Tallis on Memory: A Smile at Waterloo Station

A Smile at Waterloo Station

Let us return to that smile. It is supposed to be ‘stored’ in the changed state of excitability of a neural circuit resulting from my exposure to it. The state of the circuit is ‘a present propensity to react’, and when it does react, the memory is ‘activated’. That is to say, the memory is a present state of part of my nervous system: a physical state of a physical entity, namely my brain. This state has somehow to be about, or refer to, the smile. Yet it is difficult to understand how physical activity can be ‘about’ something other than itself. We encounter this difficulty in the case of the perception of something even actually present. The perceptual state is about the thing perceived. Outside of the brains of sentient beings, no other physical event has this ‘aboutness’. But understanding this aboutness presents an even greater challenge in the case of physical states that are supposed to correspond to memories: the states have to be about something that is no longer present – that no longer even exists. What’s more, memory in us humans is explicitly memory: it is not simply past experience acting upon us by reverberating in the present. That remembered smile is located by me in the past – indeed, in a past world, which, as John McCrone has put it, is, “a living network of understanding rather than a dormant warehouse of facts.”

Making present something that is past as something past, that is to say, absent, hardly looks like a job that a piece of matter could perform, even a complex electrochemical process in a piece of matter such as a brain. But we need to specify more clearly why not. Material objects are what they are, not what they have been, any more than they are what they will be. Thus a changed synaptic connexion is its present state; it is not also the causes of its present state. Nor is the connection ‘about’ that which caused its changed state or its increased propensity to fire in response to cues. Even less is it about those causes located at a temporal distance from its present state. A paper published in Science last year by Itzhak Fried claiming to solve the problem of memory actually underlines this point. The author found that the same neurons were active in the same way when an individual remembered a scene (actually from The Simpsons) as when they watched it.

So how did people ever imagine that a ‘cerebral deposit’ (to use Henri Bergson’s sardonic phrase) could be about that which caused its altered state? Isn’t it because they smuggled consciousness into their idea of the relationship between the altered synapse and that which caused the alteration, so that they could then imagine that the one could be ‘about’ the other? Once you allow that, then the present state of anything can be a sign of the past events that brought about its present state, and the past can be present. For example, a broken cup can signify to me (a conscious being when I last checked) the unfortunate event that resulted in its unhappy state.

Of course, smuggling in consciousness like this is inadmissible, because the synapses are supposed to supply the consciousness that reaches back in time to the causes of the synapses’ present states. And there is another, more profound reason why the cerebral deposit does not deliver what some neurophysiologists want it to, which goes right to the heart of the nature of the material world and the physicist’s account of its reality – something that this article has been circling round. I am referring to the mystery of tensed time; the mystery of an explicit past, future and present.

That remembered smile is located in the past, so my memory is aware that it reaches across time. In the mind-independent physical world, no event is intrinsically past, present or future: it becomes so only with reference to a conscious, indeed self-conscious, being, who provides the reference point – the now which makes some events past, others future, and yet others present. The temporal depth created by memories, which hold open the distance between that which is here and now and that which is no longer, is a product of consciousness, and is not to be found in the material world. As Einstein wrote in a moving letter at the end of his life, “People like me who believe in physics know that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.” I assume that those who think of memory as a material state of a material object – as a cerebral deposit – also believe in physics – in which case they cannot believe that tensed time exists in the brain, or more specifically, in synapses. A material object such as the brain may have a history that results in its being altered, but the previous state, the fact of alteration, or the time interval between the two states, are not present in the altered state. A synapse, like a broken cup, does not contain its previous state, the event that resulted in its being changed, the fact that it has changed, the elapsed time, or anything else containing the sense of its ‘pastness’ which would be necessary if it were the very material of memory. How could someone ever come to believe it could?

Those who imagine that experiments with Aplysia cast light on memory betray the origin of the erroneous belief that memory is inscribed in matter. The belief is based on a slither from memory as you and I understand it, to learning; from learning to altered behaviour; from altered behaviour to altered properties of the organism; and viola! – the materialisation of memory! However, with Einstein’s help, we can see that sincere materialists must acknowledge that they have no explanation of memory. Instead of thinking that memories can be located in the brain (or even more outrageously, captured in a dish), they ought to hold, along with Bergson, that “memory [cannot] settle within matter” even though (alas), “materiality begets oblivion.” In short, they should take off their dull materialist blinkers and acknowledge the wonderful mystery of memory.

Was hoping you'd post something on Tallis, after mentioning her in the other thread.

Thanks Sciborg!

A Smile at Waterloo Station

I detect synchronicity (in the Jungian sense).  It felt like you were on a corresponding journey, linking these 3 posts. The ideas of Whitehead: about actual occasions instead of "bits of matter", the exploratory comments of Kaufmann regarding the possible as part of reality, the information processing viewpoint of Arvan and the denial of "memory traces" by Raymond Tallis all are tightly interlocking concepts in my own personal untangling of how the world works.  

I detect synchronicity (in the Jungian sense).  It felt like you were on a corresponding journey, linking these 3 posts. The ideas of Whitehead: about actual occasions instead of "bits of matter", the exploratory comments of Kaufmann regarding the possible as part of reality, the information processing viewpoint of Arvan and the denial of "memory traces" by Raymond Tallis all are tightly interlocking concepts in my own personal untangling of how the world works.  

I also think maybe some of Stephen Robbins ideas on translating Bergson's ideas into science could be useful - how do you go from "memories are not in the brain" to explaining how memories relate to the brain's physical structure? Might be of interest to you ->

Bergson and the Holographic Theory

Bergson’s model of time (1889) is perhaps the proto-phenomenological theory. It is part of a larger model of mind (1896) which can be seen in modern light as describing the brain as supporting a modulated wave within a holographic field, wherein subject and object are differentiated not in terms of space, but of time. Bergson’s very concrete model is developed and deepened with Gibson’s ecological model of perception. It is applied to the problems of consciousness, direct realism, qualia and illusions. The model implies an entirely different basis for memory and cognition, and a brief overview is given for the basis of direct memory, compositionality and systematicity

Bergson, Perception and Gibson

Bergson’s 1896 theory of perception/memory assumed a framework anticipating the quantum revolution in physics, the still unrealized implications of this framework contributing to the large neglect of Bergson today. The basics of his model are explored, including the physical concepts he advanced before the crisis in classical physics, his concept of perception as “virtual action” with its relativistic implications, and his unique explication of the subject/object relationship. All form the basis for his solution to the “hard problem.” The relation between Bergson and Gibson as natural compliments is also explored, with Bergson providing the framework that explicates Gibson’s concept of direct perception, with Gibson’s resonance model as a precursor to dynamic systems models of the brain and his reliance on invariance laws defining perceived events providing more detail for the mechanisms Bergson only envisioned from afar, and with Bergson providing the basis for an otherwise missing Gibsonian model of direct memory.

" Your life’s memories could, in principle, be stored in the universe’s structure." by Franco Vazza & Alberto Feletti

The first results from our comparison are truly surprising: Not only are the complexities of the brain and cosmic web actually similar, but so are their structures. The universe may be self-similar across scales that differ in size by a factor of a billion billion billion.

Is the apparent similarity just the human tendency to perceive meaningful patterns in random data (apophenia)? Remarkably enough, the answer seems to be no: Statistical analysis shows these systems do indeed present quantitative similarities. Researchers regularly use a technique called power spectrum analysis to study the large-scale distribution of galaxies. The power spectrum of an image measures the strength of structural fluctuations belonging to a specific spatial scale. In other words, it tells us how many high-frequency and low-frequency notes make the peculiar spatial melody of each image.

A stunning message emerges from the power spectrum graph in Figure 2 (below): The relative distribution of fluctuations in the two networks is remarkably similar, over several orders of magnitude.

" Your life’s memories could, in principle, be stored in the universe’s structure." by Franco Vazza & Alberto Feletti

Perhaps this would be the place to re-post something I mused about in another thread. 

... I awoke one morning recently with an idea about memory which really surprised me as I have no clue what prompted it. The idea was that memory is not a matter of storage but a matter of accessing (or viewing) events that are ever present  - somehow timeless. So we don't have some form of representation of an event encoded and filed in some neurological circuitry but we perform a kind of remote viewing of the event we are trying to remember; an event which still exists in the true timelessness of reality. Remote viewing is far from perfect and can often result in mistakes and misinterpretations. In the same way, recall could also be considered less than reliable. Likewise, imagination may intrude on viewed places or events in the same way that memories could be partially or wholly imagined.

In essence, I reasoned that memory is not about storage but about viewing a live event. Live in the sense that all events are simultaneous and therefore happening "now" even though we experience them in a linear timeline. So, as I tried to explain, recall is not data retrieval from some storage location (as with computers) but a variety of remote viewing. There may be some degree of separation from the event which makes viewing somewhat unreliable. The nature of that separation is another philosophical question because, if it is not in time or space then perhaps it is a loosening of association? I'm struggling for the right words but I hope I'm getting my meaning across.

Perhaps this would be the place to re-post something I mused about in another thread. 


In essence, I reasoned that memory is not about storage but about viewing a live event. Live in the sense that all events are simultaneous and therefore happening "now" even though we experience them in a linear timeline. So, as I tried to explain, recall is not data retrieval from some storage location (as with computers) but a variety of remote viewing. There may be some degree of separation from the event which makes viewing somewhat unreliable. The nature of that separation is another philosophical question because, if it is not in time or space then perhaps it is a loosening of association? I'm struggling for the right words but I hope I'm getting my meaning across.

Which lends itself to the question of a frequent rembering of a pleasant event. 
Is it the event, or a previous  remembering one is revisiting?

Might be relevant:

He Could Not Speak Until They Took Out Half of His Brain by M Mahin

Of these cases of successful hemispherectomy, perhaps none is more astonishing than a case of a boy named Alex who did not start speaking until the left half of his brain was removed. A scientific paper describing the case says that Alex “failed to develop speech throughout early boyhood.” He could apparently say only one word (“mumma”) before his operation to cure epilepsy seizures. But then following a hemispherectomy (also called a hemidecortication) in which half of his brain was removed at age 8.5, “and withdrawal of anticonvulsants when he was more than 9 years old, Alex suddenly began to acquire speech.” We are told, “His most recent scores on tests of receptive and expressive language place him at an age equivalent of 8–10 years,” and that by age 10 he could “converse with copious and appropriate speech, involving some fairly long words.” Astonishingly, the boy who could not speak with a full brain could speak well after half of his brain was removed. The half of the brain removed was the left half – the very half that scientists tell us is the half that has more to do with language than the right half. 

Cases like this make a mockery of scientist claims to understand the human brain. When scientists discuss scientific knowledge relating to memory, they almost never discuss the most relevant thing they could discuss, the cases of high brain function after hemispherectomy operations in which half of the brain is removed. Instead the scientists cherry-pick information, and describe a few experiments and facts carefully selected to support their dogmas, such as the dogma that brains store memories, and brains make minds. They also fail to discuss the extremely relevant research of John Lorber, who documented many cases of high-functioning humans who had lost almost all of their brain due to hydroencephaly.

Mahin has another blog re: Mind-is-not-Brain:

https://headtruth.blogspot.com/

Memory without a Trace

Stephen Braude

"To download a pdf, please click here."

So why is the concept of a memory trace fundamentally nonsensical? Let’s begin with an analogy drawn from John Heil’s outstanding critique of trace theory.4 Suppose I invite many guests to a party, and suppose I want to remember all the people who attended. Accordingly, I ask each guest to leave behind something (a trace) by which I can remember them. Let’s suppose each guest leaves behind a tennis ball. Clearly, I can’t use the balls to accomplish the task of remembering my party guests. For my strategy to work, the guests must deposit something reliably and specifically linked to them, and the balls obviously aren’t differentiated and unambiguous enough to establish a link only with the person who left it.
 
So perhaps it would help if each guest signed his or her own tennis ball or perhaps left a photo of himself or herself stuck to the ball. Unfortunately, this threatens an endless regress of strategies for remembering who attended my party. Nothing reliably (much less uniquely and unambiguously) links the signature or photo to the guest who attended. A guest could mischievously have signed someone else’s name or left behind a photo of another person. Or maybe the signature was illegible (most are), or perhaps the only photo available was of the person twenty-five years earlier (e.g., when he still had hair, or when he had a beard, wore eyeglasses, and was photographed outdoors, out of focus, and in a thick fog), or when he was dressed in a Hallo-ween costume or some other disguise.
 
But now it looks like I need to remember in order to remember. A tennis ball isn’t specific enough to establish the required link to the person who left it. What the situation requires is an unambiguous representational calling card, and the tennis ball clearly doesn’t do the job. So we supposed that something else might make the tennis ball a more specific link—a signature or a photo. That is, we tried to employ a secondary memory mechanism (trace) so that I could remember what the original trace (the tennis ball) was a trace of. But the signature and photo are equally inadequate. They, too, can’t be linked unambiguously to a specific individual. Of course, if I could simply remember who wrote the signature or left behind the photo, then it’s not clear why I even needed the original tennis balls. If no memory mechanism is needed to make the connection from photo to photo donor or from illegible signature to its author, then we’ve conceded that remembering can occur without corresponding traces, and then no trace was needed in the first place to explain how I remember who attended my party. So in order to avoid that fatal concession, it looks like yet another memory mechanism will be required for me to remember who left behind (say) the illegible or phony signature or the fuzzy photo. And off we go on a regress of memory processeses. It seems that no matter what my party guests leave behind, nothing can be linked only to the guest who left it. We’ll always need something else, some other mechanism, for making the connection between the thing left behind and the individual who left it.