Psience Quest

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(2024-01-22, 04:06 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]Hmmm ->


But property dualism seems to be religiously motivated, just toward the materialist-atheist faith?

Yes exactly like substance dualism which is religiously motivated in faith in some kind of spiritualism.

My post was however a response to nbtruthman regarding physicalists not necessarily believing mind can be described in terms of energy and forces and their interactions.

Let me ask you. Is a H2O molecule wet? is 10 or a billion H2O molecules wet? Wetness is an example of an emergent property. non-reductive physicalism helds the same about the mind.
(2024-01-22, 04:35 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]Let me ask you. Is a H2O molecule wet? is 10 or a billion H2O molecules wet? Wetness is an example of an emergent property. non-reductive physicalism helds the same about the mind.

This talking point is raised by believe[r]s in the materialist/physicalist faith a lot...yet I don't think it really seems comparable to the mind.

Wetness, after all, is a property conferred by consciousness toward the water molecules. There is no feeling of wetness without mind which means the attempt at analogy is unconvincing unless one already believes in the materialist/physicalist religion.

Emergence fails to get around the Something from Nothing problem, unless one accepts the material world can perform illogical miracles.
(2024-01-22, 04:37 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]This talking point is raised by believe[r]s in the materialist/physicalist faith a lot...yet I don't think it really seems comparable to the mind.

Wetness, after all, is a property conferred by consciousness toward the water molecules. There is no feeling of wetness without mind which means the attempt at analogy is unconvincing unless one already believes in the materialist/physicalist religion.

Emergence fails to get around the Something from Nothing problem, unless one accepts the material world can perform illogical miracles.

If there were any good solutions to all questions I assume philosophy wouldn't be a thing.
(2024-01-22, 04:54 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]If there were any good solutions to all questions I assume philosophy wouldn't be a thing.

But even so there is good philosophy versus bad philosophy...

"What would a philosophy look like that had given up on all reductionist dreams?” -Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy
(2024-01-22, 05:06 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]But even so there is good philosophy versus bad philosophy...

"What would a philosophy look like that had given up on all reductionist dreams?” -Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy

I just love when people believes themselves more clever than others…

let’s list some prominent proponents of property dualism:

David Chalmers: He is well-known for his formulation of the "hard problem" of consciousness, which addresses why and how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. Chalmers argues for a form of property dualism in which mental states are irreducible to physical states.


Frank Jackson: Known for his "knowledge argument" against physicalism, which he illustrated through the thought experiment known as "Mary's room."


Thomas Nagel: He is famous for his paper "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" which argues that there is a subjective aspect to the mind that escapes physicalist explanations.

Even though these people don’t belief the mental can be reduced to energy, forces and their interactions, they don’t believe any imaginary spritual substance is needed.
(2024-01-22, 05:12 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]I just love when people believes themselves more clever than others…

let’s list some prominent proponents of property dualism:

David Chalmers: He is well-known for his formulation of the "hard problem" of consciousness, which addresses why and how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. Chalmers argues for a form of property dualism in which mental states are irreducible to physical states.


Frank Jackson: Known for his "knowledge argument" against physicalism, which he illustrated through the thought experiment known as "Mary's room."


Thomas Nagel: He is famous for his paper "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" which argues that there is a subjective aspect to the mind that escapes physicalist explanations.

Even though these people don’t belief the mental can be reduced to energy, forces and their interactions, they don’t believe any imaginary spritual substance is needed.

Curious where you see Chalmer's arguing for property dualism?

The man has even written favorably about Idealism and, IIRC, Substance Dualism.

In any case the point isn't about being "more clever", it's specifically about having a good argument for property dualism...and I'm unconvinced there is any such argument...
(2024-01-22, 05:26 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]Curious where you see Chalmer's arguing for property dualism?

The man has even written favorably about Idealism and, IIRC, Substance Dualism.

I have never seen him write favorably about any of these stances, but here’s a list of resources  pointing to his stance on property dualism:

https://consc.net/papers/emergence.pdf

https://mindmatters.ai/2023/01/philosoph...-the-soul/

https://philosophy-science-humanities-co...%20Dualism

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers
(2024-01-22, 05:12 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]Even though these people don’t belief the mental can be reduced to energy, forces and their interactions, they don’t believe any imaginary spritual substance is needed.

I think that might be a charitable interpretation.  After all, if they don't believe in reductionism then what do they believe is "needed"?  And, more directly I suspect, I would guess they are a bit more evasive about "imaginary spiritual substances" than the ardent reductionist, atheists.
(2024-01-22, 09:00 PM)Silence Wrote: [ -> ]I think that might be a charitable interpretation.  After all, if they don't believe in reductionism then what do they believe is "needed"?  And, more directly I suspect, I would guess they are a bit more evasive about "imaginary spiritual substances" than the ardent reductionist, atheists.

As I wrote earlier I believe all philosophies of their mind have their share of issues. Property dualists can't explain what's needed for the mind to emerge. They also have an interaction problem to solve. But I believe their position is easier to reconcile with the changes to consciousness that can follow brain damage like persistent vegetative state etc.
(2024-01-22, 04:35 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]Yes exactly like substance dualism which is religiously motivated in faith in some kind of spiritualism.

Fundamentally, Substance Dualism takes no position regarding any kind of faith in any religion or spiritualism. Those are rather different questions than what Substance Dualism asks. Substance Dualism simply recognizes that there are two base substances ~ mind and matter, the mental and the physical, to say nothing about faith or deities or spirituality.
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