I think that Bernado Kastrup has pretty much demolished panpsychism's arguments that consciousness is somehow just another form of matter.
Seems interesting at first, until you bring NDEs and reincarnation into the picture, nevermind spiritual experiences of telepathically sensing disemboded consciousnesses.
(2018-11-14, 10:23 PM)Valmar Wrote: [ -> ]I think that Bernado Kastrup has pretty much demolished panpsychism's arguments that consciousness is somehow just another form of matter.
Seems interesting at first, until you bring NDEs and reincarnation into the picture, nevermind spiritual experiences of telepathically sensing disemboded consciousnesses.
Could you cite where you see Kastrup demolishing Panpsychism?
I don't think "matter" - especially in the Panpsychic sense - is necessarily set against the things you mention on the second line - For example varied spiritual/mystic traditions have posited matter is always alive (Hylozoism) or that there are different kinds of matter with varied properties (Hylic Pluralism) from which subtle bodies and Heavens/Hells are made from.
Did anyone else notice how Tam Hunt manages to distort David Chalmer's contribution right at the start of this piece:
Quote:Chalmers thought the mind-body problem should be called “hard” in comparison to what, with tongue in cheek, he called the “easy” problems of neuroscience: How do neurons and the brain work at the physical level? Of course they’re not actually easy at all. But his point was that they’re relatively easy compared to the truly difficult problem of explaining how consciousness relates to matter.
(2018-11-26, 11:22 PM)David001 Wrote: [ -> ]Did anyone else notice how Tam Hunt manages to distort David Chalmer's contribution right at the start of this piece:
What's wrong with what Hunt writes?
Quote:The hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995) is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (i.e., phenomenal consciousness, or mental states/events with phenomenal qualities or qualia). Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience? And why does a given physical process generate the specific experience it does—why an experience of red rather than green, for example? http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Hard...sciousness
Steve001,
You will also find this quote in that article:
Quote:Chalmers thought the mind-body problem should be called “hard” in comparison to what, with tongue in cheek, he called the “easy” problems of neuroscience: How do neurons and the brain work at the physical level? Of course they’re not actually easy at all. But his point was that they’re relatively easy compared to the truly difficult problem of explaining how consciousness relates to matter.
Quote:You will also find this quote in that article:
You don't need to double quote. Why do you disagree with Hunt's characterization?
(2018-11-28, 01:38 AM)Steve001 Wrote: [ -> ]You don't need to double quote. Why do you disagree with Hunt's characterization?
Originally I only saw the quote I referred to, which appears much earlier in the piece, and it is definitely a weaker form of Chalmer's observation that the Hard Problem is how physical matter can actually feel qualia.
I mean heck, a philosopher is lucky to come up with one nugget like that in his career, and when one does, it should not be brushed aside! I don't see how vibrations - whether in phase or out of phase, linear or non-linear, coupled or otherwise - can provide an explanation for why the particular piece of matter called a human can experience stuff. I know for sure a computer doesn't.
In a way, I think the concept of the Hard Problem is sacred. It is the absolute distillation of the biggest problem with materialism.
(2018-11-28, 09:59 AM)David001 Wrote: [ -> ]Originally I only saw the quote I referred to, which appears much earlier in the piece, and it is definitely a weaker form of Chalmer's observation that the Hard Problem is how physical matter can actually feel qualia.
I mean heck, a philosopher is lucky to come up with one nugget like that in his career, and when one does, it should not be brushed aside! I don't see how vibrations - whether in phase or out of phase, linear or non-linear, coupled or otherwise - can provide an explanation for why the particular piece of matter called a human can experience stuff. I know for sure a computer doesn't.
In a way, I think the concept of the Hard Problem is sacred. It is the absolute distillation of the biggest problem with materialism.
The problem with philosophers is they spend too much time thinking. Here's a hard problem, one you might be able to provide an answer for. Why some people find it difficult to acknowledge the way matter is arranged and it's functioning within brains makes it not possible brains can do what they do?