New book, "Heavens on Earth", by Michael Shermer

Examples of ideas initially ridiculed or greeted with skepticism (and one vice versa), which became accepted (rejected) in parallel with the strength of the evidence:
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of...ang_theory
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Just picking the Big Bang as an example, the Wikipedia article does tell us something about the time-course of its acceptance:

"In 1931, Lemaître proposed in his "hypothèse de l'atome primitif" (hypothesis of the primeval atom) that the universe began with the "explosion" of the "primeval atom" — what was later called the Big Bang....
From around 1950 to 1965, the support for these theories was evenly divided, with a slight imbalance arising from the fact that the Big Bang theory could explain both the formation and the observed abundances of hydrogen and helium, ...
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Through the 1970s and 1980s, most cosmologists accepted the Big Bang, but several puzzles remained ..."

So according to Wikipedia it took 40-60 years from the time the theory was proposed, and around 20 years after opinion was evenly divided, before most cosmologists accepted it.

To my mind, that seems entirely consistent with Planck's picture of sceptics dying off rather than being converted.

But it doesn't surprise me at all that someone thinks they know better.

This reply set me thinking of some related ideas which don't seem to really belong in this thread, regarding the experiences and writing of Leo Tolstoy. I may post a separate thread if I get my thoughts together.

I was thinking it of a variation on Pascal's Wager - interesting it made you think of Tolstoy, hopefully you make this thread.

Also a subject we've gone over many times before. The point of evidence is to spread an idea beyond true believers, to scientists who are skeptical of the idea. I can't think of an example offhand, where evidence has failed to do so.

I think this is indicative of just how much Laird's point has passed you by. In large part, many of the parapsychology researchers chose to come to the research from a materialist or atheist background, and (reasonably) found the evidence curious, rather than just dismissing it out of hand as impossible. Then, having done the research, many of them have come to the conclusion that it may be more likely than not that the evidence is suggestive of something that is going on that is outside the scientific mainstream.

This is, of course, entirely different than what you suggest here. You seem to think that the only people to take psi evidence seriously are "true believers", and yet again have done what you've done a million times - blatantly implying that anyone who sees the psi evidence as something more than nothing is just a "true believer", and the only ones whose opinions are worth a dime are scientists who are skeptical of it. You're very, very clearly categorizing it as: "Psi evidence is legit? You're a true believer and not good at analyzing good evidence" and "Real scientist who can make unbiased determinations about the value of the evidence? Your conclusion about the evidence (which in most cases like Chris said they're not actually familiar with) must be more accurate and a result of an unbiased process of considering the evidence". 

It's just unbelievable that you don't see that this is what you are doing. The evidence HAS spread beyond true believers, those who see any little thing that they might find to be "paranormal" and proclaim "ghosts are real! Telepathy is real! The afterlife is real!", to actual, real life researchers who have studied the phenomena. Many, many of those researchers do not agree with you, and their beliefs are based on the research they have done and the evidence they have looked at. 

Have you ever considered the antithesis of "true believers"? Something akin to professional skepticism. In many instances, that is what the scientists you are referencing are, dismissing the research and the conclusions thereof without weighing the evidence against its shortcomings seriously, and without much familiarity with it. 

You really are entirely oblivious to the naivety and weaknesses of your position. The psi evidence has done literally exactly what you said evidence ought to have done, in that it's been considered by serious researchers who do not agree with the unfamiliar scientific community at large. You can't seem to come to grips with the fact that that's the case.

I was thinking it of a variation on Pascal's Wager - interesting it made you think of Tolstoy, hopefully you make this thread.

It surprised me too. When it comes to literature, I was much more familiar with the works of Isaac Asimov and Arthur C. Clarke. Nevertheless, I found something even more resonant in at least one portion of Tolstoy.

Courtesy of the Daily Grail, here's a little Scientific American article by Shermer entitled "Will Science Ever Solve the Mysteries of Consciousness, Free Will and God?":
https://www.scientificamerican.com/artic...l-and-god/

His answer is no. I'm not really a fan of philosophy, but the arguments he makes seem so superficial and silly that I think he should leave it to the philiosophers.

Courtesy of the Daily Grail, here's a little Scientific American article by Shermer entitled "Will Science Ever Solve the Mysteries of Consciousness, Free Will and God?":
https://www.scientificamerican.com/artic...l-and-god/

His answer is no. I'm not really a fan of philosophy, but the arguments he makes seem so superficial and silly that I think he should leave it to the philiosophers.

They are superficial, but I think his ultimate conclusion may not be wrong, at least if by "solve" he means prove beyond and sort of doubt. 

Shermer seems like a hard guy to pin down sometimes.

Just out of curiosity, can someone better versed in these questions clarify whether Shermer's characterisation of the "hard problem" is correct?

The hard problem of consciousness is represented by the qualitative experiences (qualia) of what it is like to be something.

Is it really the same problem as "What is it like to be a bat?"

Just out of curiosity, can someone better versed in these questions clarify whether Shermer's characterisation of the "hard problem" is correct?

The hard problem of consciousness is represented by the qualitative experiences (qualia) of what it is like to be something.

Is it really the same problem as "What is it like to be a bat?"

I am not claiming to be better versed in these questions but that is how I understand the "hard problem". Nagel's example was a bat but we could just as easily say the same for you and I: I can never know how you experience the world. Take something like the colour red, for example. We both see red but do you experience red in the same way that I do? We can't possibly know. We can know the physics of colour wavelengths and the physiology of the eye and brain which process the colour data but we can't know how that feels for each other to look at something red.

The difference is that physics and physiology are objective: they can be measured and thus are accountable to science. The way I feel about something is subjective and personal. It can't be measured, you can't write a formula to encapsulate my feeling. That is why subjectivity is eschewed by scientists and why Alan Wallace wrote a book about the "Taboo of Subjectivity". So "qualia" are those "what it's like" elements to our experience and qualia are the reason there is a hard problem for scientists who are bound by objectivity.

The other part of the Shermer article brings up something we have also discussed at length here already: Scientific (or Methodological) Naturalism. The idea that science can only deal with what scientists deem to be of the "natural" world. That is the material world. So the so-called supernatural, like God or the afterlife, belongs to religion which deals in such concepts but not science. So those who are aligned with scientism will contend that if something can't be examined by science it can be ignored, it is not of the natural world and probably doesn't exist.

Kamarling

Thanks. I must admit I've never really understood clearly what the "hard problem" is.

Regarding the part about God, Shermer's argument seems to blur the distinction between the "natural world" and the "material world", and also the distinction between a God who can influence the natural world and a God who is a "natural being". Perhaps I'm expecting too much from a five-sentence paragraph.

Kamarling

Thanks. I must admit I've never really understood clearly what the "hard problem" is.

Regarding the part about God, Shermer's argument seems to blur the distinction between the "natural world" and the "material world", and also the distinction between a God who can influence the natural world and a God who is a "natural being". Perhaps I'm expecting too much from a five-sentence paragraph.

You are right that he doesn't see that distinction. I think that Shermer has the concept of a God separate from "his" creation. In short, he has the same concept as the bible literalists and fundamentalists. In my view there is no separation therefore no external influence. God is nature and nature is God. The material world is merely a manifestation: something we perceive as material because we are likewise constrained by the same physical laws that are also manifest but, ultimately, exist in the universal mind. Of course, we don't have an adequate lexicon for these concepts - or, at least, I don't.