Psience Quest

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(2024-01-12, 04:30 PM)stephenw Wrote: [ -> ]As for Penrose and any other effort to embed mind in matter, I reject.  The informational realism model has mental action embedded in the universal wave function.  A separate environment to physical here and now measurements.  An environment where mind can gain information from the past, while in the present and directly effect outcomes in the future, before they happen.

To be clear Penrose has, AFAIK, no definitive statement about this. He just looks at superposition and notes what he calls a "decision" is being made, by which he means some possibility is selected for.

He allows for the possibility of a conscious decision.

Now *I* would ask what else but volition can ensure one possibility from the infinite number of possibilities is selected, which is why I hold to the Volitional Theory of Causation.
(2024-01-12, 06:54 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ].........................................
I think the challenge here remains - why should this stop alternative possibilities from happening?

A "primary rule" is just "law of nature" by another name. Now I think this can be grounded by some entity or entities maintaining the world's rules but that would be a constant process. 
..........................................

But these "rules" of causation or natural laws would be simply the way our reality is laid down to autonomously work - they just couldn't work in any other way. No constant supervision by a conscious entity required. A simple analogy would be a clock - it is so designed that all the clockwork of gears and shafts and levers and springs inevitably result in one mechanically computed minute and second following the next in time order. No conscious overseer and enabler entity is required to constantly keep it from making mistakes and reversing the arrow of time, for instance. It autonomously works this way second to second and minute to minute because that is the way it was designed. I suppose that a "meta-rule" or "meta-law" might also be required to initially foundationally establish that some sort of rules or laws of reality can in fact be laid down such that things simply can't work in any other way. I suppose that your position might be that there is no Designer with the power to do that, thereby requiring causation to be volitional second to second.
(2024-01-12, 06:54 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]I know some physicists feel this way, that "observer" could possibly just be a computer with a detector...but AFAIK it isn't clear if this is an adequate answer. From a Sci-Am article by Stapp, Kafatos, and Kastrup:

Some criticize this contention by claiming that inanimate objects, such as detectors, can also perform measurements, in the sense described above. The problem is that the partitioning of the world into discrete inanimate objects is merely nominal. Is a rock integral to the mountain it helps constitute? If so, does it become a separate object merely by virtue of its getting detached from the mountain? And if so, does it then perform a measurement each time it comes back in contact with the mountain, as it bounces down the slope? Brief contemplation of these questions shows that the boundaries of a detector are arbitrary. The inanimate world is a single physical system governed by QM. Indeed, as first argued by John von Neumann and rearticulated in the work of one of us, when two inanimate objects interact they simply become quantum mechanically “entangled” with one another—that is, they become united in such a way that the behavior of one becomes inextricably linked to the behavior of the other—but no actual measurement is performed."[/i]

However, my concern with grounding causation doesn't rest on QM, rather QM just makes stark the issue. The challenge to me remains that for anything that happens, there seems to be infinite possibilities that didn't happen...even if we're talking about a micron-or-less shift in measurement.

all that quantum probabilistic stuff has had the crap kicked out of it (generalised) by Nima and friends work on scattering amplitudes, they don't use any reference to quantum mechanical processes AT ALL to calculate scattering amplitudes.
(2024-01-07, 04:10 PM)nbtruthman Wrote: [ -> ]I guess I just can't follow you here. It seems to me that subjective experience by its very nature is completely private and inner, and simply has no objective aspect, it has absolutely no "looks like from outside", no quality of being an "external representation" of any objective physical thing. You simply can't physically separate yourself from a perception (composed of mind-stuff) and draw a representation of it. You fundamentally can't see or feel tactilely a thought, which is composed of mind. 

The ultimate inner nature of mind or a subjective experience composed of mind, is a mystery, but it is definitely of a different fundamental nature, a different existential category, than an objective fact of the world. Example: the subjective experiencing of the color red is not physical, whereas the objective reality of the red colored object is a physical reality in the physical world whose different aspects include mass, dimensions, and wavelengths of reflected light subjectively perceived as the color red. 

The objectively physically real object is composed of matter and energy which are in an entirely different existential category than whatever subjective perception is composed of, and therefore the objectively physically real object cannot be an "external representation" of the subjective perception or thought. Like the fact that the mass of an object is fundamentally not an external representation of its perceived color. Its mass has little or no relation to its color.

 
The subjective experiencing of the perception of the color red is an ineffable "thing" with absolutely no weight or physical dimensions, and therefore this subjective state of consciousness and perception simply has no physical aspect or quality. Any more than the subjective perception of the weight of a piece of steel when held in the hand has any actual objective reality of mass or dimensions.

I'm trying to say it in different ways, but basically the ineffable essence of the subjective perception itself is for a fact somehow completely composed of an immaterial "something" we term consciousness or mind, that cannot be objectively and physically seen, felt or smelled. Therefore, subjective perception simply has no objective physical aspect or quality.

A little belatedly, because I've had to think about this, and have also had visitors:

I'm not asserting that the proposed objective aspect of subjective experience that I've termed "mental energy" has such physical properties as mass, although it would certainly have dimensions. I don't know whether or not wavelength would be a potentially applicable property, but I expect not. The nature of mental energy in this respect is simply to have substantive form, with the form correlating perfectly with the inner experience.

You've got me thinking though about what that form would look like (how to describe it), and it's quite difficult to imagine. Some aspects of experience are easier to "formalise" than others: for example, the form (as mental energy) of a visual experience could conceivably be something like a three-dimensional reflection of the actual visual field, but what form would an emotional state take, and how would its form cohere and integrate with the form of the concurrent visual experience?

I think we'd have to posit a multidimensional space of more than three dimensions, which could be an interesting realm to explore. Mental energy's being multidimensional over more than three dimensions would, though, make it harder to identify with (as) the spiritual/astral/etheric body which separates from the physical body during OBEs, because that spiritual body seems to be three-dimensional. It also seems to be able to take on different forms, including a point (invisible) form, and if it was a direct correlate of inner experience, one would expect experience to become non-existent during the period that the spiritual body took on point (invisible) form, but it doesn't.

In any case, as I mentioned earlier, I borrowed this idea from my interpretation of Analytic Idealism, and maybe it's a bad fit for dualism. It should probably be discarded if it is neither necessary nor has explanatory power, or if it really is impossible to imagine its form, or if there is a better alternative.

"Mental energy" seems to be necessary for Analytic Idealism on my interpretation given that the process of "dissociation" of personal psyches from the universal mind is said to be due to certain dimensional structures which develop in that universal mind, which to me implies that the universal mind consists in some sort of substance which takes form - a substance which, of course, I've ended up referring to as "mental energy".

Given that dualism does not entail dissociation, it does not have that same need for mind to take on an objective substantive form, but that leaves open the possibility of some other need, or of it providing enhanced explanatory power.

Let's start with exploring the first possibility: that "mental energy" - the substantive "outer" form of inner experience - is a necessary concept even on dualism's premises.

In this respect, I think there's a clue in your saying that 'the subjective perception itself is for a fact somehow completely composed of an immaterial "something" we term consciousness or mind': composition - even if of consciousness or mind - seems to imply or at least be consistent with some sort of (objective) substantive form. Could this (inevitable?) language of yours - albeit qualified by "immaterial" - hint at the necessity of this concept?

Consider also that it is an objective fact that you and I subjectively experience (assuming you're not simply an advanced AI). I get that it's not a straightforward deduction from subjective experience being an objective fact to subjective experience having an objective substantive form, but it is suggestive, and we also know that our experience is at least differentiated, and thus also suggestive of form.

Regarding the second possibility, that of explanatory power:

Consider that as you yourself acknowledge, consciousness is (objectively) causally efficacious, not just internally, but externally too. Is this causal efficacy best explained by positing that inner, intangible experience is the correlate of an objective substance to which it gives form? It seems easier to understand the causal efficacy of a formal substance than of something ineffable.

Consider, too, the subconscious in its various guises and functions. Consider more specifically the example of "zoning out" - thinking about something else - while driving, and then later returning one's attention to the road, and sometimes being able to recall the last few seconds of driving despite one's awareness having been elsewhere. It seems difficult to explain that subconscious activity as merely "ineffable experience", because it literally was not experienced (it was subconscious), leaving only "ineffability" - and yet, it is in all other respects the same as an experience. This suggests that it is, in some sense, not "ineffable" but in fact "effable", having some objective substantive form which "functions" within (as) the mind though not as a conscious experience.

None of this is rigorous nor, perhaps, especially compelling argumentation; I'm just putting out some ideas for consideration. I'm interested to know what you think, and in what anybody else who sees fit to chime in thinks.

Incidentally, in an earlier post, you lamented the unpopularity of mysterianism, but according to Wikipedia, mysterianism is "a form of nonreductive physicalism", for which I wouldn't have expected you to advocate...
(2024-01-21, 10:40 AM)Laird Wrote: [ -> ]......................................................
Incidentally, in an earlier post, you lamented the unpopularity of mysterianism, but according to Wikipedia, mysterianism is "a form of nonreductive physicalism", for which I wouldn't have expected you to advocate...
......................................................

My use of the term "Mysterianism" was in the sense of the traditional definition of the term, not what is termed "New Mysterianism":

(From Wiki, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colin_McGinn): "New, or epistemological, Mysterianism is contrasted with the old, or ontological, form, namely Mysterianism, that consciousness is inherently mysterious or supernatural. The New Mysterians are not (the) Cartesian dualists (that the Old Mysterians are).  The argument (of the New Mysterians) holds that human minds cannot understand consciousness, not that there is anything supernatural about it."

"New Mysterianism", according to Wiki (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_mysterianism ):

Quote:(A) "New mysterianism, or commonly just mysterianism, is a philosophical position proposing that the hard problem of consciousness cannot be resolved by humans. The unresolvable problem is how to explain the existence of qualia (individual instances of subjective, conscious experience).... Some "mysterians" state their case uncompromisingly (Colin McGinn has said that consciousness is "a mystery that human intelligence will never unravel"); others believe merely that consciousness is not within the grasp of present human understanding, but may be comprehensible to future advances of science and technology."
+
(B) "In terms of the various schools of philosophy of mind, (new) mysterianism is a form of nonreductive physicalism."

Statement (B) about New Mysterianism is essentially giving a why for holding such a belief. This "why" presumably lies in the physicalist contention that mind simply does not really exist - it is some sort of illusion, since absolutely all that exists is composed of matter and energy in motion. Something that does not really exist fundamentally can't be understood by definition.
(2024-01-21, 04:07 PM)nbtruthman Wrote: [ -> ]My use of the term "Mysterianism" was in the sense of the traditional definition of the term, not what is termed "New Mysterianism":

(From Wiki, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colin_McGinn): "New, or epistemological, Mysterianism is contrasted with the old, or ontological, form, namely Mysterianism, that consciousness is inherently mysterious or supernatural. The New Mysterians are not (the) Cartesian dualists (that the Old Mysterians are).  The argument (of the New Mysterians) holds that human minds cannot understand consciousness, not that there is anything supernatural about it."

"New Mysterianism", according to Wiki (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_mysterianism ):


Statement (B) about New Mysterianism is essentially giving a why for holding such a belief. This "why" presumably lies in the physicalist contention that mind simply does not really exist - it is some sort of illusion, since absolutely all that exists is composed of matter and energy in motion. Something that does not really exist fundamentally can't be understood by definition.

Non-reductive physicalism is also a thing with multiple proponents. Non-reductive physicalists believe that the mind and body are two separate but interconnected entities. The mind interacts with the brain and affects physical reality, but it is not solely determined by or reducible to physical interactions.
(2024-01-21, 05:37 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]Non-reductive physicalism is also a thing with multiple proponents. Non-reductive physicalists believe that the mind and body are two separate but interconnected entities. The mind interacts with the brain and affects physical reality, but it is not solely determined by or reducible to physical interactions.

Isn't this Dualism?
(2024-01-21, 08:38 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]Isn't this Dualism?

There's two different forms of dualism. Here's an extract from a book about philosophy of mind:

Quote:The first thing that usually comes to mind when one thinks of dualism is René Descartes’ (1596-1650) substance dualism. However, there is another form of dualism, quite popular nowadays, which is called property dualism, a position which is sometimes associated with non-reductive physicalism.

Property Dualism – Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind (rebus.community)
(2024-01-21, 10:40 AM)Laird Wrote: [ -> ]A little belatedly, because I've had to think about this, and have also had visitors:

I'm not asserting that the proposed objective aspect of subjective experience that I've termed "mental energy" has such physical properties as mass, although it would certainly have dimensions. I don't know whether or not wavelength would be a potentially applicable property, but I expect not. The nature of mental energy in this respect is simply to have substantive form, with the form correlating perfectly with the inner experience.

You've got me thinking though about what that form would look like (how to describe it), and it's quite difficult to imagine. Some aspects of experience are easier to "formalise" than others: for example, the form (as mental energy) of a visual experience could conceivably be something like a three-dimensional reflection of the actual visual field, but what form would an emotional state take, and how would its form cohere and integrate with the form of the concurrent visual experience?

I think we'd have to posit a multidimensional space of more than three dimensions, which could be an interesting realm to explore. Mental energy's being multidimensional over more than three dimensions would, though, make it harder to identify with (as) the spiritual/astral/etheric body which separates from the physical body during OBEs, because that spiritual body seems to be three-dimensional. It also seems to be able to take on different forms, including a point (invisible) form, and if it was a direct correlate of inner experience, one would expect experience to become non-existent during the period that the spiritual body took on point (invisible) form, but it doesn't.

In any case, as I mentioned earlier, I borrowed this idea from my interpretation of Analytic Idealism, and maybe it's a bad fit for dualism. It should probably be discarded if it is neither necessary nor has explanatory power, or if it really is impossible to imagine its form, or if there is a better alternative.

"Mental energy" seems to be necessary for Analytic Idealism on my interpretation given that the process of "dissociation" of personal psyches from the universal mind is said to be due to certain dimensional structures which develop in that universal mind, which to me implies that the universal mind consists in some sort of substance which takes form - a substance which, of course, I've ended up referring to as "mental energy".

Given that dualism does not entail dissociation, it does not have that same need for mind to take on an objective substantive form, but that leaves open the possibility of some other need, or of it providing enhanced explanatory power.

Let's start with exploring the first possibility: that "mental energy" - the substantive "outer" form of inner experience - is a necessary concept even on dualism's premises.

In this respect, I think there's a clue in your saying that 'the subjective perception itself is for a fact somehow completely composed of an immaterial "something" we term consciousness or mind': composition - even if of consciousness or mind - seems to imply or at least be consistent with some sort of (objective) substantive form. Could this (inevitable?) language of yours - albeit qualified by "immaterial" - hint at the necessity of this concept?

Consider also that it is an objective fact that you and I subjectively experience (assuming you're not simply an advanced AI). I get that it's not a straightforward deduction from subjective experience being an objective fact to subjective experience having an objective substantive form, but it is suggestive, and we also know that our experience is at least differentiated, and thus also suggestive of form.

Regarding the second possibility, that of explanatory power:

Consider that as you yourself acknowledge, consciousness is (objectively) causally efficacious, not just internally, but externally too. Is this causal efficacy best explained by positing that inner, intangible experience is the correlate of an objective substance to which it gives form? It seems easier to understand the causal efficacy of a formal substance than of something ineffable.

Consider, too, the subconscious in its various guises and functions. Consider more specifically the example of "zoning out" - thinking about something else - while driving, and then later returning one's attention to the road, and sometimes being able to recall the last few seconds of driving despite one's awareness having been elsewhere. It seems difficult to explain that subconscious activity as merely "ineffable experience", because it literally was not experienced (it was subconscious), leaving only "ineffability" - and yet, it is in all other respects the same as an experience. This suggests that it is, in some sense, not "ineffable" but in fact "effable", having some objective substantive form which "functions" within (as) the mind though not as a conscious experience.

None of this is rigorous nor, perhaps, especially compelling argumentation; I'm just putting out some ideas for consideration. I'm interested to know what you think, and in what anybody else who sees fit to chime in thinks.

Incidentally, in an earlier post, you lamented the unpopularity of mysterianism, but according to Wikipedia, mysterianism is "a form of nonreductive physicalism", for which I wouldn't have expected you to advocate...

A lot to consider. My thinking on this so far.  

Your view as expressed here is that both the conscious mind and the subconscious are "in some sense, not "ineffable" but in fact "effable", having some objective substantive form which "functions" within (as) the mind..."

I would still hold that mind simply can't have an objective, substantive aspect or property or component, because mind is of another entire level of reality than the physical, at least when considering the incommensurability of all known aspects of the two. This means they are totally unsuitable for comparison - that is, they are lacking any features that can be conceivably compared. Like the inner experience of red as opposed to the objective measurable wavelength of the corresponding light waves.

My impression of your "mental energy" is that it is a feat of imagination, a sort of philosophical device invented for the purpose of solving a problem, but something that is actually inconceivable when deeply considered. 

Unfortunately, interactional dualism similarly has features that are inconceivable to the logical mind conditioned to the physical world, but it seems to be considerably simpler. 

There is then the Ockham's Razor principle of parsimony to be considered.

Your suggested mental energy or objective substantive aspect of mind would presumably exist for all states and conditions within the physical world, not just in the special case of embodiment, that is, in the interface between the mind and the physical brain that allows the mind to be causally efficacious in the world. Why isn't "mind energy" always manifesting itself all over the physical world? This would inevitably complicate the theory with all sorts of rules governing how this interface works, and a required explanation as to why the interface normally only works for embodiment. So there would be no simplicity, or principle of parsimony, advantage to the theory over interactional dualism.

But in fact, your theory would seem to be more complicated by far than interactive dualism, because now instead of two, there are three different levels or kinds of existence whose interrelationships have to be explained: (1) consciousness or mind, (2) a hybrid - a mental energy which may be multidimensional that somehow (inconceivably) shares aspects of both physical objectivity and the immaterial mental realms, and (3) the physical realm.

Of course, Ockham's Razor isn't a hard and fast law of nature, it just has a strong tendency to be fulfilled.
(2024-01-21, 09:33 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]There's two different forms of dualism. Here's an extract from a book about philosophy of mind:


Property Dualism – Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind (rebus.community)

Hmmm ->

Quote:Though these are both dualist views, they differ in fundamental ways. Property dualism was proposed as a position that has a number of advantages over substance dualism. One advantage is that, because it does not posit an immaterial mental substance, it is believed to be more scientific than Cartesian dualism and less religiously motivated.

But property dualism seems to be religiously motivated, just toward the materialist-atheist faith?
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