Is the Filter Theory committing the ad hoc fallacy and is it unfalsifiable?

I disagree. Brains can and do have thoughts, memories, subjective feelings, and utilize logic.

Monkeys have thoughts, memories and utilize crude logic. They also appear to have subjective feelings.

Here we go again, the endlessly repeated use of the invalid argument by assertion, plus the irrelevant observation that animals apparently have consciousness. It's becoming tiresome.

It is poorly framed because whether or not an entity has (or, as you put it, "needs") a soul depends^[1] on whether or not it is conscious (and because "do what they do" is a strange way of referring to that which is potentially experiential), so the better framing of the question is:

Which of the following are conscious?

That is a completely different question. I understand that it is hard to tell if an animal is conscious. That is not what I am asking.

Again, the problem is that I was reading here that not only consciousness, but all memory and mental activity could not happen without a soul. That is clearly wrong. I was trying to get the other person to see it was wrong by getting him to agree that toads or monkeys can do their mental functions without having souls. 

To my complete surprise, I cannot find one person to say they agree with me on that. What can possibly be wrong with saying that, though you disagree with me on a lot of things, you agree with me that monkeys can do their mental functions even if it is true that they don't have souls? Sadly, after multiple times of asking that question, I am still waiting for the first person here to say they agree with me on that.

Perhaps everybody just misunderstands what I am asking. If they understood the question, I think they would agree.

Are you deliberately avoiding the real issue or do you not understand the point at all?  Our brains certainly process information but that does not imply consciousness as unconscious computers do that.  What we want from you is an explanation of how unconscious matter can be responsible for consciousness.  Comparing us to animals does not answer the question.

Actually both are issues. I was seeing somebody saying that not only consciousness, but all memory functions require a soul. I was trying to at least get one point of agreement, that toads or monkeys don't need souls to do their toad-business or monkey-business in their brains.

Sciborg,

The problem of consciousness is a hard problem. We don't know where it comes from.

So far you have given us no convincing reason that matter cannot produce consciousness. Yes, you quote a lot of authorities saying it is so, but they really aren't giving a convincing reason why this is so.

Some of your sources say minds can't have thoughts about things. I simply do not agree. When frogs jump, for instance, they have thoughts about jumping. When they plan to jump, they have thoughts about future jumping. And so on. So whether frogs do or do not have souls, they have thoughts about jumping.

I certainly don't know how consciousness happens. I know that the brain is certainly key to what happens. Is something else involved? I don't know. But as I said many times, if something else is involved, it could not continue my self-consciousness without my brain.

- Talk about whether a material brain can create consciousness and you're told the real discussion is whether Souls Need Brains.

How many times must I explain this to you? I was saying if hypothetically souls exist, the evidence shows they would not be able to continue our existence as ourselves without our brains.

- Talk about why you think Souls Need Brains is false and you're asked why you believe in souls, how animals don't have souls, how you believe in "magic" (whatever that means).

Huh? Regarding animals, I am talking about whether they can have thoughts about things, not about whether they have souls.

Regarding the question of how your views of consciousness differ with magic, you have given no answer. If you have an answer, why don't you give it? Can you not tell the difference between your views and magic?

In any case I would say Souls Need Brains is false because the stuff that makes a nail makes up a brain, and we've been told thinking a nail is conscious makes one "dumb as a nail".

And would you say that computers cannot add numbers because nails cannot add numbers, or that televisions cannot display a screen because nails cannot display a screen?

Just because a nail cannot do something, does not prove nothing else can do it.

Reading the writings of atheists Harris, Tallis, and Rosenberg I don't think the matter that makes up a nail, in greater volume with different arrangement, negates the reasons given why we don't think a nail has consciousness. Just as a nail doesn't have thoughts, subjective feels, rationality, or memory I don't think the brain can have those either.

And just as a nail does not satisfy thirst, or power a light bulb, or make a comfortable seat, therefore nothing can?

I don't agree with the argument that, if a nail cannot do something, than nothing else can do it.

Thus I don't think the Souls Need Brains claim holds. This doesn't mean there has to be a soul, just that the assertion is weak because there is no good argument for it to hold.

How could a soul remember without a brain? We see that when the brain is damaged in certain spots, the conscious self can lose the ability to remember.

How could the soul communicate with language without a brain? We see that when the brain is damaged in certain spots, the conscious self loses the ability to form sentences.

For me to even consider the idea that Souls Need Brains, I would need a convincing explanation for why the stuff that makes up a nail can produce the varied aspects of consciousness when it's making up parts of a human or parts of some animal.

My brain is not made up of the stuff that makes up nails.

My brain is not made up of the stuff that makes up nails.

Hmmm, let's start fresh with this.

What is this different stuff it's made up of then? I was thinking of this post:

I know of no scientists that thinks that nails have consciousness. (If one thinks nails have consciousness, some might argue that this person is as dumb as a nail.  ). Those that insist consciousness is strictly material will tell you it occurs only when there is enough material arranged in a complex way that creates consciousness. 

It seemed to me that when you said "enough material arranged in a complex way" you meant the nail and the brain are made of the same stuff but the amount and arrangements were different.

But I am happy to be corrected and for you to tell us how the stuff the brain is made up of is different than the stuff a nail is made up of.

[Laird]

[Which of the following are conscious?] is a completely different question.

No, it's the first step in answering your original question:

"Do the following need souls to do what they do?"

Crucial to that question in this context is whether or not part of "what they do" is "experience phenomenally and think consciously".

If they're not conscious and don't have experiences, then, of course, we can all agree that not only do they not "need" a soul to "do what they do", but, by pretty much any definition of "soul" that I can think of, they definitely don't have one.

If, though, they are conscious, then we can proceed to the next step in answering your question:

Why and how are they conscious; what necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness do they satisfy, and, in particular, is having a soul - as you (Merle) define it - part of those conditions?

To satisfy your desire for an answer to your question, I'll answer it given that framing via those two-step questions:

1. Which of the [entities Merle listed] are conscious? All of them, with the potential exception of the waterfall: although I tend towards endorsing animism, it's admittedly difficult to know whether such entities as waterfalls - those that our modern culture sees as "inanimate objects" - really are conscious.
   
2. Why and how are they conscious; what necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness do they satisfy, and, in particular, is having a soul - as you (Merle) define it - part of those conditions? They are conscious because they are embodied minds; minds that are irreducible to anything non-mental (aka physical). Those minds are distinct entities from the physical (non-mental) brains^[1] with which they are associated. Mind and brain though distinct are tightly coupled during the mind's embodiment, and they interact intimately. The soul (as I define it in this context) is the subject of consciousness; the essential conscious self of those embodied minds. "Separable conscious minds each with its own subject of consciousness" seems to generally meet your own - Merle's - definition of a "soul", so, yes, part of the reason why the entities you listed are conscious (and thus "do what they do") is that they have ("need") a "soul".
   

[1] Edited to add: some of the entities you listed don't seem to have brains; for those, simply substitute "bodies" or similar.

Any more questions or is that clear to you?

I understand that it is hard to tell if an animal is conscious.

I don't think that it is at all. It's patently obvious that animals are conscious.

Perhaps everybody just misunderstands what I am asking. If they understood the question, I think they would agree.

I understand well enough the premise of your question; I just think that it's false. That premise is that (of the two) consciousness is not fundamental, but rather neurology is, and that consciousness emerges from neurology at a certain level of complexity of neural structure, so that it is plausible that while the visible behaviour of certain organisms with less complex neural structures appears very similar to that of beings (such as humans) with more complex neural structures and who are conscious, those organisms in fact aren't conscious.

Good reasons have been shared in this thread for thinking that that premise is false, and compelling counter-arguments to your arguments against mind-body dualism have been shared. I don't expect that any of them will change your mind, but maybe when the dust settles you'll reflect on them more thoughtfully.

It seemed to me that when you said "enough material arranged in a complex way" you meant the nail and the brain are made of the same stuff but the amount and arrangements were different.

Nails are made of metal. Brains are made of complex hydrocarbons.

The key there is that the atoms need to be "arranged in a complex way" in order to have thoughts, such as the arrangement of atoms in brains.

Carbon chemistry is complex, and can make complex things like elephants and elephant brains. Metals, by contrast, make only simple things like crystals, which can all be grouped together to make things like nails, not functioning brains.

Nails are made of metal. Brains are made of complex hydrocarbons.

The key there is that the atoms need to be "arranged in a complex way" in order to have thoughts, such as the arrangement of atoms in brains.

Carbon chemistry is complex, and can make complex things like elephants and elephant brains. Metals, by contrast, make only simple things like crystals, which can all be grouped together to make things like nails, not functioning brains.

Let's not get ahead of ourselves, plenty of time to discuss what we think complexity can and can't do.

So nails and brains are both made of atoms? Are the atoms made of stuff too? None of this stuff is conscious right?

edit: Part of going slow is I don't want to dominate the discussion as I see Laird and others have replied to you as well.

Some of your sources say minds can't have thoughts about things. I simply do not agree. When frogs jump, for instance, they have thoughts about jumping. When they plan to jump, they have thoughts about future jumping. And so on. So whether frogs do or do not have souls, they have thoughts about jumping.

Why do you keep bringing this up?  Nobody disputes this.  A thought consists of two things - information and consciousness.  Information in a computer is not a thought.  A computer therefore cannot think.  Physical processes can certainly contain and work with information, if guided by consciousness, but brains are physical matter only and so you need to be able to explain how physical matter can produce consciousness.  Frogs and cats having thoughts is simply not helping the debate.

Why do you keep bringing this up?  Nobody disputes this.  A thought consists of two things - information and consciousness.  Information in a computer is not a thought.  A computer therefore cannot think.  Physical processes can certainly contain and work with information, if guided by consciousness, but brains are physical matter only and so you need to be able to explain how physical matter can produce consciousness.  Frogs and cats having thoughts is simply not helping the debate.

I understand that consciousness and thoughts are different things. That why I distinguish the two. I want to first establish an agreement that brains can have thoughts about things, and then discuss consciousness. And yet I keep hearing that brains cannot have thoughts about things. As long as I keep hearing people argue that brains cannot have thoughts about things, I will explain that I think brains can have thoughts about things.

So, if we can stipulate that brains can have thoughts about things, and then move on to consciousness, that is what I want to do. Can we all stipulate that brains can have thoughts about things so we can move on?