Neuroscience and free will

Nope, that's not as accurate as saying "without understanding" IMO. I think "without understanding" is about as good a definition as I can get. Every time I try to go any further, I find I'm overreaching with assumptions, so I couldn't agree that your definition is reasonable.

So you're saying that if there could be an event without causal precursors, you're not willing to agree that it would be an arbitrary event? In what way could it be non-arbitrary if it had no causal precursors?

I'm not insisting that there are such events, I'm just defining a term.

~~ Paul

[Laird]

It's the difference between solving a binomial problem by working examples until you hit on the solution or solving it through proof (using the Binomial Theorem). Both cases offer you a solution. So discussion can focus on the solution, rather than how you got there (to avoid the problem where every discussion turns into anti-materialism).

You can build up millions of observations under identical conditions without attempting any sort of idea about cause. Yes, scientists take it further and build proof (as in scientific evidence) for regularities and laws (which Paul can refer to show you what the solution will look like, were you to build up a million observations). But if you don't like that, you can just consider the millions of observations instead.

I'm not 100% sure I'm interpreting the above correctly in the light of our exchange, but I think what you're saying is that, on further consideration, you don't after all think that it really matters whether we define determinism as prescriptive or descriptive, because the regularities we observe will be there regardless. Right?

Determinism is a sorting term for whether the millions of observations are identical or whether they differ.

If you find they are not identical, what does a description of the point(s) of departure look like? Does it look like something other than a change in conditions (determinism) or random/indeterminate?

Haven't you introduced a false entailment here? As I understand it, determinism does not entail that there are multiple occasions on which the conditions of a causal relation (law) apply, whereas you seem to be suggesting that it does: up the top you gave the example of "millions", but here you indicate simply more than one, given that you say that conditions might change. Instead, determinism entails... well, definitions vary, but something like 'that events have a "sufficient" or "necessitating" cause' or 'that given their causes, events are "inevitable"' . The conditions of a causal relation (law) could apply on a single occasion within the entire universe, and that causal relation could still be deterministic (because the causes of the relation are "sufficient" or "necessitating" with respect to the event) - right?

[Laird]

Rearranging the order of the quoted parts of your posts for better flow...

I think laws are descriptive, but when we are confident of them we talk as if they are prescriptive. However, that does not give us the "right" to describe individual events and call them laws. A law describes a large class of phenomena.

I've (roughly) been using Prof. Swartz's definition of laws. He has this to say about physical laws and individual events on page 28 of his book:

And just as there is no science of events per se, there is, equally, no science of ‘individual events.’ This follows, of course, from my insisting a moment ago that physical laws must be purely descriptive in their terms. Mount Saint Helens’s eruption on May 18, 1980, falls under physical law inasmuch as it was an eruption (of a certain kind Q), occurring under circumstances (of a certain kind R) of a volcano (of a kind S), etc. But there is no physical law pertaining analytically to Mount Saint Helens exclusively. This is not to say, however, that there might not be one or more physical laws such that the circumstances leading up to the eruption and the eruption itself were those generalizations’ only instance. Generality does not require that there be more than one instance; nor does it require, even, that there be at least one instance. But generality does require that the proposition not be analytically restricted to specific individuals (or events).

One must be careful, then, when speaking of some particular event E as falling under a physical law. Descriptions that are often sufficient to individuate an event (“the first eruption of Mount Saint Helens in the twentieth century,” “Ford’s pardoning of Richard Nixon,” etc.) are often very meager, often contain proper names and other restricted terms, and often fail to specify – as is required for ‘falling under’ a law – a sequence of events. Thus Ford’s pardoning Nixon is an event that falls under a physical law only to the extent that it has some general description and is identified as a member of a pair (or sequence) of similarly generally described events.

Why is this important? Because we are trying to clarify what determinism means, especially to you, and, as I suggested to Linda in my immediately previous post, the conditions for a causal relation (law) could apply on a single occasion within the entire universe, and that causal relation (law) could still be deterministic. So, if you agree with that suggestion, then you would seem to be arbitrarily excluding certain (deterministic) causal relations from your conception of a physical law if you do not also accept (something like) Prof. Swartz's definition, which allows for a general law to apply in only one instance.

Can you accept this definition of physical laws after all?

Also, I'm not sure that descritivism means we are free to assume that the described phenomena could have happened differently. Just because we shouldn't assume the laws are prescriptive doesn't mean that they are in fact flexible.

I don't think that that's justifiable though. Here's why:

Given that the described phenomena could only have happened differently if the laws had been different (since the laws are simply generalised descriptions of what actually goes on in the world), to drop the assumption that the phenomena could have happened differently would be to eliminate the possibility that the laws could have been different, which would make them necessary, which is essentially prescriptive, which contradicts our descriptivism. So, I don't think we'd be assuming anything; I think it's logically entailed.

I'm happy to have a crack at this, but I'm not really sure of the point. It seems like a lot of work just to end up with a couple of sentences that give an inkling of how a free decision is made. But let's go for it.

Well, paraphrasing/repeating what I wrote in that old thread on Skeptiko where we first discussed all this, I think psychology and psychoanalysis are the disciplines that most deal with the processes of free decisions. You could try introspection too.

You seem to be looking for laws of free choices that, per your understanding of laws, "describe a large class of phenomena". I suppose that there might be some, but I haven't thought deeply about nor looked carefully into it. Again, there's probably a wealth of material within psychology and psychoanalysis. We could probably come up ourselves with some general methods that people "freely choose to choose by", but I'm not sure how easy they'd be to formulate as physical laws.

Also worth considering is that laws of free choice which described a "large" class of phenomena might tend to reduce the freedom of the agents participating in those phenomena, since they might limit the range of possibilities. I guess though that it would depend on the exact nature and scope of the laws.

You got a few bonus sentences there, and an early delivery. Not sure about the inkling.

I don't understand physical laws well enough to determine whether they can all be framed in term of events.

Anyway, let's assume I agree and continue.

OK. So, you've agreed that physical laws are (or can be taken to be) conditional descriptions of events. I should make explicit what's implicit in that: that the descriptions are accurate, true, and correct.

Here's my next contention for you then: A true description of the world is necessitated by the way the world is; the way the world is is not necessitated by the true descriptions of it.

Agreed?

[Laird]

Do you mean conditional as in "here are the priors that give us the result" or "the laws of physics are contingent" where I'd use contingent both in the sense of subject to chance & dependent on circumstance.

The conditions of the conditional are the specific (or general...) circumstances which define the event. e.g., For the event in which two objects are drawn together by a force, the conditions (circumstances) include that the two objects have mass.

I think the "dependent on circumstance" branch, that the "laws" are really instances of findings in circumstances , challenges their universality.

They are universal though in that they are true at all times and places - even when the conditions don't hold for a given time and place. I do get your point though.

The "subject to chance" aspect challenges their immutability.

I'm interested to understand better what you mean in the first place by laws being subject to chance... expound a little if it pleases you... (the root "contingency" I think I understand well enough).

Regarding events, are we including/assuming that there's an explanation for why a different event doesn't occur. As in, why does the charge hold - even over a range - for particular conditions?

It's a crucial question, but not one I planned to ask in the first few steps, to clarify concepts and define terms.

Because to me that's where Final Cause enters the picture, perhaps with Formal & Material as well.

Additionally when asking "Why doesn't an alternative happen?" is there another good example of restriction via selection of possibility besides our own mental causation?

What else is there?! ;-) (besides causally-efficacious conscious entities, I mean...)

I'm not 100% sure I'm interpreting the above correctly in the light of our exchange, but I think what you're saying is that...you don't...think that it really matters whether we define determinism as prescriptive or descriptive, because the regularities we observe will be there regardless. Right?

Yes

Haven't you introduced a false entailment here? As I understand it, determinism does not entail that there are multiple occasions on which the conditions of a causal relation (law) apply, whereas you seem to be suggesting that it does: up the top you gave the example of "millions", but here you indicate simply more than one, given that you say that conditions might change. Instead, determinism entails... well, definitions vary, but something like 'that events have a "sufficient" or "necessitating" cause' or 'that given their causes, events are "inevitable"' . The conditions of a causal relation (law) could apply on a single occasion within the entire universe, and that causal relation could still be deterministic (because the causes of the relation are "sufficient" or "necessitating" with respect to the event) - right?

Determinism does not entail that there are multiple occasions on which the conditions are identical. Instead, it is saying that on any occasions where the conditions are identical (whether that be zero, one, or billions) the outcomes are identical. If you want to call the conditions under which the events occur "causal", that's okay for the purposes of this discussion.

Linda

Determinism does not entail that there are multiple occasions on which the conditions are identical. Instead, it is saying that on any occasions where the conditions are identical (whether that be zero, one, or billions) the outcomes are identical. If you want to call the conditions under which the events occur "causal", that's okay for the purposes of this discussion.

Linda

This is the same fallacy as stated before by Paul.  In an abstract space and sequence - occasions where conditions are identical can be theorized in the abstract.  Then, logic will predict fixed outcomes.

There are no such conditions that are identical, in a fully complete way, in the real physical world.  I understand determinism as P=1 in informational space.  In spacetime, at a real location, QM says P will always be subject to random fluctuation.

Electronic devices now can use electron tunneling.  How is this phenomenal and useful event fit any definition of "determined"?

I was struggling with the casual way "random" was being tossed around.  Max's recently distinction (with or without understanding) resonates with me.

I have a much harder time with the notion of "random" than I do with free will.

There are no such conditions that are identical, in a fully complete way, in the real physical world.

There are plenty of conditions which are identical, at all levels of scale. Examples...electrons are identical with respect to charge, the sun rises in the east, sugar tastes sweet, 1+1=2, etc.

Electronic devices now can use electron tunneling.  How is this phenomenal and useful event fit any definition of "determined"?

Given that it is used to produce specific and consistent results, it seems the very definition of "determined".

Linda

Nope, I was restating what I stated here...

https://psiencequest.net/forums/thread-n...1#pid25921

That’s as far as I can get for a definition of random = without understanding.

I saw that you were restating that definition. I'm just not sure why you won't accept a definition having to do with no causal precursors.

~~ Paul