous, brings an ability to view them as two methodologies connecting exactly, with four categories.  Two classes of structure and two of action.  
 
Information science is not seen as holistically as is physical science, but that is changing.  Shannon excluded the meanings of symbols in his equations of information theory.  Yet, individual meaning and the meanings of messages have plenty of observations of reality in the fields of linguistics, math, logic, functionality and social sciences.  To me these are the analog of physics where the actions of knowing and understanding are parsed.  Information theory bits and bytes are the partner to meanings that are based in objective data and from mutual meanings of individual knowers.  Material science and information theory are the structural two categories.  Forces compare with volition and understanding as the active side of information objects.

Information science leaped forward with getting to the bottom of communication, when meanings and function were separated.  Putting back the "fire in the equations" is the step when seeing information science as the mate of physical environments.  Minds don't make meanings, there get them by processing information.

We obviously disagree completely. I am genuinely very interested in a list of this evidence you refer to, and how it overturns the neurological research evidence for my interactional dualist position that I outlined in post #59 at https://psiencequest.net/forums/thread-n...1#pid56301 . I agree that the interaction problem is severe, but feel that my cited counter-evidence based on physical neurological research is even more powerful, enough to overcome it. It seems an assessment has to be along the lines of the abductive argument to the best of several competing explanations. 

In particular, I would be interested in your assessment of how the research-derived functions of the various neurological structures of the brain that I partially enumerated are not likely to be what they look to be - part of a vast interactional dualist receiver/transducer-like system, and if so what their true functions really are. The old abductive reasoning adage might be apropos, that if it walks like a duck and looks like a duck and sounds like a duck it probably really is a duck and not a swan. 

My basic argument boils down to the observation that regardless of the (arguable) absence of a plausible interactional mechanism, the research evidence on the functions of the brain's many specialized structures looks very much to be implementing the several preliminary stages of physical neurological/spirit causal transduction that could be expected under the interactional dualist model. If not, then what are these vastly complex structures really doing?  Of course, the common materialist explanation is typically that this vast apparatus is generating consciousness.

Resolving this conflict would amount to identifying the true functions of the brain under the neutral monist (or idealist) model, which so far at least to me seems always to be couched mostly in philosophical generalizations rather than getting down to the nitty gritty of incorporating and accounting for the actual vast quasi-mechanisms of the brain.

We seem to agree on a fundamental point: consciousness, or qualia, eludes objective description and cannot be distilled into any computational process. Our divergence lies in your belief in the necessity of a spiritual realm beyond our physical existence. In contrast to your argument about the neurological structures of the brain, I attribute the complexity of the human brain to our remarkable sensory capabilities, particularly our vision, and our highly adaptable anatomy.

The human anatomy is exceptionally versatile, offering numerous survival advantages across various environments. Bipedalism, for example, not only enables efficient movement over long distances but also allows for the use of hands in carrying objects and tools. This, combined with an upright stance, improves our ability to see further. Moreover, the human hand, with its dexterity and opposable thumb, is crucial for tool use and fine motor tasks. Compared to other primates, such as chimpanzees, humans possess superior visual acuity, largely due to a denser concentration of cone cells in the fovea, facilitating detailed visual tasks and craftsmanship.

A personal anecdote illustrates the brain's role in our mental functions. A relative of mine, who survived a stroke, developed prosopagnosia, losing the ability to recognize faces, yet retains the ability to navigate daily life independently. This condition underscores the brain's specialized functions, challenging the simplicity with which we often view the world and arguing against dualism. When the brain is compromised, so too is our mental existence. Instances of individuals emerging from persistent vegetative states contradict dualistic expectations of a spiritual existence separate from the physical body, as these 'awakenings' resemble more of a system reboot, with no recollection of the elapsed time.

A concluding remark on the transmitter theory. David references a theory by Henry Stapp (and previously Von Neumann) within physics, suggesting consciousness might influence the outcome of quantum superpositions. This hypothesis offers a potential bridge between a realm of consciousness and physical reality, yet remains unverifiable with current scientific methods. It's also not clear to me within this framework how sensory information is 'transmitted' back to the external consciousness. Maybe David will elaborate.

By the way, there is more evidence that the mental faculties of abstract thought and logic must be solely part of the immaterial soul rather than spirit functions mirrored by and interfaced with by the brain. Famous neurosurgeon and epilepsy researcher Wilder Penfield noted that there are no intellectual seizures — that is, that epileptic seizures never evoke abstract intellectual thought. He also noted that during his fifty years of clinical practice and research, stimulation of the brain — either by seizures or by a neurosurgeon during surgery — never evoked abstract thinking. Finally, patients who have had their brains essentially cut in half to eliminate siezures have completely normal powers of abstract thought after the procedure. They are still one person.

I think this is perfectly explainable within monism while it of course is quite a problem for reductionism.

We seem to agree on a fundamental point: consciousness, or qualia, eludes objective description and cannot be distilled into any computational process. Our divergence lies in your belief in the necessity of a spiritual realm beyond our physical existence. In contrast to your argument about the neurological structures of the brain, I attribute the complexity of the human brain to our remarkable sensory capabilities, particularly our vision, and our highly adaptable anatomy.

The human anatomy is exceptionally versatile, offering numerous survival advantages across various environments. Bipedalism, for example, not only enables efficient movement over long distances but also allows for the use of hands in carrying objects and tools. This, combined with an upright stance, improves our ability to see further. Moreover, the human hand, with its dexterity and opposable thumb, is crucial for tool use and fine motor tasks. Compared to other primates, such as chimpanzees, humans possess superior visual acuity, largely due to a denser concentration of cone cells in the fovea, facilitating detailed visual tasks and craftsmanship.

A personal anecdote illustrates the brain's role in our mental functions. A relative of mine, who survived a stroke, developed prosopagnosia, losing the ability to recognize faces, yet retains the ability to navigate daily life independently. This condition underscores the brain's specialized functions, challenging the simplicity with which we often view the world and arguing against dualism. When the brain is compromised, so too is our mental existence. Instances of individuals emerging from persistent vegetative states contradict dualistic expectations of a spiritual existence separate from the physical body, as these 'awakenings' resemble more of a system reboot, with no recollection of the elapsed time.

A concluding remark on the transmitter theory. David references a theory by Henry Stapp (and previously Von Neumann) within physics, suggesting consciousness might influence the outcome of quantum superpositions. This hypothesis offers a potential bridge between a realm of consciousness and physical reality, yet remains unverifiable with current scientific methods. It's also not clear to me within this framework how sensory information is 'transmitted' back to the external consciousness. Maybe David will elaborate.


I think this is perfectly explainable within monism while it of course is quite a problem for reductionism.

On your claim that most of the complexity of the brain is due to sensory processing. According to much research, the brain enables the following long list of functions only one item of which is sensory processing. Most of the neurons of the brain are occupied in non-sensory processing of various kinds that can be interpreted as parts of a vastly complex multiple-stage interactional mechanism. 

Thoughts and decisions; problem solving, thinking, finding meaning.
Memories and emotions including happiness and sadness responses.
Perception of various sensations: sight including processing of shapes, colors and image movement, also hearing, smell, touch and pain.
Movements (motor function): the faculty of conscious agency, turning mental decisions into actions in the world.
Speech and language functions.
Balance and coordination.
Fight or flight response (stress response).
Automatic behavior such as breathing, heart rate, sleep and temperature control.
Autonomic regulation of organ function.

As can be seen, the brain enables most all mental functions not just sensory. The term "enables" is typically used in such compilations simply because it is quite descriptive of what seems to be going on: an immaterial conscious awareness capable of agency manifesting in the physical by intricately interfacing with a supremely complex neurological system.

Sorry, but you still need to identify what functions the bulk of the neurological structures of the brain are accomplishing, if it isn't enabling this interactional interface.

On the "reboot" from a vegetative state argument: of course - when the physical brain is damaged, the mind appears also to be damaged. But this is only an appearance, since the functioning of the immaterial spirit is also severely impaired while embodied because it is intricately enmeshed in the damaged neurological apparatus. Accordingly, under such conditions as your suggested persistent vegetative state consciousness including consciousness of time are damped out. And as long as the spirit is embodied consciousness will be subject to any damage and distortions incurred in the neurological apparatus it is inhabiting. 

It would be interesting to hear how monism can account for this picture. We agree that materialist reductionism is a no-show in this contest.

It would be interesting to hear how monism can account for this picture. We agree that materialist reductionism is a no-show in this contest.

I fully agree with your statements above.

How can Idealism account for this... well, mind can create and embody ideas via the faculty of imagination ~ give them form and function, which is understood by their perceived qualities. I'm not of the opinion that mind in the sense that we understand it could be capable of creating the archetypal forms we perceive in this reality ~ human, oak tree, star, galaxy, what-have-you.

No, it must be an intelligence on a scale far exceeding anything imaginable or capable by any incarnate entity's mind.

Which then brings me to a sort of Neutral Monism... with the neutral substance being... a sort of supra-mind, supra-entity, supra-beingness, of which mind as we understand it is merely a vastly limited in scope and capability being.

So... a sort of "Idealism", except with a transcendental supra-mind or supra-minds being the origin of reality and existence.

Words sort of... fail at this point. I think I've had a possible experience with one such entity, but I have no means to even begin describing such a incomprehensible vastness.

On the "reboot" from a vegetative state argument: of course - when the physical brain is damaged, the mind appears also to be damaged. But this is only an appearance, since the functioning of the immaterial spirit is also severely impaired while embodied because it is intricately enmeshed in the damaged neurological apparatus.

I believe the argument presented is not robust; it resembles an attempt to bridge gaps in understanding rather than providing solid evidence. While I acknowledge that some of my arguments might also seem like attempts to 'fill in the gaps'—for example, the question of why humans have such large brains—the major problem with your radio transmitter analogy is that it directly violates the laws of thermodynamics. This makes it exceedingly unlikely, given that every technological artifact produced by science, including the computer devices we're using for this conversation, is based on a precise understanding of these laws. It's not necessary for us to reach a consensus in this conversation. However, I cannot overlook the insights provided by physics since the era of Galileo, which compel me to align my worldview accordingly.

I believe the argument presented is not robust; it resembles an attempt to bridge gaps in understanding rather than providing solid evidence. While I acknowledge that some of my arguments might also seem like attempts to 'fill in the gaps'—for example, the question of why humans have such large brains—the major problem with your radio transmitter analogy is that it directly violates the laws of thermodynamics. This makes it exceedingly unlikely, given that every technological artifact produced by science, including the computer devices we're using for this conversation, is based on a precise understanding of these laws. It's not necessary for us to reach a consensus in this conversation. However, I cannot overlook the insights provided by physics since the era of Galileo, which compel me to align my worldview accordingly.

Surely if our normal reality is actually in contact with another one, it becomes an open system.

God knows (!!) whether the entropy concept survives the change of perspective involved in considering a spiritual reality - I suspect it doesn't because that reality is non-physical!

Entropy continuously increases only if you consider a complete system.

David

Surely if our normal reality is actually in contact with another one, it becomes an open system.

Wouldn’t that entail that the other reality is also a physical system? 😄

In any case, I believe we agree that the interactions of consciousness with the physical substance is likely to intersect with the mysteries of quantum mechanics.

I believe the argument presented is not robust; it resembles an attempt to bridge gaps in understanding rather than providing solid evidence. While I acknowledge that some of my arguments might also seem like attempts to 'fill in the gaps'—for example, the question of why humans have such large brains—the major problem with your radio transmitter analogy is that it directly violates the laws of thermodynamics. This makes it exceedingly unlikely, given that every technological artifact produced by science, including the computer devices we're using for this conversation, is based on a precise understanding of these laws. It's not necessary for us to reach a consensus in this conversation. However, I cannot overlook the insights provided by physics since the era of Galileo, which compel me to align my worldview accordingly.

I can only repeat my challenge, which you have not yet engaged with: "Sorry, but (then) you still need to identify what functions the bulk of the neurological structures of the brain are accomplishing, if it isn't enabling this interactional interface." Whatever these so far unidentified functions are, they must be very important since they are so metabolically costly. And I add that the only other function for this vastly complex system that comes to mind would presumably be to actually generate consciousness, which explanation we apparently agree is an untenable materialist reductionist position.

In the absence of an adequate response to this issue I can only suggest that it is perhaps a standoff where the preponderance of physical evidence points to my position, and (perhaps), basic physical thermodynamical theory claims such an interactional mechanism is impossible. I could only suggest that there may be only two outcomes on this issue: either somehow the neurophysiological data is false (that seems impossible since it is based on countless research studies covering fmri scanning, observed effects of various diseases, and many other types of research), or there somehow is a special case exception to the thermodynamic considerations in the special case of spirit embodiment. After all, we have no sure knowledge of what "laws" govern the spiritual realm, but we do know for sure that that it exists from the extensive evidence of many kinds of paranormal phenomena.

Also, there is no response to my observations regarding my presented evidence that the mental faculties of abstract thought and logic must be solely part of the immaterial soul rather than spirit functions mirrored by and interfaced with by the brain.m

I would make a point of distinguishing the continuity of consciousness beyond the body from this question of two substances.

All that is required for the former is that there is enough rules variability in the Monist "stuff", the key example for me being the ease at which one can have play a ghost in a video game after the physical body dies.

However I would also concede that there is functional Dualism there, in that the experience of the body can be switched to some new vehicle (subtle body, body in a different reality, or new physical incarnation on Earth).

If one rejects the afterlife accounts...there still seems to be a kind of Informational/Physical Dualism?