Kastrup: Idea of the World

"Reply" is messed up for me...


No. I'm asking why if "experiential qualia" are "fundamental" we don't all "experience" them the same.

But if the experience is different aren't we experiencing different qualia?

How else would we know there's a difference in the experience without consciousness being involved from the subject being studied to the observations made by those doing the study?

This has always been my issue. I don't even think qualia are real, I think they really are just the result of calculations of one form or another. My reasons are difference though. Being legally blind and then having out of body experiences where suddenly all my blind spots go away is one. Given I can't even imagine visuals in those blindspots it seems like their existence is tied to biology purely. Likewise the one time I possessed a cat. Seeing through its eyes was fascinating. It seemed to highlight anything that was an edge, and even though it seemed like everything was more or less black and white, or at least severely muted colours it almost seemed to make it easier to pick things out. It now makes so much sense to me how cats can be such good predators. Colour vision would've gotten in the way. But it also makes sense why they can make the errors they do when jumping, like jumping into water because it looked like the shore was there. This was clearly a result of the cats brain, since I was not a cat in any sort of "soul" way, but I was still experiencing it anyways.

I'm unclear what it means to be or not be a cat in a "soul" way? Do you mean your identity was still your own human personality but within the body of the cat?

No. I'm asking why if "experiential qualia" are "fundamental" we don't all "experience" them the same.

Perhaps because "experiential qualia" are "fundamental".

Your question seems to be rooted in an expectation that qualia can be reduced to something else. That shows a gap in linguistics. Look at what the words say.

This has always been my issue. I don't even think qualia are real, I think they really are just the result of calculations of one form or another. My reasons are difference though. Being legally blind and then having out of body experiences where suddenly all my blind spots go away is one. Given I can't even imagine visuals in those blindspots it seems like their existence is tied to biology purely. Likewise the one time I possessed a cat. Seeing through its eyes was fascinating. It seemed to highlight anything that was an edge, and even though it seemed like everything was more or less black and white, or at least severely muted colours it almost seemed to make it easier to pick things out. It now makes so much sense to me how cats can be such good predators. Colour vision would've gotten in the way. But it also makes sense why they can make the errors they do when jumping, like jumping into water because it looked like the shore was there. This was clearly a result of the cats brain, since I was not a cat in any sort of "soul" way, but I was still experiencing it anyways.

Cat vision is not something I've experienced. But it is fascinating.

One difference between human and cat vision is sensitivity to motion.  As humans our peripheral vision is quite poor. But we are highly sensitive to motion, even at the extreme edges of our vision. (I'm aware that your own sight may not fit this description).

On the other hand, cats are highly sensitive to lateral motion.  When a mouse scoots across the floor, the cat is incredibly alert. But vertical motion - such as a tasty treat dropped in front of its eyes - can pass unnoticed.

I tend to regard these things as the technological mechanisms. But behind that technology is an observer, whether a cat or a human. I can't comment on the cat as an observer, but as a human, I'm aware of myself peering out at the world. That awareness isn't part of the technology, of necessity, it comes after the technology has done its job.

On the subject of animal awareness, I've had very frequent dreams of running very fast on all fours. The part I find intriguing is that to achieve such speed, it is always the front legs which play the greatest role. That surprises me, since in humans and many animals, the hind legs are the strongest. 

One day, I saw a video of a bison running, and noted how its front parts were very strong. That's not to say that my dreams were of being a bison, but certainly of some animal with strong front legs, propelling it along.

But if the experience is different aren't we experiencing different qualia?

Exactly my point. But that is consistent with an interaction with an external reality. It seems less consistent with whirlpools of consciousness experiences in a river of consciousness experiences. If the (oft-used) "redness of red" isn't fundamental, what is?

What do you think is happening when different wavelengths of light interact with retinal cone cells? I don't think we can regard this as a neuronal correlate of consciousness... This well understood process does seem very suggestive of an "external reality".

Perhaps because "experiential qualia" are "fundamental".

What does that sentence mean to you. I maybe misconstruing "fundamental".

Your question seems to be rooted in an expectation that qualia can be reduced to something else. That shows a gap in linguistics. Look at what the words say.

No. I'm assuming the opposite, that qualia can't be reduced to something else. That is how I'm understanding (idealist) qualia.

Exactly my point. But that is consistent with an interaction with an external reality. It seems less consistent with whirlpools of consciousness experiences in a river of consciousness experiences. If the (oft-used) "redness of red" isn't fundamental, what is?

What do you think is happening when different wavelengths of light interact with retinal cone cells? I don't think we can regard this as a neuronal correlate of consciousness... This well understood process does seem very suggestive of an "external reality".

How does it suggest a truly external, independent reality, exactly? How exactly is it more consistent, supposedly, with a truly external reality, as opposed to an entirely unknown objective reality filtered unconsciously through a subjective lens?

Of that, I don't think you have any answer or evidence.

And no, "different wavelengths of light interact with retinal cone cells" isn't satisfactory evidence of anything.

You have to explain how retinal cone cells fundamentally work to translate raw light into subjectively perceived shades of colour.

No. I'm assuming the opposite, that qualia can't be reduced to something else. That is how I'm understanding (idealist) qualia.

You're trying to understand an Idealist concept through your Physicalist lens, so of course you won't be able to understand it properly, through that perspective.

Qualia cannot be reduced to matter and physics, but that doesn't mean different consciousnesses cannot experience the same fundamental Qualia differently.

Indeed, that's how it is. We never experience a fundamental nature of Qualia ~ only a subjective interpretation of it.

[Laird]

I think malf's question as a rhetorical critique is sound. Idealism as Bernardo presents it is in my view incoherent. That doesn't make materialism a sound view though - it, too, is incoherent.

I certainly didn't intend to defend Kastrup, his presentations leave me unmoved. As do Malfs's.