Neuroscience and free will

That is answered by Final Cause. Now we can get into the question of whether Final Causes are extant I suppose.

Now my ignorance shows. How does Final Cause explain why something else doesn't happen under a free decision, given that something else could have happened?

The "deterministic" causal chain that is happening by Luck? What's to be broken there? Final Cause fills in the explanatory gap, at least in some Possible World which is what I thought the discussion was about -> How could Free Will be Possible?

The deterministic causal chain that would be happening if there were no free will. Or are you saying there is no deterministic causal chain in any world?

I'll have to get used to the nomenclature. As far as I know, the Final Cause is the purpose for making the decision. I'm not sure how that helps us to understand how the decision was made.

At (b). The How of the Possibility Space follows from Tallis' discussions regarding Intentionality, and I still don't understand what kind of "how" you are looking for regarding the final selection.

I have the same question you asked a few pages ago: Why/How did I make the final choice out of the possibility space? Why chicken and not fish?

Do these explain why something else doesn't happen, or just descriptions where causation is taken for granted? If the latter those aren't "how" explanations that would be of value at the level of decisions.

A quick glance suggest it's the latter...

It explains why something else doesn't happen at the higher levels of the events. I agree that there have to be axioms at the lowest level. But that is true for any system, including one involving free will. You are not going to be able to explain the free-causal chain all the way to the bottom, either.

So it's a "just so" offering? Better to have an axiom as it relates to any event, rather the brute facts where bottom level physics is taken for granted. After all a metaphysics of change is something true in all possible worlds, whether this world is a simulation or a god's ephemeral dream..

When you give me the axioms of free will choices, then I'll tell you whether they seem more satisfying then the assumptions of physics. And I can tell you that if the axiom is "... here I make a free decision ...", then I will not be more satisfied.

I don't think the first sentence makes any sense unless it's in relation to an inner cause. Why does anything else obey the assumption that things need causal precursors if something within the universe does not...isn't this an appeal to Luck? Beyond that there are limitations to the randomness otherwise they wouldn't be modeled by stochastic variables - so this isn't really pure randomness, for example position clouds of electrons can be translated across a 3-D coordinate system by moving the macro-objects they constitute.

I will now give up trying to explain why randomness doesn't bother me. It has nothing to do with free decisions, so it really doesn't matter.

Another way of perhaps seeing this --> We can start with change and get into Aquinas' Five Ways, and then we have a God who gives us an explanation for the causal picture. Then we would could just paste whatever "how" explanation you have for your examples at the end of those explanations...that seems more satisfying then papering over the explanatory hole which just takes causation for granted within the context of the physicalist faith in "just so" magic?

I have no idea about this. Is God the axiom underlying the entire thing? What sort of explanations does God give?

I still don't see the problem...I mean I can  see what is missing when physicalists take things like "Laws of Nature" as tenets of their faith, brute facts that paper over causation questions, but the idea of Final Cause as determining the Effect of an Efficient Cause seems perfectly fine as that brings the history of the agent into account within the translation to particular Possibility Spaces. That Consciousness evades and at least in the case of Intentionality runs against the external 3rd person causal flow only highlights the space in the world picture where Final Cause can act.

Okay, I'll give up asking my question, even though it's the same question you asked a few pages ago. There are too many undefined terms in your paragraph. I need to do more homework to understand it.

How does the Final Cause determine the Effect of an Efficient Cause? The Final Cause is the reason a thing is what it is. The Efficient Cause is the agency of the event. How does the reason a thing is what it is determine the agency of the event?

I'm sure I got your definitions wrong there, but I'm just trying to show how difficult this is to understand.

~~ Paul

Stipulating? No, no, I was just giving examples of random and deterministic choosing methods. I expect the free method to be different, not wholly random and deterministic. Or not even at all random and deterministic.


We're talking about the deterministic method now, not the free method. It could be different next Tuesday because there are actually dozens of factors that determine my choice, and also because things happen between now and next Tuesday. And I agree that the choice can come down to preferences, wants, desires, inclinations, and fancies. But that doesn't necessarily mean that any of those emotions are not purely deterministic and random.

So I just want a little script of how a free decision is made. I'm making no assumptions about determinism, randomness, physics, or otherwise.

~~ Paul

Sorry Paul but all I get from that is another demand for a mechanism. What else would you mean by a "script"? I am seeing an assumption that there must be a mechanism which implies a description of the steps involved in that mechanism. Basically, you seem to be asking me to confirm your deterministic view.

I have to say that I get lost in all the philosophical jargon that you, Sciborg and Laird seem to comprehend. My understanding of free will is much more simplistic: a choice made freely which may be influenced by, but not determined by, historical factors.

Sorry Paul but all I get from that is another demand for a mechanism. What else would you mean by a "script"? I am seeing an assumption that there must be a mechanism which implies a description of the steps involved in that mechanism. Basically, you seem to be asking me to confirm your deterministic view.

I have to say that I get lost in all the philosophical jargon that you, Sciborg and Laird seem to comprehend. My understanding of free will is much more simplistic: a choice made freely which may be influenced by, but not determined by, historical factors.

I used the word "script" to try to stay away from "procedure" or "method" or "mechanism." I figure that no matter how the free decision is made, we ought to be able to show the script after the fact.

Now, if there are no steps and just an "instantaneous" free selection from the set of possibilities, then there is no script. I must give up on my hope of an explanation. (And, secretly, I'll think that sounds an awful lot like rolling an n-sided die.)

There is a lot of jargon. You can see from my previous post that I'm getting overwhelmed, too. I'll have to go back and review the definitions of terms. Your simple description is just fine. I have the same question, of course, but you knew that.

~~ Paul

Now my ignorance shows. How does Final Cause explain why something else doesn't happen under a free decision, given that something else could have happened?

There's a need (or so I would argue) for Final Causes, and if Mind can select the Final Cause that's how it makes a free decision.
How I see it is:
Efficient Cause -> What is usually regarded as the Cause of an Event.
Final Cause -> What selects a Possibility from the set of Possible Effects.

Or are you saying there is no deterministic causal chain in any world?

I mean if there is a Mind that has set Final/Inner Causes in such a way, sure. If it's just so, then it's just randomness of a special kind right - things happen predictably for no reason just as they would happen stochastically for no reason?

I'll have to get used to the nomenclature. As far as I know, the Final Cause is the purpose for making the decision. I'm not sure how that helps us to understand how the decision was made.

Is "Possibility Selector" better?

I have the same question you asked a few pages ago: Why/How did I make the final choice out of the possibility space? Why chicken and not fish?

By Mind's ability to make use of Final Cause through Intentionality / Subjectivity / Rationality.

It explains why something else doesn't happen at the higher levels of the events.

But we have numerous examples for that, like "force" or "energy". I don't think that helps for what you are looking for here because if I said Free Will was a "force unto itself" or it was "Unity of Force & Will in a panpsychic sense" you wouldn't be satisfied right?

I agree that there have to be axioms at the lowest level. But that is true for any system, including one involving free will. You are not going to be able to explain the free-causal chain all the way to the bottom, either.

Free will is at the bottom if it's Possibility Selection, and we know there has to be Possibility Selection of some kind b/c we see change.

When you give me the axioms of free will choices, then I'll tell you whether they seem more satisfying then the assumptions of physics. And I can tell you that if the axiom is "... here I make a free decision ...", then I will not be more satisfied.

My point was the axiom of needing Final Causes to be paired with Efficient Causes is applicable where there is change. So would the axiom "Change is bringing about the Potential into Actuality, and can only be done by something that is Actual".

Those apply in all possible worlds, or at least those which have change. (I suspect it holds in static worlds as well.

I will now give up trying to explain why randomness doesn't bother me. It has nothing to do with free decisions, so it really doesn't matter.

Well the randomness you are talking about isn't really random, and is instead neither deterministic nor random. Seems relevant to this dichotomy you believe is an actual thing in Nature as it disproves it outright without even getting into the error of reifying math as describing causation?

I have no idea about this. Is God the axiom underlying the entire thing? What sort of explanations does God give?

My point was the "how" explanation has to include an explanation for change itself, if it is going to get to an explanation for free will. Why the how examples you give are in the wrong explanatory space because I can fit them on after the explanations for events.

Okay, I'll give up asking my question, even though it's the same question you asked a few pages ago. There are too many undefined terms in your paragraph. I need to do more homework to understand it.

I didn't say you need to give up, I said I don't understand what your problem is given the varied answers already given about the failures of the physicalist paradigm and how those explanatory gaps re: Causes + Consciousness have been filled.

Pretty sure all the terms have been defined in the thread?

How does the Final Cause determine the Effect of an Efficient Cause? The Final Cause is the reason a thing is what it is. The Efficient Cause is the agency of the event. How does the reason a thing is what it is determine the agency of the event?

Agency is in the Final Cause, which directs the outcome of Efficient Causes. Free will has to be in the selection of the effect of an Efficient Cause.

I used the word "script" to try to stay away from "procedure" or "method" or "mechanism." I figure that no matter how the free decision is made, we ought to be able to show the script after the fact.

Now, if there are no steps and just an "instantaneous" free selection from the set of possibilities, then there is no script. I must give up on my hope of an explanation. (And, secretly, I'll think that sounds an awful lot like rolling an n-sided die.)

There is a lot of jargon. You can see from my previous post that I'm getting overwhelmed, too. I'll have to go back and review the definitions of terms. Your simple description is just fine. I have the same question, of course, but you knew that.

~~ Paul

I think I see the difference being that those steps you want to see are, in your view, determined. That is, they could not have been otherwise. I accept that there may be prior influences but reject the hard determinism that says that only one choice is possible. That's where subjectivity comes in. Influences such as inspiration, mood, whims, etc. are all subjective.

I have to say that I get lost in all the philosophical jargon that you, Sciborg and Laird seem to comprehend. My understanding of free will is much more simplistic: a choice made freely which may be influenced by, but not determined by, historical factors.

Ultimately I agree with your definition, and I am not sure exactly why immaterialists have to worry...

I am trying, however, to comprehend what the seeming problem exactly is. I see why it's a problem for materialism which says physics is all of reality, and this why is why nihilists say materialism makes human existence worthless...but why it's a problem generally even if God exists is quite difficult to understand...

Maybe those who favor explanations from Mind -> World see deep issues with material causation, while those who favor going from World -> Mind see deep problems with mental causation?

I was doing a bit of google searching and happened across a Reddit discussion (for clarity, I am not involved in the discussion - it is an unknown third party) involving Noam Chomsky. He seems to address what Paul seems to conclude, i.e. that there are only two possibilities: determinism and randomness. Make of it what you will:

I had a really interesting exchange with Chomsky on free will recently. I thought I'd share it here.

Me: Hi, Mr. Chomsky. The people who don't believe we have free will often make this point:

"Let's say we turned back time to a specific decision that you made. You couldn't have done otherwise; the universe, your body, your brain, the particles in your brain, were in such a condition that your decision was going to happen. At that very moment you made the decision, all the neurons were in such a way that it had to happen. And this all applies to the time leading up to the decision as well. In other words, you don't have free will. Your "self", the control you feel that you have, is an illusion made up by neurons, synapses etc. that are in such a way that everything that happens in your brain is forced."

What is wrong with this argument?

Noam Chomsky: It begs the question: it assumes that all that exists is determinacy and randomness, but that is exactly what is in question. It also adds the really outlandish assumption that we know that neurons are the right place to look. That’s seriously questioned, even within current brain science.

Me: Okay, but whatever it is that's causing us to make decisions, wasn't it in such a way that the decision was forced? So forget neurons and synapses, take the building blocks of the universe, then (strings or whatever they are), aren't they in such a condition that you couldn't have acted in a different way? Everything is physical, right? So doesn't the argument still stand?

Noam Chomsky: The argument stands if we beg the only serious question, and assume that the actual elements of the universe are restricted to determinacy and randomness. If so, then there is no free will, contrary to what everyone believes, including those who write denying that there is free will – a pointless exercise in interaction between two thermostats, where both action and response are predetermined (or random).

I was doing a bit of google searching and happened across a Reddit discussion (for clarity, I am not involved in the discussion - it is an unknown third party) involving Noam Chomsky. He seems to address what Paul seems to conclude, i.e. that there are only two possibilities: determinism and randomness. Make of it what you will:

I agree with Chomsky but I'd go further - determinism and randomness are just external expressions of our expectation. The very fact you can put a probability distribution on something you cannot explain in terms of causes (the position of the electron in its "cloud" of possible coordinates) shows that.

There's a need (or so I would argue) for Final Causes, and if Mind can select the Final Cause that's how it makes a free decision.
How I see it is:
Efficient Cause -> What is usually regarded as the Cause of an Event.
Final Cause -> What selects a Possibility from the set of Possible Effects.

I mean if there is a Mind that has set Final/Inner Causes in such a way, sure. If it's just so, then it's just randomness of a special kind right - things happen predictably for no reason just as they would happen stochastically for no reason?

The existence of physical axioms doesn't seem like any more or less "no reason" than the existence of the Final Cause. There has to be something at the bottom.

Is "Possibility Selector" better?

That's a fine term, too. Though it doesn't answer my question.

By Mind's ability to make use of Final Cause through Intentionality / Subjectivity / Rationality.

It's that "make use of Final Cause" part that seems vague to me.

But we have numerous examples for that, like "force" or "energy". I don't think that helps for what you are looking for here because if I said Free Will was a "force unto itself" or it was "Unity of Force & Will in a panpsychic sense" you wouldn't be satisfied right?

That's actually a small step. Now I'd like to know how the "force" effects a decision.

Free will is at the bottom if it's Possibility Selection, and we know there has to be Possibility Selection of some kind b/c we see change.

I'm okay with Free Will at the bottom. But we still don't know what attributes it has (spin?  ) and we don't know how the layers between it and the actual choice work.

My point was the axiom of needing Final Causes to be paired with Efficient Causes is applicable where there is change. So would the axiom "Change is bringing about the Potential into Actuality, and can only be done by something that is Actual".

I'll have to study this, since it reads to me like a sequence of capitalized words.

Well the randomness you are talking about isn't really random, and is instead neither deterministic nor random. Seems relevant to this dichotomy you believe is an actual thing in Nature as it disproves it outright without even getting into the error of reifying math as describing causation?

Why is what I think is random not actually random?

I didn't say you need to give up, I said I don't understand what your problem is given the varied answers already given about the failures of the physicalist paradigm and how those explanatory gaps re: Causes + Consciousness have been filled.

They haven't been filled from my point of view. And this is probably how the story goes. You have invented a bunch of terms that are somehow relevant to the question of how a free decision is made. None of this gives me any understanding of how these various agents and causes make a free decision.

Pretty sure all the terms have been defined in the thread?

Yes, but they are so foreign to me that I have to go back and reread many posts.

Agency is in the Final Cause, which directs the outcome of Efficient Causes. Free will has to be in the selection of the effect of an Efficient Cause.

I believe that is a nonstandard definition of final cause.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arist...ty/#FouCau

~~ Paul

I think I see the difference being that those steps you want to see are, in your view, determined. That is, they could not have been otherwise. I accept that there may be prior influences but reject the hard determinism that says that only one choice is possible. That's where subjectivity comes in. Influences such as inspiration, mood, whims, etc. are all subjective.

No, I'm specifically searching for an explanation of an indetermined decision. (I'm not convinced that the subjective aspects of our minds can't just be deterministic and random.)

So let's say that my decision is partially determined, a bit random, and partially free. I could then write a script after the fact, but it would have a hole in it, an elision.

Code:

1. first step
2. second step
.
. poof
.
n. final step

I'm just suspicious about the "poof" part. Is there no way to describe how that free choice is made? Even a simple one where I'm just choosing between chicken and fish?

~~ Paul