Neuroscience and free will

[Laird]

What is the point of bastardizing the term law to pertain to a single event? [...] [T]his [is a] redefinition of the term[.]

OK, let's clarify that here we're talking about "physical laws" in general, rather than about some particular subset of them which we think we have approximated via the scientific method, such as those which we refer to as "the laws of physics". In the light of your objection, we could consider this to be a new term: we are not referring to "scientific laws" but more broadly to "physical laws", being the comprehensive set of actually true conditional descriptions of events in reality (whatever those actually true descriptions are, and regardless of whether we can ever know them - for more on this see my next post to Sci).

So, if we want this set to be comprehensive, then we have to allow for the possibility that for some members, the conditions pick out only one actual event in the world, right? If not, then on what basis would we exclude that possibility?

All I'm getting at here is that even though a law is descriptive, it may in fact be describing phenomena that always follow the law.

Then what you're getting at is a meaningless tautology.

In the context of descriptive laws, to "follow" a law simply means to be described by that law, so your statement amounts to:

"...even though a law is descriptive, it may in fact be describing phenomena that are always described by their descriptions".

Well, of course that which is described by a description is always described by its description! You're simply restating in the second part of the sentence that which you stated in the first - you aren't saying anything meaningful.

I'm not really looking for laws, although that would be interesting. I'm looking for a simple logical description of the steps I take to make a free decision. I realize that "steps" sound mechanical, so feel free to substitute another word. There must be something like steps.

Sometimes there might be steps, sometimes not. It would depend on how the freely willing agent freely willed the choice, which (the method by which to make the choice) might itself be (sometimes explicitly) freely chosen by the agent.

If not, and the decision literally pops into my mind, then I claim that decision is random.

The complement of "a decision made in steps" is not necessarily "a decision literally popping into your mind". That would imply that the decision came to you from outside and that you were not responsible for its entering and impacting upon your mind. Another possibility beyond this false dichotomy is "a decision made instantaneously by you". This could be a decision freely willed from within, which occurs in the context of and takes into account your "memories and the current state of affairs".

But the range of possibilities is limited!

I meant more limited than it would have been had there not been such (a) law(s). And I ought not to have spoken of "possibilities" but of "actualities": if we are free, yet despite a wide range of possible choices open to us we make the same actual choices such that our choices can be described by very general laws, then we might not be making very good use of our freedom, and might (depending on further context) in practice (albeit not metaphysically) not be free... but as I originally wrote/implied, those sort of assessments depend on a lot more than what's at issue here.

The decision has to have something to do with the question at hand, no?

I wouldn't say "has to" but I would agree that generally, for most reasonable people making reasonable decisions, that would be the case.

I don't know where you're going.

Good. That'll stop you from objecting on the basis that you don't like the destination.

Yes, I agree that the world is not necessitated by true descriptions of it.

Good. I'll hold off on sharing my next contention with you until we've reached agreement on the definition of a "physical law".