Is the Filter Theory committing the ad hoc fallacy and is it unfalsifiable?

No, I am not an expert, but I did a PhD that involved some QM calculations, but that was about 50 years ago!

BTW you are horribly wrong about the scale at which QM effects are important, the Plank length is 1.616255)×10^(−35) m, whereas for example the radius of the hydrogen atom - one of the best studied examples of QM is the hydrogen atom, where the Bohr radius is  5.2917721×10^(−11) m - so you are about 20 orders of magnitude wrong!

So do we simply conclude that given a lot of molecules, they could do anything?

To be honest Merle, all your knowledge of this subject seems to be third hand and all you want to do is argue - not learn - so I am disinclined to continue to debate with you.

David

To be fair I think he conceded some ground in his reply to you:

I know of no scientists that thinks that nails have consciousness. (If one thinks nails have consciousness, some might argue that this person is as dumb as a nail.  ). Those that insist consciousness is strictly material will tell you it occurs only when there is enough material arranged in a complex way that creates consciousness.

It seems he agrees with us that *some* arrangements of matter being able to produce consciousness by way of their amount and structure is laughable, he just hasn't included *all* arrangements of matter.

Or to put it another way, to go back to Sam Harris's critique of materialism:

To say “Everything came out of nothing” is to assert a brute fact that defies our most basic intuitions of cause and effect—a miracle, in other words.

Likewise, the idea that consciousness is identical to (or emerged from) unconscious physical events is, I would argue, impossible to properly conceive—which is to say that we can think we are thinking it, but we are mistaken. We can say the right words, of course—“consciousness emerges from unconscious information processing.” We can also say “Some squares are as round as circles” and “2 plus 2 equals 7.” But are we really thinking these things all the way through? I don’t think so.

Consciousness—the sheer fact that this universe is illuminated by sentience—is precisely what unconsciousness is not. And I believe that no description of unconscious complexity will fully account for it. It seems to me that just as “something” and “nothing,” however juxtaposed, can do no explanatory work, an analysis of purely physical processes will never yield a picture of consciousness.

Merle gives the Materialist faith their religious Something from Nothing miracle, whereas you and I maintain logical consistency from nails to brains.

=-=-=

On a side note:

Even Amnesics Dream of Tetris: Memory study shows that video game images persist despite brain damage

[Laird]

So far I haven't seen anybody mention a serious contradiction or puzzle about materialism

In the thread Analytical argument against physicalism, friend of the forum and sometime participant Titus Rivas shared a link to his paper Exit Epiphenomenalism which elaborates on a knock-down argument against physicalism.

Some years later when it came up again (recently) in a different thread, I summarised it as follows:

1. If consciousness is epiphenomenal, then we do not (because we cannot) know we are conscious.
   
2. We know we are conscious.
   
3. Therefore, consciousness is not epiphenomenal.
   

It might not be clear to you how the first premise in particular is justified, so I encourage you to read Titus's paper to get clear on that.

Ian Wardell put it in his own words in a comment on one of the articles of yours that was posted to this thread:

Consider that one knows in the most immediate manner possible that oneself is conscious. This awareness, moreover, is not an instantaneous thing, it must be smudged out in time. Hence, one might entertain the thought, ‘yes, I know for certain I myself am conscious’, even if not expressed explicitly in words. Could this thought, this realisation, be purely due to chains of physical causes and effects without one’s actual consciousness playing any role in the fruition of this thought? No, because this certainty, this thought, is clearly due to one’s immediate and direct apprehension of one’s own consciousness. In other words, it is simply incoherent to suppose one could be certain of one’s own consciousness through physical chains of causes and effects *alone*. At least in this instance, consciousness is an indispensable ingredient and cannot be causally irrelevant.

You seemed to misunderstand the argument or at least Ian's framing/phrasing of it in your own response:

Ian, you say that you know that the soul is needed for consciousness. How do you know that? Do you know it in the same sense that one might “know” that the Sun is orbiting a stationary Earth or that a steel plate is not predominantly empty space at the molecular level? We may think it is obvious that the sun orbits the earth, a steel plate is completely solid, or that a non-material soul is driving our thoughts. That is what we feel! But sometimes science shows our feelings to be wrong.

Ian quite rightly pointed that out in his final comment in reply to you on that article:

You have simply not understood nor assimilated anything I have said.

Note that all the above quotes from comments on your blog are selected extracts, not the full comments.

There are plenty of other serious problems for physicalism, as has been pointed out by others in this thread, but this argument seems to me to be decisive.

I disagree. Foggy memories work just fine. In fact, most of our memories are foggy and change with time.

Perfect Isomorphism has nothing to do with whether a memory is foggy or "photographic". [It means the structure can only have one thing it points to, or to put it another way the material signifier has to signify one - and only one - event from the past. As Braude notes, this is an impossible object.]

If you don't understand a term feel free to ask, will make the conversation run smoother.

In the thread Analytical argument against physicalism, friend of the forum and sometime participant Titus Rivas shared a link to his paper Exit Epiphenomenalism which elaborates on a knock-down argument against physicalism.

I somewhat agree with the argument but I am not sure it is a knock down argument.

After all a lot of Physicalists do reject epiphenomenalism. I do wonder if they are correct in doing so if they wish to remain Physicalists but I have admittedly not given this much thought...

So to get back to the question in the thread title, my understanding is someone commits the "ad hoc fallacy" when they rearrange or add explanations for their position to get around facts that would invalidate their position.

A good example of this, IMO, is how the Materialists/Physicalist faith defines the physical as not having any mental characteristics then tries to explain away consciousness as an "illusion" or due to "emergence".

Does the Filter Hypothesis do the same thing to preserve its assumption that there is a soul? I don't think so, because the problems with Materialism/Physicalism don't automatically mean there is a soul. For example Tallis doesn't think the Materialist/Physicalist conception of what a brain is can store memories, yet he rejects the idea of souls or afterlives. Nevertheless he says:

Instead of thinking that memories can be located in the brain (or even more outrageously, captured in a dish), they ought to hold, along with Bergson, that “memory [cannot] settle within matter” even though (alas), “materiality begets oblivion.” In short, they should take off their dull materialist blinkers and acknowledge the wonderful mystery of memory.

I do think "Filter" is a poor term to use though, even "Filter/Transmitter" seems off to me. While imperfect I actually think the analogies of mind/body relations using video games are better...

[Laird]

After all a lot of Physicalists do reject epiphenomenalism. I do wonder if they are correct in doing so if they wish to remain Physicalists but I have admittedly not given this much thought...

Fair enough. All the argument really needs to succeed though is the physicalist premise that consciousness is not causally efficacious (which is the basis of premise #1 as I summarised the argument above), and it seems that Merle - albeit he seems to be more of a mind/brain identity theorist than a strict epiphenomenalist - does endorse that premise; see, for example, his claim that the Libet experiments disconfirm free will: that the brain wholly determines conscious experiences, which does seem to entail that on his view, consciousness is not causally efficacious.

This bolded bit assumes the existence of souls for the purposes of debate, so it's rather different than someone arguing that souls don't exist. So I don't see how the accusation of ad hoc fallacy can be thrown around in the second case if for no other reason than *if* there are souls to find out what their post-mortem existence is like one logically looks at purported Survival cases. And in those cases souls retain memories.

(Really I'm not convinced the accusation holds much weight at all even in the first case, especially coming Materialists with all their odd religious beliefs hidden by ad hoc terms like "Emergence" or "Illusion of Consciousness".)

I mean IIRC there were (are?) Christians who rejected the idea of a Heavenly afterlife as pagan and believed Paradise will be in this world after some apocalyptic events. These people did think the soul is still there as a lobotomized entity, as a sort of Aristotelian Form without its usual pairing with the "Prime Matter".

So I guess that's a case where souls need brains and have to wait for God to provide new bodies after...Judgement Day or whatever...

This is exactly why I hate using the term 'soul'. It inevitably pulls in ideas that appeal to materialists because they are plain daft and so can act as a weak argument for materialism, or to people with strong religious ideas who don't think they are daft. I don't see the discussions we have here as having much relevance to either group unless they are having second thoughts.

BTW, I very much like the part of your comment that I have marked in bold!

David

Fair enough. All the argument really needs to succeed though is the physicalist premise that consciousness is not causally efficacious (which is the basis of premise #1 as I summarised the argument above), and it seems that Merle - albeit he seems to be more of a mind/brain identity theorist than a strict epiphenomenalist - does endorse that premise; see, for example, his claim that the Libet experiments disconfirm free will: that the brain wholly determines conscious experiences, which does seem to entail that on his view, consciousness is not causally efficacious.

Hmm I'm not sure this is a problem for Merle's position. The consciousness here that is not causally efficacious is the agent, which I think is different than denying the causal efficacy of something that could be non-physical. (There are determinist Idealists like Kastrup for example.)

That said I don't it matters either way for the question of souls, as I noted earlier Theists and/or Idealists of various stripes also think decisions are made in determinist fashion but continue to be believe in afterlives.

Heck, even if souls are dependent on brains - as some believers in particular types of Christianity have said - God would remake the body to dwell in Paradise or exist forever in a lake of fire or whatever...but I think to make this work one has to believe in souls but reject all evidence & investigation of what souls' post-mortem existence is like...I suppose this is where the ad hoc fallacy comes in, if a person says all Survival evidence is conjured tricks by a demonic entity...

This is exactly why I hate using the term 'soul'. It inevitably pulls in ideas that appeal to materialists because they are plain daft and so can act as a weak argument for materialism, or to people with strong religious ideas who don't think they are daft. I don't see the discussions we have here as having much relevance to either group unless they are having second thoughts.

BTW, I very much like the part of your comment that I have marked in bold!

David

I guess we could say "Consciousness" but that doesn't quite capture what is meant by "Soul". There are people [like] Tallis who believe in free will, reject materialism, reject computationalism, don't think the brain can store memories...yet they also reject Survival.

[Laird]

Hmm I'm not sure this is a problem for Merle's position. The consciousness here that is not causally efficacious is the agent, which I think is different than denying the causal efficacy of something that could be non-physical.

"Physical consciousness" is an oxymoron to me, and I'm not really sure how well it encapsulates Merle's position, but here are some assertions he's made in this thread:

I argue that the brain itself is making the decisions, and creates both the muscle movements and awareness of the story of what is going on at the same time. This awareness of what is going on is called consciousness.

Each moment one set of neural patterns gains predominance and controls the attention, directing our movements at that moment. Immediately other sets of neural patterns pop into focus in sequence, directing our movements throughout the day, and writing the story of a conscious self doing all of this.

I think the molecules in my brain perceive things, and write the story of a conscious person doing it.

[M]ind and subjective awareness arise from neurons.

[N]eurons make complex thought including consciousness.

The consciousness is not doing the computations. The consciousness is simply a state that the brain creates that says it is consciously aware of this.

According to Merle, then, our brains and their molecules, neurons, and neural patterns create, make, and give rise to our thoughts, mind, subjective awareness, and consciousness itself; they direct us; they make our decisions; they write the story of our conscious selves.

That all sounds pretty one-way to me: there doesn't seem to be any room for consciousness - "physical" or not - to reach back into the brain to impart knowledge of its existence. There seems to be no scope, then, for consciousness of being conscious, and yet we do know that we are conscious; we are conscious of being conscious.

(There are determinist Idealists like Kastrup for example.)

Kastrup's a determinist? Is that new? He's defended free will in the past. Has he changed his views?