(2020-12-20, 07:12 AM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: I think this depends on what Paul means by "conceive".
Of particular interest is what he means by "conceiving" of randomness.
Also I feel like there's this cycle that needs to be explained:
1) We seem to start off with the issue of the randomness/determinism dichotomy. This seems to be the source of the idea that free will is incoherent.
2) But then we are told the "how" problem exists even if one (temporarily at least) forgoes the dichotomy.
3) Yet attempted clarification of the "how" problem always seems to lead back to the inability to conceive of something that is neither deterministic nor random.
I skipped around in the 75 page thread and this was the same problem there. Of course this is why I said people should stop talking about free will until they've had a good conversation or ten about causation...
But there is no clarification of the "how" problem. At least Laird is being straightforward in saying that it is irreducible in between and below the point where it is deterministic and/or arbitrary. So now I am left with deciding whether I want to have faith that there is a nonrandom indeterministic component.
You keep saying we should talk about causation. I don't know what to say beyond the fact that we have computers and particle decay. Below that I agree we don't have any way of explaining how or why. But with free decisions, we have no explanation at any level. We have no examples to point to except our own feelings of what is going on.
But if you think you can offer something in the context of causation rather than decision-making, I'm happy to listen.
~~ Paul
If the existence of a thing is indistinguishable from its nonexistence, we say that thing does not exist. ---Yahzi