Could consciousness all come down to the way things vibrate?

I don't think it's a matter of imagination, so much as it is whether a theory can get past some basic questions.

As such, there should be some clarity on processes that are providing sensory reports and how this creates an "illusion". What is being processed prior to the sense of qualia? Is what is processed quantitative, is it Physical or Informational? If the latter, what is Information?

The details will either satisfy or they won't. Idealism and dualism are similarly detail-lite, perhaps moreso. What specifically is "a sense of qualia" other than our sensory processes in action anyway?

And perhaps most important, reporting implies a relation between data and the Reader of data -- So who is in the system receiving the report?

The sum of previous data readings/experiences?

This isn't to say that Consciousness as Fundamental must entail  a soul that survives a body, nor a Self completely divorced from sensory organs + nervous system of the body. If anything I think the materialist is better off abandoning the physicalist, suggesting the world consists of qualitative properties and intrinsic beings & neither of those things are captured by the quantitative relations that make [up] physics.

I'm not sure what you mean here. Do you think a proton is aware of what its electrons are doing? Depends on how you define 'aware', right?

The details will either satisfy or they won't. Idealism and dualism are similarly detail-lite, perhaps moreso. What specifically is "a sense of qualia" other than our sensory processes in action anyway?

It's not the lightness of details, it's what details are missing from a theory that make it a non-starter. Without a mind to report to, without aspects of information (mental representation and/or phenomenal quality) we usually think of as being part of a mind, what is the value in considering a theory that speaks of "illusions" and "reports".

I know I exist in some fashion, I know I have phenomenal experience and mental content. Idealism and Dualism consider these fundamental so while certain versions have problems they don't have the particular non-starter issues the theories I'm rejecting have. Since matter is defined through the phenomenal experience [it's easier to go from Mind -> Matter, and Dualism as conceived by most isn't, IMO, philosophical Dualism but that's for another thread...].

The sum of previous data readings/experiences?

Does a lab journal have consciousness? Do machine learning programs deserve rights?

I'm not sure what you mean here. Do you think a proton is aware of what its electrons are doing? Depends on how you define 'aware', right?

I mean why can't there be qualitative aspects and mental representation in a single world, namely this mortal sphere (+ enclosing universe), and simply note these are a part of the world that [is] not amenable to reductionist/quantitative explanation? After all even the idea of "matter" is based on observations of solidity made in consciousness. If "matter" is merely the set of relations entered into by assumed particles that seems more Platonic than Material..

I think this would close certain divides in academia -> For example by this above definition I propose it seems to me Tallis would be a materialist, just with a different conception of matter + the rest of the physical (time/space/causality). You could also count Gregg Rosenberg, who is a self-defined "Liberal Naturalist" who simply sees Consciousness as the Carrier of Causality but denies adding more entities to the scientific picture.

This proposal doesn't mean a proton needs awareness, though we'd instead likely have to consider certain questions about disunity in the levels of science but this is already a point made even in skeptic circles (Massimo wrote about it, for example) - just not at the level of human cognition as yet.

Agreed to an extent - I think Chalmers weakens the issue or at least unintentionally narrows the disputation w/ materialism.

For one, EJ Lowe's There are No Easy Problems of Consciousness.

I have always understood Chalmers concept of the HP to mean 'provably' hard. As such, I don't think he was saying that other aspects of cognition - such as participating on this forum - are 'easy' problems to automate. 

Oh wait - maybe I can think of a couple of characters here that might be AI!

I agree, David Chalmers didn't seem to exploit his concept to the max - presumably he began to feel pressure to conform!

My own thinking leads me to the suspicion that panpsychism is right about matter and conscious being mutually dependant but I cannot accept consciousness as being nothing more than the vibrations of matter.  Maybe I could accept that matter is the vibrations of something non-material though.

My own thinking leads me to the suspicion that panpsychism is right about matter and conscious being mutually dependant but I cannot accept consciousness as being nothing more than the vibrations of matter.  Maybe I could accept that matter is the vibrations of something non-material though.

Yes, but I have always thought non-material stuff is consciousness - it certainly is in the Idealist concept.

Trying to argue about the made up term 'qualia', is just as bad as arguing about 'consciousness', they are crappy catch-all terms. You may as well just talk abut the actual stuff (real world examples) and ignore the catch-all term... as you have done here.

Personally I don't really see any fundamental difference between my experience of 'colour', and my experience of "confidence that a memory of a past event is the correct one", or the experience of 'feeling fooled'.

You seem to be arguing that 'qualia' is a catch-all phrase in your first paragraph, and then recognising the whole point of the word qualia in the second!

How would things change by using specific example - how would you conceive of a machine that could feel pain - no idea - how would you  conceive of a machine that could appreciate the sensation of being fooled - you couldn't - how could you conceive of a machine that could understand falling in love - you couldn't.

All qualia are like that - which is why it makes sense to have a name for that class of things!

It's not the lightness of details, it's what details are missing from a theory that make it a non-starter. Without a mind to report to, without aspects of information (mental representation and/or phenomenal quality) we usually think of as being part of a mind, what is the value in considering a theory that speaks of "illusions" and "reports".

I know I exist in some fashion, I know I have phenomenal experience and mental content. Idealism and Dualism consider these fundamental so while certain versions have problems they don't have the particular non-starter issues the theories I'm rejecting have. Since matter is defined through the phenomenal experience [it's easier to go from Mind -> Matter, and Dualism as conceived by most isn't, IMO, philosophical Dualism but that's for another thread...].

Nature, with all its magic and mystery, has spent billions of years evolving the processes whereby biological systems can successfully and efficiently interact with their environments. Our realities entirely constructed by the processes (the relationship between wavelengths of light and "the illusion of colour" was the initial example in this thread). "The illusion of self" would seem to bestow some evolutionary survival imperative on an individual and load the odds in favour of such a species.

The fact that we even consider using the word "illusion" to describe the notion of an entity or "soul" riding these biological processes, may be a reflection on how utterly immersive the construct is.

I'm not trying to present any sort of proof. However, the idea of such a construct is appealing because it removes two problems that the immaterialist faces:

1. The unique association with conscious awareness and biological systems, and

2. Those biological systems are made of the same atoms, molecules and elements that are found in abundance in our universe.


Of course such a model has another implication. Any sort of "self-reflection" may have its benefits, but it is the least likely way of discovering genuine insights into the underlying nature of our conscious experience; the constructs are built specifically to lead us down the wrong path in that regard. Consequently, any pseudoprofound pronouncements based on those reflections can be enjoyed for their elegance and erudition, but do not really add anything substantive.

(In fairness every model for consciousness relies on some sort of "illusion". I'm tempted to say that introspection is limited in advancing our understanding, no matter the model (notwithstanding the apparent benefits of meditation))

Does a lab journal have consciousness? Do machine learning programs deserve rights?

I'm sticking to biological systems

I mean why can't there be qualitative aspects and mental representation in a single world, namely this mortal sphere (+ enclosing universe), and simply note these are a part of the world that [is] not amenable to reductionist/quantitative explanation? After all even the idea of "matter" is based on observations of solidity made in consciousness. If "matter" is merely the set of relations entered into by assumed particles that seems more Platonic than Material..

I think this would close certain divides in academia -> For example by this above definition I propose it seems to me Tallis would be a materialist, just with a different conception of matter + the rest of the physical (time/space/causality). You could also count Gregg Rosenberg, who is a self-defined "Liberal Naturalist" who simply sees Consciousness as the Carrier of Causality but denies adding more entities to the scientific picture.

This proposal doesn't mean a proton needs awareness, though we'd instead likely have to consider certain questions about disunity in the levels of science but this is already a point made even in skeptic circles (Massimo wrote about it, for example) - just not at the level of human cognition as yet.

Interesting Massimo piece, thanks.

You seem to be arguing that 'qualia' is a catch-all phrase in your first paragraph, and then recognising the whole point of the word qualia in the second!

How would things change by using specific example - how would you conceive of a machine that could feel pain - no idea - how would you  conceive of a machine that could appreciate the sensation of being fooled - you couldn't - how could you conceive of a machine that could understand falling in love - you couldn't.

All qualia are like that - which is why it makes sense to have a name for that class of things!

Do you understand "falling in love"?