An excellent concise and accurate statement of the interactive dualism theory of mind

[Laird]

I feel that you fundamentally misunderstand both Idealism and Neutral Monism.

With respect, I think that the reverse is the case. At worst, I might be charged with misunderstanding your conceptions of idealism and/or neutral monism.

For Objective Idealism, God is the ultimate substance.

I think you mean subjective or maybe absolute idealism. Objective idealism doesn't entail God, and sees objective reality as a set of mind-independent and thus impersonal ideas.

For Neutral Monism, I consider Spirit to be the neutral, ultimate substance.

By which definition of "substance"?

God and Spirit are not "things"

I think you misunderstand the meaning of "thing" in this philosophical context. As a "substance" in the philosophical sense, a "thing" is simply an entity which is primary and not derivative, and which has properties and attributes but is not a property or attribute itself. "Thing" in this philosophical context does not connote an object comprised of matter as in the everyday definition of "thing".

In the philosophical sense, as a "substance", God, whether finite or infinite, very much is a "thing". However, you seem to be using "God" and "Spirit" in a non-standard sense (given what follows), so who really knows?

they are infinities that exist prior to form, which is inherent limitation.

An infinity is as it seems ~ it is infinite potential, with all possibilities, known and unknown, undetermined. Form imposes limits on infinity, granting it qualities, perhaps quantities, granting it existence.

You seem to be conflating "infinite versus finite" with "potential versus actual" and with "formlessness versus form". I'm not sure how that is best disentangled, nor whether you'd even want it to be, so from here on I'll simply assume that on your terms, infinite = potential = formless, and finite = actual = form.

For Objective Idealism, God is the Universal Mind

Again, I think you mean subjective or maybe absolute idealism here, not objective idealism.

albeit composed of pure infinities, thus having none of the qualities of any mind we can conceive of. Thus "mind" is just a label, albeit perhaps with connotations that invite confusion.

So, on your terms, on idealism, to start with, there is only (infinite) potential. The problem here is that pure potential cannot itself actualise anything, so it is unclear how a real world came into being.

For Neutral Monism, there is no issue, despite having many similarities with Objective Idealism ~ the ultimate substance is not "Mind". It is something beyond the usual definitions. Spirit can compose all things ~ it is infinite, without definition, thus to define it is to limit it, to grant it quality, form, purpose.

It is again unclear what you mean by this ultimate "substance". Again, you need to define that term ("substance").

On a broad reading in context, it seems that all you're saying is that before anything came into existence, there was a formless, infinite, potential that you're simply choosing to call a "substance" - even though that's neither the philosophical nor everyday meaning of that word - and which somehow became actualised into both mind and matter.

Well, fine, but this is simply an origin story for an ontological substance dualism.

It's also not the conventional understanding of neutral monism, which - according to its Wikipedia page - David Chalmers has said is not different in essence from his property dualism, which itself is epiphenomenalism by another name. It does though seem to be a broad, vague, and kind of confused term, so, again, who knows?

If this physical reality is simply a manifestation within the Mind of God, of Spirit, then it simply a form of existence.

Now you seem to revert from whatever it is you mean by "neutral monism" to monistic idealism, some of the fatal flaws with which I outlined in my first post in this thread - that is, unless you are again using a non-standard definition of "mind" here. It would be helpful if you defined this term too.

The higher spiritual realities are also a form of existence, albeit just much less dense and of a different character. Mind, as a form, a limitation, has no issue interacting with matter, another sort of form, limitation.

How does incarnate mind interact with matter? Through resonance, through attraction, through emotion, perhaps. The mind, the aura, the slice of soul that it is, organizes the material elements in such a way that resonates with that form. Perhaps the inspiration here is Sheldrake's Morphic Resonance...

Consider also that how we know of the physical world is purely through the mental senses. So we never bear witness to the true underlying, perhaps quantum nature of the physical, which itself must have an origin in Spirit.

Consider how matter exists as being form, limitation. with particular qualities that define it. Infinity defined by boundaries. Like mind is.

The problem of interaction is thus purely a lack of understanding between what the actual nature of the different substances are.

To put it in Daoist terms... Yang, Heaven, limitlessness, only comes into being when Yin, Earth, limitation, is defined. Thus, two distinct substances arise from the same origin, Taiji, which are also the other's origin ~ Heaven comes from Earth, and Earth from Heaven, because before Earth existed, Heaven was simply Taiji, infinity without distinction, thus without defined existence.

This is all fine as far as it goes, but it's also compatible with substance dualism. You simply offer an origin story (an infinity of formless potential somehow - you don't specify how - actualising into finite forms) for what ultimately is a substance dualism. OK. No problem. It doesn't, though, seem to really be either neutral monism nor idealism proper.

[Laird]

@Sciborg_S_Patel and @Valmar in particular: before responding, please note that rather than explicitly laying out the conceptual system with which I'm working, I chose to imply it via a series of specific responses to specific things you guys have written in your posts. Please, then, read my responses to both of you in full to get a full sense of it, and consider those responses holistically. I can lay it all out explicitly if you'd prefer though.

@Laird

Do you have any comment on my position, that philosophy that gets far ahead of science is not very useful?

To me, we live in a time when most scientists that are interested in consciousness either assume materialism and perhaps assume that consciousness will 'emerge' out of the complexity of the brain.

To me, this is definitely inconsistent with NDE research, to name but one area.

Do we need a new term such as "Practical philosophy" to distinguish the question as to what is the ultimate nature of consciousness and its relation to matter, from the question as to what philosophy science should assume if it can be prized away from materialism or panpsychism?

David

@Sciborg_S_Patel and @Valmar in particular: before responding, please note that rather than explicitly laying out the conceptual system with which I'm working, I chose to imply it via a series of specific responses to specific things you guys have written in your posts. Please, then, read my responses to both of you in full to get a full sense of it, and consider those responses holistically. I can lay it all out explicitly if you'd prefer though.

If it's already explicitly laid out somewhere else, I could just read that.

I do think I need to take a step back and really see how everyone is defining "substance", as well as what I consider a substance to be.

I will admit to not really understanding what a "person-thing" is, especially if it's distinct from ectoplasm, apparitions, the NDEr that is seen by others, and any other "spiritual" matter.

[Laird]

@Laird

Do you have any comment on my position, that philosophy that gets far ahead of science is not very useful?

To me, we live in a time when most scientists that are interested in consciousness either assume materialism and perhaps assume that consciousness will 'emerge' out of the complexity of the brain.

To me, this is definitely inconsistent with NDE research, to name but one area.

Do we need a new term such as "Practical philosophy" to distinguish the question as to what is the ultimate nature of consciousness and its relation to matter, from the question as to what philosophy science should assume if it can be prized away from materialism or panpsychism?

David

I think your position is probably fair, but I'm not really sure about the way you evidence it: you've suggested, for example, that had Newton discovered General Relativity right at the start, it would have been unworkably advanced, but I'm not convinced that folk even back then wouldn't have figured out pretty quickly from General Relativity the approximations that classical mechanics uses.

Anyhow, I do think that there is an interplay between science and philosophy, and even that the boundaries between the two are very blurry and porous, so it does seem to be very helpful for them to be at a similar level of sophistication.

I agree that the scientific paradigm needs to move beyond the philosophy of physicalism; I disagree that the ultimate right move is idealism or even neutral monism. I think that dualism is not just a practical starting point, but the right ultimate destination, albeit that its details can and need to be finessed, including in the light of scientific discoveries.

[Laird]

If it's already explicitly laid out somewhere else, I could just read that.

Unfortunately, it's not.

I do think I need to take a step back and really see how everyone is defining "substance", as well as what I consider a substance to be.

OK. I provided the definition I'm working with right up front in my first post to this thread.

I will admit to not really understanding what a "person-thing" is, especially if it's distinct from ectoplasm, apparitions, the NDEr that is seen by others, and any other "spiritual" matter.

Perhaps this will help to explain:

Consider that on Analytic Idealism there is a singular mind sometimes referred to as "That Which Experiences". That's a person-thing. On dualism, there is simply more than one, plus a whole lot of "stuff" in which they exist. Person-things can incarnate into bodies which are made of physical stuff. Ectoplasm is made of a different type of stuff.

Apparitions and NDErs seen by others might either be persons inhabiting so-called "subtle" bodies made of yet another type of stuff, or persons projecting (perhaps not deliberately; perhaps beyond their control) a form directly to another person, without that form actually existing as any type of stuff.

Unfortunately, it's not.


OK. I provided the definition I'm working with right up front in my first post to this thread.


Perhaps this will help to explain:

Consider that on Analytic Idealism there is a singular mind sometimes referred to as "That Which Experiences". That's a person-thing. On dualism, there is simply more than one, plus a whole lot of "stuff" in which they exist. Person-things can incarnate into bodies which are made of physical stuff. Ectoplasm is made of a different type of stuff.

Apparitions and NDErs seen by others might either be persons inhabiting so-called "subtle" bodies made of yet another type of stuff, or persons projecting (perhaps not deliberately; perhaps beyond their control) a form directly to another person, without that form actually existing as any type of stuff.

Can Persons exist without being a part of any kind of stuff?

Or is a Person distinct from their embodiment, but nevertheless always embodied in some way?

[Laird]

Can Persons exist without being a part of any kind of stuff?

I think so, yes, but I can't know for sure.

I think you must too, given that you think pluralistic idealism is plausible. Pluralistic idealism is just a bunch of persons existing with no stuff existing, and thus no kind of stuff that they could be a part of.

I think so, yes, but I can't know for sure.

I think you must too, given that you think pluralistic idealism is plausible. Pluralistic idealism is just a bunch of persons existing with no stuff existing, and thus no kind of stuff that they could be a part of.

Yeah I am not sure about this either.

I think it's a challenge because Immateriality, in a strict philosophical sense, doesn't seem to be solved by subtle bodies or soul stuff. Even in those cases, as noted by your division, you have "stuff" that can only have a correlation with a Person's mental life for the same reasons a material/physical brain can only be correlated with thought.

This does raise my confidence in Survival, though it also makes it feel more mysterious as to what Survival is like...

[Laird]

Even in those cases, as noted by your division, you have "stuff" that can be only have a correlation with a Person's mental life for the same reasons a material/physical brain can only be correlated with thought.

Yes, exactly. I think that that's a good reason to consider a person not to be comprised of stuff - of any type.

A while back though I did speculate in another thread, riffing off my interpretation of Analytic Idealism, that a person's mental life is a type of energy ("mental energy") which could have an external appearance - a form. I was pulled up on that by @nbtruthman, probably quite rightly. He objected (paraphrased in this context) that that would turn experience into a type of stuff, which it decidedly is not.