Dualism or idealist monism as the best model for survival after death data

Non-reductive physicalism is also a thing with multiple proponents. Non-reductive physicalists believe that the mind and body are two separate but interconnected entities. The mind interacts with the brain and affects physical reality, but it is not solely determined by or reducible to physical interactions.

Isn't this Dualism?

Isn't this Dualism?

There's two different forms of dualism. Here's an extract from a book about philosophy of mind:

The first thing that usually comes to mind when one thinks of dualism is René Descartes’ (1596-1650) substance dualism. However, there is another form of dualism, quite popular nowadays, which is called property dualism, a position which is sometimes associated with non-reductive physicalism.

Property Dualism – Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind (rebus.community)

A little belatedly, because I've had to think about this, and have also had visitors:

I'm not asserting that the proposed objective aspect of subjective experience that I've termed "mental energy" has such physical properties as mass, although it would certainly have dimensions. I don't know whether or not wavelength would be a potentially applicable property, but I expect not. The nature of mental energy in this respect is simply to have substantive form, with the form correlating perfectly with the inner experience.

You've got me thinking though about what that form would look like (how to describe it), and it's quite difficult to imagine. Some aspects of experience are easier to "formalise" than others: for example, the form (as mental energy) of a visual experience could conceivably be something like a three-dimensional reflection of the actual visual field, but what form would an emotional state take, and how would its form cohere and integrate with the form of the concurrent visual experience?

I think we'd have to posit a multidimensional space of more than three dimensions, which could be an interesting realm to explore. Mental energy's being multidimensional over more than three dimensions would, though, make it harder to identify with (as) the spiritual/astral/etheric body which separates from the physical body during OBEs, because that spiritual body seems to be three-dimensional. It also seems to be able to take on different forms, including a point (invisible) form, and if it was a direct correlate of inner experience, one would expect experience to become non-existent during the period that the spiritual body took on point (invisible) form, but it doesn't.

In any case, as I mentioned earlier, I borrowed this idea from my interpretation of Analytic Idealism, and maybe it's a bad fit for dualism. It should probably be discarded if it is neither necessary nor has explanatory power, or if it really is impossible to imagine its form, or if there is a better alternative.

"Mental energy" seems to be necessary for Analytic Idealism on my interpretation given that the process of "dissociation" of personal psyches from the universal mind is said to be due to certain dimensional structures which develop in that universal mind, which to me implies that the universal mind consists in some sort of substance which takes form - a substance which, of course, I've ended up referring to as "mental energy".

Given that dualism does not entail dissociation, it does not have that same need for mind to take on an objective substantive form, but that leaves open the possibility of some other need, or of it providing enhanced explanatory power.

Let's start with exploring the first possibility: that "mental energy" - the substantive "outer" form of inner experience - is a necessary concept even on dualism's premises.

In this respect, I think there's a clue in your saying that 'the subjective perception itself is for a fact somehow completely composed of an immaterial "something" we term consciousness or mind': composition - even if of consciousness or mind - seems to imply or at least be consistent with some sort of (objective) substantive form. Could this (inevitable?) language of yours - albeit qualified by "immaterial" - hint at the necessity of this concept?

Consider also that it is an objective fact that you and I subjectively experience (assuming you're not simply an advanced AI). I get that it's not a straightforward deduction from subjective experience being an objective fact to subjective experience having an objective substantive form, but it is suggestive, and we also know that our experience is at least differentiated, and thus also suggestive of form.

Regarding the second possibility, that of explanatory power:

Consider that as you yourself acknowledge, consciousness is (objectively) causally efficacious, not just internally, but externally too. Is this causal efficacy best explained by positing that inner, intangible experience is the correlate of an objective substance to which it gives form? It seems easier to understand the causal efficacy of a formal substance than of something ineffable.

Consider, too, the subconscious in its various guises and functions. Consider more specifically the example of "zoning out" - thinking about something else - while driving, and then later returning one's attention to the road, and sometimes being able to recall the last few seconds of driving despite one's awareness having been elsewhere. It seems difficult to explain that subconscious activity as merely "ineffable experience", because it literally was not experienced (it was subconscious), leaving only "ineffability" - and yet, it is in all other respects the same as an experience. This suggests that it is, in some sense, not "ineffable" but in fact "effable", having some objective substantive form which "functions" within (as) the mind though not as a conscious experience.

None of this is rigorous nor, perhaps, especially compelling argumentation; I'm just putting out some ideas for consideration. I'm interested to know what you think, and in what anybody else who sees fit to chime in thinks.

Incidentally, in an earlier post, you lamented the unpopularity of mysterianism, but according to Wikipedia, mysterianism is "a form of nonreductive physicalism", for which I wouldn't have expected you to advocate...

A lot to consider. My thinking on this so far.  

Your view as expressed here is that both the conscious mind and the subconscious are "in some sense, not "ineffable" but in fact "effable", having some objective substantive form which "functions" within (as) the mind..."

I would still hold that mind simply can't have an objective, substantive aspect or property or component, because mind is of another entire level of reality than the physical, at least when considering the incommensurability of all known aspects of the two. This means they are totally unsuitable for comparison - that is, they are lacking any features that can be conceivably compared. Like the inner experience of red as opposed to the objective measurable wavelength of the corresponding light waves.

My impression of your "mental energy" is that it is a feat of imagination, a sort of philosophical device invented for the purpose of solving a problem, but something that is actually inconceivable when deeply considered. 

Unfortunately, interactional dualism similarly has features that are inconceivable to the logical mind conditioned to the physical world, but it seems to be considerably simpler. 

There is then the Ockham's Razor principle of parsimony to be considered.

Your suggested mental energy or objective substantive aspect of mind would presumably exist for all states and conditions within the physical world, not just in the special case of embodiment, that is, in the interface between the mind and the physical brain that allows the mind to be causally efficacious in the world. Why isn't "mind energy" always manifesting itself all over the physical world? This would inevitably complicate the theory with all sorts of rules governing how this interface works, and a required explanation as to why the interface normally only works for embodiment. So there would be no simplicity, or principle of parsimony, advantage to the theory over interactional dualism.

But in fact, your theory would seem to be more complicated by far than interactive dualism, because now instead of two, there are three different levels or kinds of existence whose interrelationships have to be explained: (1) consciousness or mind, (2) a hybrid - a mental energy which may be multidimensional that somehow (inconceivably) shares aspects of both physical objectivity and the immaterial mental realms, and (3) the physical realm.

Of course, Ockham's Razor isn't a hard and fast law of nature, it just has a strong tendency to be fulfilled.

There's two different forms of dualism. Here's an extract from a book about philosophy of mind:


Property Dualism – Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind (rebus.community)

Hmmm ->

Though these are both dualist views, they differ in fundamental ways. Property dualism was proposed as a position that has a number of advantages over substance dualism. One advantage is that, because it does not posit an immaterial mental substance, it is believed to be more scientific than Cartesian dualism and less religiously motivated.

But property dualism seems to be religiously motivated, just toward the materialist-atheist faith?

Hmmm ->


But property dualism seems to be religiously motivated, just toward the materialist-atheist faith?

Yes exactly like substance dualism which is religiously motivated in faith in some kind of spiritualism.

My post was however a response to nbtruthman regarding physicalists not necessarily believing mind can be described in terms of energy and forces and their interactions.

Let me ask you. Is a H2O molecule wet? is 10 or a billion H2O molecules wet? Wetness is an example of an emergent property. non-reductive physicalism helds the same about the mind.

Let me ask you. Is a H2O molecule wet? is 10 or a billion H2O molecules wet? Wetness is an example of an emergent property. non-reductive physicalism helds the same about the mind.

This talking point is raised by believe[r]s in the materialist/physicalist faith a lot...yet I don't think it really seems comparable to the mind.

Wetness, after all, is a property conferred by consciousness toward the water molecules. There is no feeling of wetness without mind which means the attempt at analogy is unconvincing unless one already believes in the materialist/physicalist religion.

Emergence fails to get around the Something from Nothing problem, unless one accepts the material world can perform illogical miracles.

This talking point is raised by believe[r]s in the materialist/physicalist faith a lot...yet I don't think it really seems comparable to the mind.

Wetness, after all, is a property conferred by consciousness toward the water molecules. There is no feeling of wetness without mind which means the attempt at analogy is unconvincing unless one already believes in the materialist/physicalist religion.

Emergence fails to get around the Something from Nothing problem, unless one accepts the material world can perform illogical miracles.

If there were any good solutions to all questions I assume philosophy wouldn't be a thing.

If there were any good solutions to all questions I assume philosophy wouldn't be a thing.

But even so there is good philosophy versus bad philosophy...

"What would a philosophy look like that had given up on all reductionist dreams?” -Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy

But even so there is good philosophy versus bad philosophy...

"What would a philosophy look like that had given up on all reductionist dreams?” -Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy

I just love when people believes themselves more clever than others…

let’s list some prominent proponents of property dualism:

David Chalmers: He is well-known for his formulation of the "hard problem" of consciousness, which addresses why and how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. Chalmers argues for a form of property dualism in which mental states are irreducible to physical states.


Frank Jackson: Known for his "knowledge argument" against physicalism, which he illustrated through the thought experiment known as "Mary's room."


Thomas Nagel: He is famous for his paper "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" which argues that there is a subjective aspect to the mind that escapes physicalist explanations.

Even though these people don’t belief the mental can be reduced to energy, forces and their interactions, they don’t believe any imaginary spritual substance is needed.

I just love when people believes themselves more clever than others…

let’s list some prominent proponents of property dualism:

David Chalmers: He is well-known for his formulation of the "hard problem" of consciousness, which addresses why and how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. Chalmers argues for a form of property dualism in which mental states are irreducible to physical states.


Frank Jackson: Known for his "knowledge argument" against physicalism, which he illustrated through the thought experiment known as "Mary's room."


Thomas Nagel: He is famous for his paper "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" which argues that there is a subjective aspect to the mind that escapes physicalist explanations.

Even though these people don’t belief the mental can be reduced to energy, forces and their interactions, they don’t believe any imaginary spritual substance is needed.

Curious where you see Chalmer's arguing for property dualism?

The man has even written favorably about Idealism and, IIRC, Substance Dualism.

In any case the point isn't about being "more clever", it's specifically about having a good argument for property dualism...and I'm unconvinced there is any such argument...