Neuroscience and free will

From an article on some newer, post Libet, neurological research verifying and clarifying the "free won't":  

See my last reply to you on the Tallis essay, which concerns Libet-type experiments.

Also Feser's post Against "Neurobabble".

All to say I'm in agreement that free will is a non-composite aspect of an agent, but I am wary of trying to justify it only by placing the agent outside of the causal picture that we'd accept for everything else.

I'll go with the ability to make a free decision being non-composite. But it seems that the actual making of a free decision must be a composite. Clearly it takes into account past events and the current state of affairs in some way, or the decision would be random with respect to the question being decided.

~~ Paul

I'll go with the ability to make a free decision being non-composite. But it seems that the actual making of a free decision must be a composite. Clearly it takes into account past events and the current state of affairs in some way, or the decision would be random with respect to to the question being decided.

~~ Paul

In this we are in agreement. [Though our exact terminology seems to be varied.]

See my last reply to you on the Tallis essay, which concerns Libet-type experiments.

Also Feser's post Against "Neurobabble".

I have never read the description of a neuroscience experiment in which the authors made any sort of claim for having the final answer, especially regarding consciousness. Of course, I make no such claim about some arbitrary science writer.

In contrast, though, I suspect that when we do believe we have a final answer for consciousness, part of the explanation will be something like "neural process X just is aspect Y of consciousness." And I suspect that will be the case even if something beyond the brain has been brought into the explanation.

~~ Paul

I have never read the description of a neuroscience experiment in which the authors made any sort of claim for having the final answer, especially regarding consciousness. Of course, I make no such claim about some arbitrary science writer.

In contrast, though, I suspect that when we do believe we have a final answer for consciousness, part of the explanation will be something like "neural process X just is aspect Y of consciousness." And I suspect that will be the case even if something beyond the brain has been brought into the explanation.

~~ Paul

Is this in reply to a link in my post?

Is this in reply to a link in my post?

A reply to this statement in Feser's article:

"Somehow, though, when neuroscientists discover some neural correlate of this or that mental event or process, a certain kind of materialist concludes that the mind’s identity with, or supervenience upon, or reducibility to, or complete explanation in terms of neural processes is all but a done deal, and that the reservations of non-materialists are just so much intellectually dishonest bad faith."

Perhaps he is not saying that any neuroscientists do that, just layman materialists. So then he agrees with my claim that neuroscientists do not do that.  

~~ Paul

The best definition I have for Random = without understanding. And for Determinism = with understanding.

I don't think this 'understanding' has to be correct in any way. It is just what we are saying about shared reality/nature to try and make sense of it from time to time.

I agree that we may be missing an understanding of certain phenomena and so have labeled it as random. Regarding particle decay, there could be a hidden variable we have failed to identify. Or Athena herself could decide when each and every particle decays. I'm not sure there is any way to disprove the latter possibility.

However, I still think it is reasonable to define

random event: an event that is not fully specified by causal precursors

So the question becomes: Are there causal precursors to particle decay, either materialistic/deterministic ones or freely decided ones? In over 100 years, no hint of causal precursors has been found.

~~ Paul