Neuroscience and free will

Nope. There is no "poof" step any different to any of the others. Each step is freely willed.

Every step? There are no intermediate steps that are algorithmic or random?

What if part of my decision making process is to grab a random number from a true random number generator?

~~ Paul

Yes I'm sure. Physics is about relations, without explaining relata, so it only makes sense it cannot explain intrinsic properties like causal power.

Right, but my question is whether physics is just admitting something that cannot be done at all, even with some sort of "free will theory."

~~ Paul

This is the crucial point. Paul would say that the ice melts because of a "nomologically necessary law" - but we have seen that when asked in virtue of exactly what it is that this "law" is "necessary", and how such a "law" is different from an "accidental generalisation", Paul has no answer, and even acknowledged that to the extent that laws are descriptive (which is his position - descriptivism), there is no difference. In other words, so-called nomologically "necessary" laws are as good as accidents. What more does one need to validate Sci's reasoning above?

Whoa, hang on. Where did I ever state that laws were necessary, nomologically or otherwise? I agree that laws are descriptive. My argument was about whether laws being descriptive dictates that there can be nothing that ever happens out of necessity. You said descriptive laws do dictate that, apparently having something to do with their being metaphysically necessary. Then we got onto nomological necessity and I no longer know what you think about the prescriptive aspects of descriptivism.

But here is what you should not do: Take the fact that we cannot distinguish a set of necessary events from a set of accidentally correlated events and use that as an opening into which to insert some form of free decision. There might be that opening, or there might not be. You need other good reasons to insert free will.

~~ Paul

[Laird]

What if part of my decision making process is to grab a random number from a true random number generator?

Then that part of the decision-making process (the consultation of a random number generator), too, is freely willed - though of course the number itself would not be (any psi effects notwithstanding).

In any case, you're quibbling. You know as well as the rest of us that people other than Luke Rhinehart don't (routinely) consult random number sources as part of their decision-making processes.

[Laird]

My argument was about whether laws being descriptive dictates that there can be nothing that ever happens out of necessity.

So, explain what you mean by "necessity". Which type of necessity relating to physical events do you think is possible, since that seems to be your claim: that there could be some sort of "necessity" to physical events. In virtue of what (since it is not their existence/truth in every possible world) are (or might be) the "things that happen" necessary? If not nomological necessity, then what? And in any case, justify (the possibility of) that "necessity".

You need other good reasons to insert free will.

Nonsense. You need good reasons to deny that which we all straightforwardly experience every day. You are the one making (or at least starting from the supposedly default position of) the utterly counter-intuitive and bizarre claim that when each of us go about our daily lives making the both trivial and vastly consequential decisions that we do, we are not "really" making decisions; our choices are somehow "necessitated" (by some sort of necessity which you are yet to justify).

That our intuitions are justified should be the default starting point, not the utterly counter-intuitive position from which you start. All Sci and I have been doing is providing a sound basis on which our totally reasonable intuitions can be (are) justified.

[Laird]

You know, I'm just not so sure about this hard determinism idea. Until somebody breaks down a decision into all of the deterministic steps involved, I don't think I can accept it. Paul, can you please do that for me? Prove that hard determinism is possible. Give me an example of a choice that I thought was free but is instead deterministic. Break it down into steps, please. Anytime is fine.

Then that part of the decision-making process (the consultation of a random number generator), too, is freely willed - though of course the number itself would not be (any psi effects notwithstanding).

In any case, you're quibbling. You know as well as the rest of us that people other than Luke Rhinehart don't (routinely) consult random number sources as part of their decision-making processes.

Wait, the random number itself is not willed? Okay, so not every event in the universe is willed. Or am I confused?

So then what if I have a table that I consult, indexed by the resulting random number, to take the next step?

I suppose you can always say that I freely choose whether to continue with my procedure. But there are still steps, in between the freely willed "continue or don't continue" steps, that are not free.

As far as not consulting true random number generators: There may be some in my brain.

~~ Paul

You know, I'm just not so sure about this hard determinism idea. Until somebody breaks down a decision into all of the deterministic steps involved, I don't think I can accept it. Paul, can you please do that for me? Prove that hard determinism is possible. Give me an example of a choice that I thought was free but is instead deterministic. Break it down into steps, please. Anytime is fine.

I can't, and neither can you. I'm not asking for a complete sequence of steps. I'm allowing for free will and then asking for a simple, hand-waving description of how I can take just one free step. How do I choose between chicken and fish once I've somehow narrowed it down to those two choices?

Here is how I might do it deterministically:

1. I had chicken for the last two days, so assign .3 to chicken and .7 to fish.

2. I do not have any fish in my house, so assign .9 to chicken and .1 to fish.

3. The resulting weights are .27 for chicken and .07 for fish, so chicken it is.

I could even throw in a little randomness:

1. I had check for the last two days, so assign .3 + rand(-.2, +.2) to chicken ...

Of course, the actual decision is 100 times more complicated and almost surely involves randomness (say, due to thermal noise in the brain).

I want something even simpler for a free decision. Given that chicken and fish are in the selection space, my free will chooses between them by (possibly doing something algorithmic and then) selecting the result according to ...

~~ Paul

So, explain what you mean by "necessity". Which type of necessity relating to physical events do you think is possible, since that seems to be your claim: that there could be some sort of "necessity" to physical events. In virtue of what (since it is not their existence/truth in every possible world) are (or might be) the "things that happen" necessary? If not nomological necessity, then what? And in any case, justify (the possibility of) that "necessity".

Some things may be necessary because they are axiomatic. Quarks, possibly. Remember, I agree that we need axioms in physics, but so also does any other model. Other things may be necessary because they follow inexorably from the axiomatic things. So spin, for example, may follow inexorably. You may call that another axiom if you want. I cannot answer the question "in virtue of what?"

We cannot rule this out merely by defining a term like "descriptive laws" to mean that there can be no events that happen by necessity. We could, of course, postulate a world where absolutely nothing happens by necessity, but that doesn't mean that our world is that kind of world.

So that leaves descriptive laws merely as an agreement that we are creating the laws by looking at the world and modeling how it appears to work.

Nonsense. You need good reasons to deny that which we all straightforwardly experience every day. You are the one making (or at least starting from the supposedly default position of) the utterly counter-intuitive and bizarre claim that when each of us go about our daily lives making the both trivial and vastly consequential decisions that we do, we are not "really" making decisions; our choices are somehow "necessitated" (by some sort of necessity which you are yet to justify).

I do not straightforwardly experience making free decisions. Perhaps your experience is different.

That our intuitions are justified should be the default starting point, not the utterly counter-intuitive position from which you start. All Sci and I have been doing is providing a sound basis on which our totally reasonable intuitions can be (are) justified.

I think our intuitions are exactly not the default starting point.

~~ Paul

[Laird]

I can't

I'm just looking for a hand-waving description of a deterministic decision. Can nobody give me a hand-waving description of a deterministic decision? Just a single step would be fine. A necessary step. A necessitating step. Oh me, oh my, but where can I find my hand-waving description of a deterministic decision? How am I to accept the possibility of a deterministic decision without even a basic, hand-waving description? Alas, alas. Please, somebody. Put me out of my misery.