Neuroscience and free will

Paul, I wonder if it isn't a description you are looking for generically but a description that suits your perspective?

No one is going to be able to provide a description that jives with current science.   If such an explanation were known (ore perhaps more aptly "existed"), we wouldn't even be having this discussion.

Further, let's assume someone posted a description in this thread that you found satisfactory.  What then?  What does the description actually do for you, again presuming it doesn't have a scientifically provable basis?

This is why I continue to struggle with how you can imagine the concept of "random" but can't imagine the concept of "free decisions".  To me both are equally intractable in that neither has any scientific basis and are both, effectively, faith or philosophical concepts.

I'm not looking for a description that fits into current science. I'm just looking for some kind of description that sounds like something more than a deterministic decision with coin flips. I'm not sure what I'll do with it, but it sure would be interesting and jiggle my worldview.

I'm not sure what to say about random. If an event has no precursors, then it is arbitrary. That seems simple enough: no causes, then random. Free decisions have to be causal in some way (perhaps a "new" way), because if they are not, then they are arbitrary. Now, perhaps there aren't any actual random events. In that case, we don't have to worry about how they happen.

~~ Paul

Well, if that selection from the possibility space is not determined by those possibilities and the current state of affairs, then you are leaping outside the deterministic/random causal chain. If the "causal chain" is taken to include free decisions, too, then of course I agree that you aren't leaping outside the causal chain, because there is no way to leap out of it.

There is no such thing as a deterministic/random causal chain, because determinism and random as terms don't offer causal explanations but expressions of probabilistic confidence.

It seems to me that the question of Causes is one of the source of the decision, not an explanation for how it is performed.

I recall way back in this thread you said you would accept an axiomatic free will if it could be shown how it relates to the past, so I'm not sure what you are asking for now?

If free will isn't an axiomatic, simple/non-composite part of the causal sequence then it's not really free. it can't an inner "how" any more than a ground level possibility selector has some internal "how", because that is a path to infinite regress on the vertical axis of a single event.

Trying to find the how of Ground-floor possibility selectors is analogous to infinite simulations, each one dependent on the simulated processor of the lower level sim...nothing would ever happen.

Again, I'm not sure why the lowest levels of physics can't be its own ground floor. Is that any more of a just-so claim than postulating a separate agent/being/thing that is the ground floor?

Physics isn't about causes, but about relations. Physics doesn't include explanations for causes, see Penrose and Feyman quotes on the mystery of "decisions" re: indeterminate particles.

There's also Gregg Rosenberg's book A Place for Consciousness for a more general treatment on the lack of causes.

Aren't you the one who said for the physicalist the Universe is held by luck? I've instead pointed out why there's a need for possibility selection - several pages of posts were spent discussing this. A "just so" claim, to me, is appealing to the laws of physics when asked how a circuit works.

It's obliviousness like this that makes it not worth engaging with you further. You don't seem to understand the implications of that which you say. You are the one arguing for nomological necessity, but when offered the opportunity to make a cogent argument for it, you instead say something that utterly undercuts it.

How could we distinguish a nomologically necessary law from an accidentally true generalization? I'm working from the pragmatic viewpoint that descriptive laws are nothing more than our best guess based on observations (and are not prescriptive in any way). That situation does not allow us to make the distinction. We would have to prove that there are no exceptions to the law. Or we would have to prove that every event X happens according to the law even though it is not necessary that they all do. How can we do that?

Also, this issue doesn't matter if we are going to adopt your (apparent) viewpoint that laws are metaphysical necessities that apply to all possible worlds. But I may be misunderstanding you in this regard.

~~ Paul

There is no such thing as a deterministic/random causal chain, because determinism and random as terms don't offer causal explanations but expressions of probabilistic confidence.

It seems to me that a deterministic explanation of billiard balls is a causal explanation. Unless you insist that the explanation include an description of how the lowest-level physical events ground the world and start the chain. I daresay that explanations of free will are also going to be missing the start of the causal chain. Because, as you say, ultimately there is an infinite regress.

But if free decisions are part of the causal chain, then I agree that there are no leaps outside the causal chain.

I recall way back in this thread  you said you would accept an axiomatic free will if it could be shown how it relates to the past, so I'm not sure what you are asking for now?

Just because free will might be an axiom doesn't mean we should give up asking how the axiomatic properties or events work. And even if it relates to the past, we still don't know why a particular choice is made from the possibility space, as you noted above.

If free will isn't an axiomatic, simple/non-composite part of the causal sequence then it's not really free. it can't an inner "how" any more than a ground level possibility selector has some internal "how", because that is a path to infinite regress on the vertical axis of a single event.

Trying to find the how of Ground-floor possibility selectors is analogous to  infinite simulations, each one dependent on the simulated processor of the lower level sim...nothing would ever happen.

Then I guess my question is hopeless. Note that we have many ground-level existants in physics, but we can still describe their attributes and how they operate and interact.

Asking how free will operates doesn't seem equivalent to asking why a particle has spin, or even asking why two particles can't occupy the same space. We have various observations and theories about the particles. We have quantum explanations of Pauli exclusion. Granted, none of them give us a warm and fuzzy feeling that we really know why Pauli exclusion exists. But there is a heck of a lot more there about how it operates than we have about how a free selection is made.

Aren't you the one who said for the physicalist the Universe is held by luck? I've instead pointed out why there's a need for possibility selection - several pages of posts were spent discussing this. A "just so" claim, to me, is appealing to the laws of physics when asked how a circuit works.

I don't think that was me. But I would distinguish the need for something from the description of how the something "operates."

~~ Paul

It seems to me that a deterministic explanation of billiard balls is a causal explanation. Unless you insist that the explanation include an description of how the lowest-level physical events ground the world and start the chain. I daresay that explanations of free will are also going to be missing the start of the causal chain. Because, as you say, ultimately there is an infinite regress.

The question for billiard ball explanations is why something else doesn't happen.

But if free decisions are part of the causal chain, then I agree that there are no leaps outside the causal chain.

Well then we should be good, since Final Causes determine the Effect of Efficient Causes. ("I can still hear you saying, never break the chain")

Just because free will might be an axiom doesn't mean we should give up asking how the axiomatic properties or events work. And even if it relates to the past, we still don't know why a particular choice is made from the possibility space, as you noted above.

If it follows from the Efficient Causes we do know why. At some point though possibility selection must occur and there must be a Possibility Space otherwise there'd be no decisions.

Then I guess my question is hopeless. Note that we have many ground-level existants in physics, but we can still describe their attributes and how they operate and interact.

Asking how free will operates doesn't seem equivalent to asking why a particle has spin, or even asking why two particles can't occupy the same space. We have various observations and theories about the particles. We have quantum explanations of Pauli exclusion. Granted, none of them give us a warm and fuzzy feeling that we really know why Pauli exclusion exists. But there is a heck of a lot more there about how it operates than we have about how a free selection is made.

No, there's actually less of a "how" in the examples you offered AFAICTell, but perhaps if this is the real "how" you wanted, and not a "how" like how circuits work, please tell us more about Pauli exclusion.

And it's less a warm fuzzy feeling than a feeling that human achievement and moral responsibility - two things materialism negates - are preserved.

I don't think that was me. But I would distinguish the need for something from the description of how the something "operates."

~~ Paul

How do the laws of physics operate? How does randomness operate?

This is why I continue to struggle with how you can imagine the concept of "random" but can't imagine the concept of "free decisions".  To me both are equally intractable in that neither has any scientific basis and are both, effectively, faith or philosophical concepts.

I'd contend "random" is a fundamental violation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. And you cannot have a bit of randomness, it undoes the entire rational picture simply by its presence.

Free will is simply an application of Final Cause, determining the effect of a set of Efficient Causes.

As for scientific basis, since "hard" science (almost?) always presupposes causation I'm not sure how one is going to get to a scientific basis unless its something like a reproducible example of macro-PK?

Another way to saying this would be science - or at least physics - is concerned with relations rather than relata but Consciousness and Cause are located in relata.

Right. This is what motivated my answer to Paul's question, "What are the laws of free choices?" - the answer is there aren't any, there are simply psychological reasons why some people tend to make some choices more often than, and make some more often in the same way as, others.

I was thinking about this, no[t] so much looking for "free will laws" but rather further elaborating on the Ground of Being.

In some sense this is the final piece of the argument, a Immaterialist Causal Closure.

I am a bit wary of how the topic of Free Will becomes a topic of everything, and this would contribute to that vein by going into arguments for "God".

OTOH, this does get to why Possibility Selectors ultimately are examples of Mental Causation rather than some other mysterious non-conscious Possibility Selector that I guess would be the stuff of physicalist dreams if it were to be known. 

So we'd go from "Consciousness is the best case for Possibility Selection" to "Consciousness has to be the Possibility Selector at the Ground Floor".


It allows one to offer up statements like this for panentheism (from Eric Weiss' The Involution):

At the level of Overmind, we find the Divine Souls. At the Supermind level, each Spirit knows itself to be an individual expression of the One, and knows all of the other Spirits to be expressions of that same One. Thus, it knows all others as intimately as it knows itself. In addition, all of its experiences are illuminated by the sense that it itself, as the One that contains and pervades all, its freely choosing its own experience. When some group of Spirits chooses, then, to put behind, or to leave above the threshold, their sense of Transcendence, they retain “on the surface,” their sense of Universality, but they lose the pervading sense of freedom that they had at the Supermental level. The Overmental Soul knows itself to be one with the others, and to be, in some way, one with the whole of the universe that it inhabits, but that universe is, in some important sense, fixed and determined. There would be a sense of freedom within that particular universe, but the Souls in this universe would operate as if they did not have the creative freedom to change the rules of the universe itself.[3]

7. A question arises here as to why Sachchidananda, an absolutely free and utterly conscious appreciation of inherent value, would indulge in this sort of self-limitation. It can only be for an amplification of appreciation, and we can get a sense of this possibility by looking at our own behavior. Within the limits of our finite existence, we human beings experience a large degree of freedom. We can, for example, organize our interactions with each other in a nearly infinite number of ways. And yet we constantly take delight in restricting our behavior so that it fits within a defined set of rules. We do this, for example, when we play games, or when we engage in business, or when we become identified with a particular set of social roles. In each of these cases, we find that limiting ourselves to a specific set of rules allows us to amplify our experience of certain values. We can imagine the Divine as engaging in self-limitation in this same spirit.

Or this one for classical theism (from Feser's Aquinas for Beginners)

Now a question suggested by our discussion of the argument from motion in chapter 3 is whether our wills can in fact be free. For if God is the first mover underlying all the motion or change that takes place in the world, that would have to include the motion or change that results from our voluntary actions, in which case God must be the ultimate cause of those actions. But in that case, how can they be free actions? Aquinas considers this question himself (QDM 6; cf. ST I.83.1). His answer is that though God does move the will, “since he moves every kind of thing according to the nature of the moveable thing … he also moves the will according to its condition, as indeterminately disposed to many things, not in a necessary way” (QDM 6). That is to say, the nature of the will is to be open to various possible intellectually apprehended ends, while something unfree, like an impersonal physical object or process, is naturally determined to its ends in an unthinking, necessary way.

Feser, Edward. Aquinas . Oneworld Publications (academic). Kindle Edition.

Perhaps this sort of thing needs its own thread? I think this thread was supposed to be about Neuroscience & Philosophy....

I'm not looking for a description that fits into current science. I'm just look for some kind of description that sounds like something more than a deterministic decision with coin flips. I'm not sure what I'll do with it, but it sure would be interesting and jiggle my worldview.

I'm not sure what to say about random. If an event has no precursors, then it is arbitrary. That seems simple enough: no causes, then random. Free decisions have to be causal in some way (perhaps a "new" way), because if they are not, then they are arbitrary. Now, perhaps there aren't any actual random events. In that case, we don't have to worry about how they happen.

~~ Paul

I get that the bold above (mine) seems logical.  I also get that there isn't a satisfactorily similar logical description for free decision-making.

What I don't follow is how the bold, while seemingly logical, is satisfactory.  It isn't for me since I (still) don't know what random means.  I don't think of things in daily life as being random under the definition you provide.  For me random seems much more akin to "not understood" (credit back to Max for introducing that concept in this thread).

A coin flip, for example, isn't a random event.  It is the inability of the human flipping the coin to be perfectly consistent in the action that introduces the illusion of random.

We have already covered science's inability as yet to prove the concept of random as an actual phenomena.

It seems to me that you may be impacted, like all of us, by your own biased worldview on this topic.  The (again seemingly logical) notion of an event with no precursors must not challenge your worldview while the concepts Laird/Sci and others have offered on the free-decision question does.  Regardless, neither "definition" seems satisfactory or even "understandable" in any sort of scientific manner.  You should have angst about both it seems to me.

Regardless, neither "definition" seems satisfactory or even "understandable" in any sort of scientific manner.  You should have angst about both it seems to me.

Can you elaborate on what is meant by "scientific manner"? Thanks!

So you just don't think it's possible that I believe the answers are not actually answering my question?

If you think my question has been answered, I would be forever in your debt if you could post the statements that answer my question, or link to a particular post. Then I will honestly tell you whether I think that answers my question.

Please note that my question is: How does a free agent make a free decision? Or, as Sciborg put it: "Why this particular resolution to this event instead of another?" My question is not: Who or where is the free agent?

~~ Paul

What I believe is that only you have a clue about what you are questioning. I don't. I tried, earlier in the thread, to get you to explain what you are looking for but you just repeat yourself as though it is self-evident. Clearly Laird thinks he's answered you at length. Or at least as best he can answer. I also suggested that perhaps you are asking the impossible - that there is no answer to your question. Perhaps you know that already and your tactic is mere deflection.

It seems to me that your question is asking to prove a negative, as in: prove that the outcome of every choice is not determined. In that way, you are not required to provide a step-wise sequence of deterministic events leading to that outcome, all you need to say is "determined - if not, prove me wrong". 

It seems obvious to most taking part in this discussion that we, as agents, have free will. We cite examples of creativity, novelty, spontaneity, etc., as well as adding some lengthy philosophical discourse (particularly Laird and Sciborg) in support of that conclusion. It also seems obvious that you feel you can just reject all of that by repeating your question as though we should be able to supply you with an answer that you can accept, and only one that you can accept. You get to decide what criteria the answer must meet but all you can offer by way of description of those criteria is repetition of the question. 

Here's a little example of the kind of response from you that I'm talking about. Nbtruthman stated:

So you can't get around it, human creativity requires that there exist the same true freedom of thought (generating possibilities) and action that is needed for true free will.

Your response:

I await a proof of this claim.

If all you are going to offer is a repeated variation on "prove it", then you should understand why Laird called time on his participation.