(2019-03-03, 07:58 PM)Paul C. Anagnostopoulos Wrote: This is tricky.
Ah. Now you start to see the problem...
(2019-03-03, 07:58 PM)Paul C. Anagnostopoulos Wrote: How do you mean "necessarily"?
For events to happen "necessarily" means that they "could not have" happened differently; that they "had to" happen that way.
(2019-03-03, 07:58 PM)Paul C. Anagnostopoulos Wrote: Perhaps I'm misinterpreting "had to" in "those laws 'had to' happen the way that they did."
It's necessary events that we're concerned with, not necessary laws - but the former would seem to require the latter, and you have eliminated that possibility by subscribing to a descriptivist account of laws.
(2019-03-03, 07:58 PM)Paul C. Anagnostopoulos Wrote: I agree that the mere existence of a descriptive law does not somehow oblige the universe to have event X always happen according to the description.
That sounds like agreement with the proposition at issue then.
Let's see if there's anything in the rest of your post that might prevent agreement:
(2019-03-03, 07:58 PM)Paul C. Anagnostopoulos Wrote: However, I'm not sure why we would insist that the event cannot always happen as described.
But nobody is insisting on that nor even suggesting it.
(2019-03-03, 07:58 PM)Paul C. Anagnostopoulos Wrote: I answered "Agreed" because I interpreted your statement this way:
Laird: If laws are descriptive (and not prescriptive) then it is not possible that the events described by those laws "had to" happen the way that they did, just because the law is possible to develop.
Those additions (italicised) implicitly contradict that which precedes them: the reason why it is not possible that the events "had to" happen the way that they did is because the laws are descriptive and not prescriptive. To tack onto the contention then that it is "just because the law is possible to develop" is to obfuscate the fact that it is because the laws are not prescriptive (because they are, in fact, descriptive). So, the additions are misleading and have no place here.
(2019-03-03, 07:58 PM)Paul C. Anagnostopoulos Wrote: It is possible that there is are operative physical processes that can only have event X occur the way it happens to be described by the law.
But any such physical processes would themselves be described by laws, right? And those laws would themselves be descriptive and not prescriptive, because those are the only type of laws you hold to exist, right? So, whatever prescriptiveness you might think you can grab hold of here ultimately dissolves into (mere) descriptiveness, right?
(2019-03-03, 07:58 PM)Paul C. Anagnostopoulos Wrote: (2) The fact that laws are descriptive does not mean that they cannot turn out to describe a set of events that only occur as described by the the law.
There's that tautology again...
"Only occurring as described by a description [which is what a descriptive law is]" is simply what it means to be described by a description. Again - and again, and again, and again - this tautology says nothing meaningful and therefore whatever argument you might think you're contributing to with it isn't - can't be - supported by it.
Too, it is not even framed in terms of necessitation or prescriptiveness anyway: that would have involved a wording like "that must occur as described by the law" or "that can only occur as described by the law" - but you used instead the descriptive phrasing: "that only [do] occur as described by the law".
So, no, there doesn't seem to be anything preventing your agreement. Thus, I put the proposition, which follows from previous propositions to which you have agreed, to you again:
The events described by laws do not happen necessarily.
Agreed?