(2024-01-24, 05:14 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]So what is an actually good argument for Property Dualism?
That's what I'm waiting on...
It's fundamentally more compatible to the observed relationsship between the brain and the mind. Think for example different kinds of amnesia, persistent vegitative state, changes to personality after strokes etc etc etc
(2024-01-24, 06:46 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]It's fundamentally more compatible to the observed relationsship between the brain and the mind. Think for example different kinds of amnesia, persistent vegitative state, changes to personality after strokes etc etc etc
But not Sudden Savants nor Terminal Lucidity, to say nothing of Psi & NDEs/CORTs. OTOH just as a valve can tighten or loosen, Filter/Transmitter Theory can explain those two as well as all the things you mention.
Also why are Property Dualists not Panpsychists?
I also think Property Dualists lose against Substance Dualists as the latter engages consciousness as the cohesive whole we experience.
(2024-01-24, 06:46 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]It's fundamentally more compatible to the observed relationsship between the brain and the mind.
Terminal lucidity (as Sci mentioned) may be what you need, then? The brains of these patients are unquestionably destroyed, as (Austrian?) researcher Alexander Batthyany has recently reminded us and yet they have a proven period just before they die when they have clear, lucid consciousness;
they are back with all their facultiies and memories after being lost for sometimes years. Their brains would resemble (equal to) the damage (in structure) done to a boiled egg by comparison, you can't unboil an egg, but they are presnt once more, thinking straight. This is actually not possible but it happens all the time according to the experts.
There is no way that neuronal networks can suddenly grow back, just like that, 'hey presto' and even if they could, it surely would be a different person entirely that came back.
“My grandfather was in palliative care for dementia. He had severe cognitive decline over the months preceding his death. There was no recognition of family or friends, paranoia, hallucinations, confusion, social withdrawal, refusal of food and drink, mumbling incoherent speech, and a lack of ability to toilet or shower himself. He awoke and began talking in a clear voice with obvious recognition of family and surroundings. He was able to inquire about family and friends that he had not been able to recognize previously. He asked that the books he had borrowed months ago be returned to their owner. He said he wished his death would come quicker. After 20 minutes, he became tired, fell asleep, and died shortly afterward.”
Terminal Lucidity Revisited | Psychology Today Australia
(2024-01-24, 07:41 PM)tim Wrote: [ -> ]Terminal lucidity (as Sci mentioned) may be what you need, then? The brains of these patients are unquestionably destroyed, as (Austrian?) researcher Alexander Batthyany has recently reminded us and yet they have a proven period just before they die when they have clear, lucid consciousness; they are back with all their facultiies and memories after being lost for sometimes years. Their brains would resemble (equal to) the damage (in structure) done to a boiled egg by comparison, you can't unboil an egg, but they are presnt once more, thinking straight. This is actually not possible but it happens all the time according to the experts.
There is no way that neuronal networks can suddenly grow back, just like that, 'hey presto' and even if they could, it surely would be a different person entirely that came back.
“My grandfather was in palliative care for dementia. He had severe cognitive decline over the months preceding his death. There was no recognition of family or friends, paranoia, hallucinations, confusion, social withdrawal, refusal of food and drink, mumbling incoherent speech, and a lack of ability to toilet or shower himself. He awoke and began talking in a clear voice with obvious recognition of family and surroundings. He was able to inquire about family and friends that he had not been able to recognize previously. He asked that the books he had borrowed months ago be returned to their owner. He said he wished his death would come quicker. After 20 minutes, he became tired, fell asleep, and died shortly afterward.”
Terminal Lucidity Revisited | Psychology Today Australia
Funny, I read about Alexander Batthyany on Ian Wardell's blog today. I wonder if any of you are Ian?
(2024-01-24, 08:59 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]Funny, I read about Alexander Batthyany on Ian Wardell's blog today. I wonder if any of you are Ian?
Ian is a known user here, though I don't recall if he wants that username to be connected to his IRL name. [But he isn't any of the regulars in this thread.]
(2024-01-24, 11:54 AM)tim Wrote: [ -> ]I think he is, yes. I emailed Chalmers many years ago to urge him to look at NDE's with respect to how they might inform, or assist him, if you see what I mean.
He responded with a short message saying he wasn't familiar with the research (basically) and that was it.
To this day, I can hardly believe it. NDE's "tell" us to stop (cease) looking in the brain and he won't even look at the sign post. I don't take him seriously anymore. I respect him for admitting the problem (the hard problem) but it seems to me he just wants to stay where he is. A kind of philosophical old pop star still living off his one hit. If that's not the case, what progress has he made.
I like a lot of his work, but it is very unclear to me why he believes that AI - programs running on Turing Machine computers - can become conscious.
I also do think he is selling short the philosophical reasoning that suggests the consciousness I have now is immaterial as a cohesive unit and thus extends beyond bodily death...which to me is all an argument for a soul requires. (An Idealist would note that the body itself is something experienced in one's consciousness, and does not even always have the same properties in dreams...
to go back to NDEs & Philosophy of Idealism paper discussed in this thread...)
Of course we cannot let philosophy alone be the arbiter, and I accept there isn't the same level of evidence for Survival as QM, but nevertheless I do think the combination of Philosophy + Survival Evidence is good enough for Survival to be a reasoned, scientifically acceptable conclusion.
(2024-01-24, 08:59 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]Funny, I read about Alexander Batthyany on Ian Wardell's blog today. I wonder if any of you are Ian?
I don't think I am, sbu. I'm certainly not tim.
(2024-01-24, 10:43 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]but it is very unclear to me why he believes that AI - programs running on Turing Machine computers - can become conscious.
I didn't know that, Sci. If he definitely does believe that, I'm frankly amazed.
(2024-01-24, 10:43 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]and I accept there isn't the same level of evidence for Survival as QM,
No, but I personally find it sufficient.
(2024-01-25, 01:02 PM)tim Wrote: [ -> ]I didn't know that, Sci. If he definitely does believe that, I'm frankly amazed.
Yep,
he does: with the caveats that they might need to have "senses, embodiment, world models and self models, recurrent processing, global workspace, and unified goals", he thinks (as of 23 August last year) that "it’s a serious possibility that we’ll have conscious LLM+s within a decade".
(2024-01-24, 08:59 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]Funny, I read about Alexander Batthyany on Ian Wardell's blog today. I wonder if any of you are Ian?
This was a disappointingly avoidant response.
The argument being put to you as I understand it is that although the observed brain<->experience correlations are more compatible with physicalism, they are not fatal to interactionist substance dualism[*], whereas phenomena such as terminal lucidity are not just more compatible with interactionist substance dualism[*], but fatal to physicalism, therefore physicalism is false and interactionist substance dualism[*] is true.
I think that the argument is sound. I'm not aware of a compelling takedown of either the argument's validity or premises. The fact that you avoided confronting it directly suggests that neither are you. The reason I wrote that that's disappointing is because you seem like a smart guy, so one would assume that given your confident, bordering-on-snarky dismissals of those who hold to non-physicalist ontologies, you
can take down this argument. If you can, then you should do so, otherwise, might I suggest toning down the dismissive approach a little?
[*]Or some other non-physicalist ontology such as idealism.