An excellent concise and accurate statement of the interactive dualism theory of mind

Don't be disingenuous. As I've pointed out already, I tried that approach and you rejected it.

I didn't "reject" it so much as I didn't agree with, and seeked further discussion to attempt to find a muddle ground.

I'm willing to listen as long as you listen, but it seems that you aren't willing to listen to my side of it, so interest does wane.

I'm a fan of two-sided conversations ~ it gets my intellectual side sparked.

In truth, you're just as rigid as anybody else here, if not more so. Take your own signature to heart.

I do not consider myself "rigid" as you claim ~ though I do tend to get defensive when I feel like I'm being unfairly dismissed.

As for my signature, that's an every day thing for me. I am well aware of my flaws.

Though I'm not so certain that you are.

[Laird]

It might be that Itay Shani's defence of cosmopsychism against the decombination problem in his paper Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysics of Experience (which I analysed in my thread The decombination problem, related arguments, and potential solutions: an analysis) could be summarised as affirming cosmopsychism as a priority monism rather than an existence monism. It might be worth asking him whether he'd be comfortable with that characterisation.

Belatedly following up on this suggestion of mine that I made in a footnote:

Rereading relevant bits of Itay's paper, I found that he explicitly affirms cosmopsychism as a priority monism (and explicitly differentiates it from existence monism by rejecting existence monism). I'm glad I didn't contact him to ask after all. Quoting him from the paper:

The second theoretical commitment of the model is to priority monism as defined by Schaffer (2010), namely, to the view that the cosmos as a whole, is prior to its parts in the sense that every proper part of the cosmos depends on the whole, asymmetrically.

For my part, I see no overriding reasons in favour of existence monism.

Belatedly following up on this suggestion of mine that I made in a footnote:

Rereading relevant bits of Itay's paper, I found that he explicitly affirms cosmopsychism as a priority monism (and explicitly differentiates it from existence monism by rejecting existence monism). I'm glad I didn't contact him to ask after all. Quoting him from the paper:

This is the frustrating part of Philosophy, because Naomi Fisher seems to use it the exact opposite way where Priority is given to the Many over the One that grounds them.

I can see why Whitehead made up new vocabulary, OTOH this is probably why his views are not well known.

[Laird]

This is the frustrating part of Philosophy, because Naomi Fisher seems to use it the exact opposite way where Priority is given to the Many over the One that grounds them.

Can you share an example of this usage of hers?

Can you share an example of this usage of hers?

Can’t recall the timestamp but it came up in this interview. 

[Laird]

Can’t recall the timestamp but it came up in this interview. 

I watched it and found all of the intervals in which priority monism is discussed. They are:

• 2:14 - 2:29 (quoting from the publisher's blurb that you yourself quoted in that post)
  
• 23:01 - 23:16
  
• 30:18 - 31:10 (the interviewer's question) followed by 31:10 - 34:38 (Naomi's answer), especially from 32:16 onwards.
  

I didn't get what you seem to have gotten out of her words. She doesn't seem to me to be giving priority to the many over the one; her usage seems to be consistent with Itay Shani's. Could you please listen again and let us know whether, on reevaluation, you agree?

I watched it and found all of the intervals in which priority monism is discussed. They are:

• 2:14 - 2:29 (quoting from the publisher's blurb that you yourself quoted in that post)
  
• 23:01 - 23:16
  
• 30:18 - 31:10 (the interviewer's question) followed by 31:10 - 34:38 (Naomi's answer), especially from 32:16 onwards.
  

I didn't get what you seem to have gotten out of her words. She doesn't seem to me to be giving priority to the many over the one; her usage seems to be consistent with Itay Shani's. Could you please listen again and let us know whether, on reevaluation, you agree?

Re-listening now...Perhaps my error is not understanding Shani's philosophy?

Schelling-via-Fisher says the Many are grounded by the Absolute but also distinct from It, but to me it seems Shani - last I read anything about him or his own words - was endorsing the idea of One True Subject?

[Laird]

Re-listening now...Perhaps my error is not understanding Shani's philosophy?

Schelling-via-Fisher says the Many are grounded by the Absolute but also distinct from It, but to me it seems Shani - last I read anything about him or his own words - was endorsing the idea of One True Subject?

Ah, now you're alluding to something similar to what I was alluding to in the bit of my footnote that I left out of my earlier quote:

Personally, I'm not convinced that this distinction is all that meaningful (on idealism), but it seemed worth drawing those terms to your attention anyway.

I agree that Itay Shani's cosmopsychism seems to be essentially the same as Bernardo Kastrup's Analytic Idealism, to the point that it was Bernardo who introduced me to that paper of Itay's in which he defends against the decombination problem by presenting cosmopsychism as a priority monism rather than an existence monism.

Bernardo's Analytic Idealism very much seems to be an existence monism (i.e., on your terms, a "One True Subject" idealism), so it's not clear that Itay's affirmation that his system is a priority monism despite that it is otherwise identical to Bernardo's system which is an existence monism really changes anything.

They both use the same water metaphor in which there is only one mind (the water) which decombines into waves or whirlpools or similar. Whether a system conforming to this metaphor can rightly be characterised as a priority monism rather than an existence monism is at least open to question, but, in the end, the label doesn't change the reality, which still seems to me to be inherently incoherent: either there is one mind or there is a plurality of minds; both can't be simultaneously true, whereas both systems seem to contend that this is true.