Is the Filter Theory committing the ad hoc fallacy and is it unfalsifiable?

Kastrup's a determinist? Is that new? He's defended free will in the past. Has he changed his views?

I'll try to find the exact quotes but pretty sure he is.

[Laird]

I'll try to find the exact quotes but pretty sure he is.

Please do - I'm very interested to see them.

Antegrade amnesia is so unexpected on dualism, one needs to resort to ad hoc reasoning to explain it. See the title of this thread.

But consciousness awareness at all is completely unexpected with materialism, so much so Harris says it's akin to a Something from Nothing miracle and Alex Rosenberg - Materialist and author of Atheist's Guide to Reality - says, "Thinking about things can’t happen at all…When consciousness convinces you that you, or your mind, or your brain has thoughts about things, it is wrong.".

Or go historical and consider what Thomas Huxley, "Darwin's bulldog", once wrote:

How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the djinn when Aladdin rubbed his lamp in the story.

There's also the ancient Greek Materialist/Physicalist Democritus who gives us a very early conception of the Hard Problem:

Intellect: “Color is by convention, sweet by convention, bitter by convention; in truth there are but atoms and the void.”

Senses: “Wretched mind, from us you are taking the evidence by which you would overthrow us? Your victory is your own fall.”

Millennia later, no solution to the Hard Problem...any day now right?

So even if there are no souls - and thus no post-mortem Survival - this doesn't save the Materialist/Physicalist conception of the brain. One only has to look at the Survival-Rejecting atheists who find Materialism/Physicalism logical flawed and/or outright false, or in defense of Materialist beliefs make absurd Illusionist/Emergentist ad hoc claims in support of that metaphysics, to see that. Even evolutionary explanations fall flat:

Why evolutionary theory contradicts materialism

( @Laird - this might be a good argument that if evolution is true, Materialism would have to demand Epiphenomenalism?)

However, it also isn't clear to me that Dualism, in context of the Filter Theory, would find it surprising that brain illness can affect mentality related to memory. The Filter Theory suggests a greater Self is localized and limited by the brain to the spatio-temporal location of the body. Given some of the reasons given for positing the Filter Theory were examples of expanded mental capacity that represented temporary failures in the brains reductive aspects*, the theory already accepts cognitive reduction of this Self by the brain.

So under Filter Theory mind's cognitive functioning/awareness is severely limited, barring certain episodes of mysticism/Psi, to the mundane existence of said body...So given that why wouldn't such cognitive limitations be increased due to issues with the brain?

I'd even say incidents of Terminal Lucidity support the idea that, nearing death, these limiting factors are themselves reduced in efficacy ->

The opportunities, [Dr. Basil] Eldadah says, are immense. “It gives us some pause with regard to our current theories and understanding about the nature of dementia. We’ve seen enough examples of this to be reassured that dementia can be reversed – albeit temporarily, very transiently – nevertheless, it does reverse. And so the question then is how.”

As Gross writes in The Transmission Model of Mind & Body: A History (essay in Beyond Physicalism, maybe available elsewhere for free?) ->

In such cases of terminal lucidity, nearing death apparently restores access to memories (Grosso, 2004, pp. 41–43; Nahm & Greyson, 2009, pp. 942–944). This seems to confirm Bergson’s argument that memories are not destroyed by brain lesions, but rendered inaccessible. Terminal lucidity deserves careful study; as it appears, in dying, consciousness begins to disengage from the damaged brain and regains memories that had become inaccessible. We might expect terminal lucidity to occur, if the transmission model were correct; the phenomena are unintelligible on the production theory.

Of course one might say - as I already have in this thread - that perhaps the soul has no memories or flawed memories during the time the brain was in a state of dementia...to which I can only ask, "So what?"

I took care of my father for years until his very last breath when his brain was ruined by a variation of Parkinson's and have seen the ravages of brain illness first hand. So if in the next life he recalls nothing of that time it wouldn't bother me much if at all.

However I think beyond brain illness affecting people's personalities/memories/etc, and the way Terminal Lucidity can negate that, we have to look at something else the Filter Theory does expect which is the Unexpected Savant cases I mentioned previously in this thread.

So, keeping score:

1. Physicalism/Materialism predicts that there should be no conscious awareness in all the universe. Because there is Consciousness it leads to ridiculous, implausible ad hoc claims/terms to try and get around the Hard Problems of Subjectivity, Rationality, Intentionality, and Memory.

2. Filter Theory predicts and/or supports limited and sporadic psychic functioning (such as data & cases described in Immaterial Minds: Rethinking the Science of Consciousness published by the American Psychological Association), Sudden Savants, Terminal Lucidity, and the varied cases of Survival. It even predicts brain issues limiting cognitive functioning, because under Filter Theory the brain is already limiting a Higher Self.

Also since Consciousness is included as part of the fundamental reality it doesn't have the problem of logical impossibility of how to get Something (Mind) from Nothing (matter which is defined by Physicalists/Materialist to have no mental aspects).

These aren't the only two options, but between them seems to me like Filter Theory is winning?

*For example:

Bergson’s formulation is dynamic. In the struggle for existence, our attention is riveted to the “plane of life.” But sometimes the “whole personality, which, normally narrowed down by action, expands with the unscrewing of the vice in which it has allowed itself to be squeezed” (p. xiv). This corresponds to what James calls the “obstruction” that we erect against lowering our psychic defenses, lest we be swamped by waves from the “mother-sea.” Once we take note of this obstruction—the natural tendency to “screw ourselves down”—we can see why it is natural to recoil from the possibly disorienting excesses of consciousness.

Grosso, The Transmission Model of Mind & Body: A History

When we look at the relationship between our apparent self and our “Transcendental Ego,” Schiller writes, “we shall perceive that matter is an admirably calculated machinery for regulating, limiting, and restraining the consciousness which it encases” (p. 287). Further on he says:

Herein lies the final answer to Materialism: it consists in showing in detail what was asserted at the outset, viz., that Materialism is a hysteron proteron, a putting of the cart before the horse, which may be rectified by just inverting the connexion between Matter and consciousness. Matter is not that which produces consciousness, but that which limits it and confines its intensity within certain limits: material organization does not construct consciousness out of arrangements of atoms, but contracts its manifestation within the sphere which it permits. (p. 289)

Schiller’s ideas are often striking and deserve more attention; he was one of the earliest modern formulators of the transmission model.

Grosso, The Transmission Model of Mind & Body: A History

I guess we could say "Consciousness" but that doesn't quite capture what is meant by "Soul". There are people [like] Tallis who believe in free will, reject materialism, reject computationalism, don't think the brain can store memories...yet they also reject Survival.

I didn't know that Tallis rejects the idea of survival, but I suspect this may be more 'political' than anything - how much can you change your position before you scare away all your colleagues?

David

[Laird]

Why evolutionary theory contradicts materialism

( @Laird - this might be a good argument that if evolution is true, Materialism would have to demand Epiphenomenalism?)

I'm not sure it's so much an argument for demanding epiphenomenalism as one discrediting epiphenomenalism, and, in quotes like the following, predicting the argument you shared in your thread The Mystery of Psycho-Physical Harmony:

But then how to account for the fact that these subjective states have just these subjective qualities? Why, for instance, does the material counterpart of pleasure feels good subjectively? Why does pain, or the physical counterpart of pain, hurt? The materialist can give no plausible explanation for this. If everything results from strictly material interactions to which the quality of subjective states is irrelevant, then the subjective qualities of pleasure and pain would have no efficacy. Not only would there be no need for these subjective qualities to be as they are, but, even more to the point, we could find no plausible explanation for how these qualities come to be associated with physical states and physical behavior relevant to survival. Can it be a mere coincidence that sticking a hand in a fire hurts, or that sexual activity feels good? Such a suggestion strains credulity.

I've been meaning to dig deeper into the resources in that thread of yours for a while now, but your posting of it was curious timing for me, because while revisiting Titus's Exit Epiphenomenalism paper, including its discussion of evolution, and considering the discussion of natural selection in the SEP entry on epiphenomenalism, something roughly along those lines had suggested itself to me too, albeit that I hadn't fleshed it out (I know: it's probably hard to believe, but that really is how it went down). I've also been meaning to ping Titus to get his reaction to the argument, but haven't gotten onto that yet either.

Meanwhile, I'm back at post #146 and trying to catch up.

I'm still confused about the argument. Is it:

1. There are no souls. All mental faculties/awareness/memories can be explained by reference to the body & brain [and possibly outside world for External Mind arguments] which are all "physical" which, whatever else that means, lacks any mental character/aspect at the fundamental level.

or

2. There may be a soul but if it exists it must be dependent on the brain which is a "physical" structure as defined above.

Because the latter means taking the idea souls exist as a premise, if not accepting that some aspect of a "filter" theory has to be true.

Neither exactly expresses what I think. Let me try again.

My position is that the mind is a set of states and processes of the brain. I cannot rule out that other things may be involved that might be as strange as dark energy or dark matter. Or perhaps something even more exotic is involved. But once we propose things like that, we reach the vague edges of what we mean by "material" or "physical". To me, anything that is affecting the physical world in predictable ways is physical. So, in that definition, the mind is totally caused by physical things,  regardless of whether anything other than the physical brain is involved.

So I see the mind as a function of the brain, but I do not definitively rule out that some strange fields or something else might be involved. The easiest way to say that is, "The mind is a set of states and processes of the brain," but if you need my answer to be pedantic, "The mind is a set of states and processes of the brain, but I cannot be absolutely certain nothing else is involved." If anything else is involved, the brain itself is so central to mental processes, that no meaningful continuation of my mental processes should be expected after my brain dies.

Do you need me to state those paragraphs every time I say what I mean by the mind, or is it acceptable to use the shortcut,  "I think the mind is a set of states and processes of the brain"?

If the souls you speak of exist, are they physical? After all, if your brain was connected to sensors, and we asked you to count to 100, we would probably see a distinct set of brainwaves. And seeing you do it a few times, we could predict how those brainwaves will look the next time. So we could physically measure what that soul is doing. Does that make souls "physical"? The definition gets fuzzy.

But whether those souls are called "physical" or "non-physical", I don't find any convincing evidence that souls can in any meaningful sense continue the mental human processes after death.

I didn't know that Tallis rejects the idea of survival, but I suspect this may be more 'political' than anything - how much can you change your position before you scare away all your colleagues?

David

I have wondered myself how certain atheists could accept varied things that seem to support Survival, even to the point of rejecting the brain's storage of memories, and then still reject the idea of an afterlife...

But I can see it. Even for those of us who accept Survival, it does set up the world to be a rather strange place. Why doesn't Terminal Lucidity happen to every dementia patient? Why don't we all have Shared Death Experiences of a higher realm when someone passes away?

Heck even if the number of Survival evidence cases went up say 10% it would probably be a global game changer.

Meanwhile, I'm back at post #146 and trying to catch up.

Thanks for that. I think it's mostly (maybe all?) incredibly wrong headed but I do appreciate the clarification.

The illusion of plausibility

E. Feser

Suppose I asserted that the difference of the positions of B and G# in the A major scale was identical with, supervened upon, or was in some other way explicable in terms of, the greater than relation that the number 23 bears to the number 18. You would no doubt wonder what the hell I was talking about. Just as notes in a scale are one thing and numbers are another, so too are positions in the scale and positions in the sequence of numbers different things, and that’s that. Relations of identity, supervenience, explanation, etc. simply don’t hold between the two. (Of course, there are mathematical relationships between notes in a scale; the point is that the relationships between notes are clearly not reducible to or entirely explicable in terms of mathematical relationships.)

Note that this has nothing to do with the lack of a law-like correlation between the two – whatever that could mean in this context, since we’re talking about abstractions rather than concrete objects or events. And even if we reverted to speaking of concrete objects and events, we don’t think that the reason talk of identity, supervenience, etc. makes no sense in this context is that we find no regular correlation in nature between (for example) the playing of B on a musical instrument and there being 23 of something in the vicinity. Correlation or lack thereof just has nothing to do with it. Even if we found that some such bizarre correlation held, we wouldn’t think “Aha! B in the A major scale must be identical to or supervenient upon the number 23!” Such a claim would be just as unintelligible in the presence of the correlation as in the absence of it.
I propose that the same thing is true of claims like this: “Having a thought with the content that P is identical to, supervenient upon, or otherwise explicable in terms of having a sentence with the meaning that P encoded in the brain”; “The semantic-cum-logical relations between thoughts are identical to, supervenient upon, or otherwise explicable in terms of the causal relations between brain events”; and other claims of this sort. Such claims are simply nonsensical. Logical relations are one thing, causal relations are another, and that’s that. If you don’t see this, either you don’t understand what a logical relation is or you don’t understand what a causal relation is – or, more likely, you are in the grip of some ideology that leads you to speak nonsense. Similarly with the claim that having a thought involves having a sentence in the head. Having the thought that 2 + 2 + 4 – that is to say, grasping the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 – is one thing, and having some sentence instantiated somewhere (whether on a chalkboard, in a notebook, in a computer, in a brain, or wherever) is another, and that’s that. If you don’t see this, then, again, either you don’t understand what a proposition is, or you don’t understand what a sentence is, or you are in the grip of some ideology.

The ideology in question is, of course, materialism (or physicalism or naturalism, if you prefer). If you start with the assumption that thinking simply must be identical to, supervenient upon, or otherwise explicable in terms of brain activity, then it will seem to you at least plausible that logical relations might be reducible to causal relations, thoughts identifiable with the having of brain sentences, etc. But no one would think these things plausible even for a moment if they were not already seeing the world through materialist glasses – indeed, they would take the evident absurdity of such proposals as prima facie evidence of the falsity of materialism. (And that is, I propose, part of the reason why most philosophers historically have not been materialists.)

I'm not sure it's so much an argument for demanding epiphenomenalism as one discrediting epiphenomenalism, and, in quotes like the following, predicting the argument you shared in your thread The Mystery of Psycho-Physical Harmony:

Apologies, I meant the essay explains why Materialists have to commit to epiphenomenalism as part of its proof of contradiction against said Materialism.

Admittedly because Materialism is a pile of ad hoc, confused beliefs it is hard to pin down a clear understanding of what that metaphysics exactly entails.

Meanwhile, I'm back at post #146 and trying to catch up.


Neither exactly expresses what I think. Let me try again.

My position is that the mind is a set of states and processes of the brain. I cannot rule out that other things may be involved that might be as strange as dark energy or dark matter. Or perhaps something even more exotic is involved. But once we propose things like that, we reach the vague edges of what we mean by "material" or "physical". To me, anything that is affecting the physical world in predictable ways is physical. So, in that definition, the mind is totally caused by physical things,  regardless of whether anything other than the physical brain is involved.

So I see the mind as a function of the brain, but I do not definitively rule out that some strange fields or something else might be involved. The easiest way to say that is, "The mind is a set of states and processes of the brain," but if you need my answer to be pedantic, "The mind is a set of states and processes of the brain, but I cannot be absolutely certain nothing else is involved." If anything else is involved, the brain itself is so central to mental processes, that no meaningful continuation of my mental processes should be expected after my brain dies.

Do you need me to state those paragraphs every time I say what I mean by the mind, or is it acceptable to use the shortcut,  "I think the mind is a set of states and processes of the brain"?

If the souls you speak of exist, are they physical? After all, if your brain was connected to sensors, and we asked you to count to 100, we would probably see a distinct set of brainwaves. And seeing you do it a few times, we could predict how those brainwaves will look the next time. So we could physically measure what that soul is doing. Does that make souls "physical"? The definition gets fuzzy.

But whether those souls are called "physical" or "non-physical", I don't find any convincing evidence that souls can in any meaningful sense continue the mental human processes after death.

I'll try, one last time, to make the only real point of interest I have in this thread.

You lay out your interpretation of mind which leaves open the possibility that some portion, potentially significant, may not be explained by brain function.  I think that's fair and a much more reasonable position that pure reductionist, physicalism.  You then offer up some potential explanatory phenomenon such as dark energy, dark matter, or 'strange fields'.  Notably, you do not offer any 'convincing evidence' for these possibilities but you leave them open nonetheless.  I find this reasonable and fair as well.

The point here is that your position is hardly empirical or scientific in the sense that significant, potentially huge, explanatory gaps remain.

So, why then does your tone change when talking about continuation of consciousness?  You eliminate the possibility out of hand seemingly based on your own personal logic (i.e., you don't see a way this can happen).  There's an inconsistency in your thinking and based on your background, I get it.  The concept of continuation feeds directly into the concept of soul which feeds back to Christianity.  That's all understandable but there is a giant bias that comes through when reading your posts.  I believe it colors your intellectual process.

For me, and I don't carry the baggage of negative religious experience, I simply leave all the possibilities open.