Free will re-redux

Just thought I'd say, 45 pages. We're getting there boys. 

Also thought to chime in about that quote since I just saw it. If you believe something can't be real because we can't describe it then you're on some shaky ground I feel. Like I can't describe what water tastes like, but as far as I know water tastes like something and is real. 

I do wonder if free will is emergent or not reducible from these other rules of the universe, in which case you're fucked trying to describe it in any other way than "when all these things combine and interact free will emerges but we can't say how and never will be able to.". If I wanted to be something other than compatibalist that'd be my angle, since there's definitely enough evidence to say our freedom might be limited from everything we know so far, but not enough to say its not real.

Unless it's all just dualism in which case well shit.

Hurm didn't say there's no explanation, he said there's no mechanistic explanation.

We already know mechanistic thinking is bad thinking.

[My last post above.]

It seems to me that everything you're talking about here shows that while the particle emission aspect of decay is not determined, the fact the half-lives can be compared & manipulated in the way you mention speaks to the continued [r]elation between the indeterministic event (particle emission) and the precusors (the stuff you mention in your post).

So there is a causal relation but it remains un-determined. I don't think there's any complicated philosophy here, rather just observation of the process and noting different isotopes have different calculable half-lives.

Honestly I think the idea that decay is a Random process, as in there's no causal relation between the precursors and the "random" emission event, is based on a philosophical insistence of a dichotomy that whenever there's a causal relation there's  determinism.

IMO if you gave a lecture on radioactive decay to physics students who had never heard an argument for everything being exclusively random/determined, and simply said the process was neither you wouldn't get any objections.

I certainly never knew of this claim of dichotomy until I heard it as a philosophical argument. No one teaching the STEM courses I took ever mentioned things must be exclusively random or determined.

I presume you mean exclusively random and/or determined.

If we cannot find any event that causes a particle to decay, then we say the decay is random. I don't know what else we can say. Do you want to say it's "indeterministic" just to leave the door open for some kind of cause that is not deterministic? Why would you bother without some evidence for such a cause? Heck, we can't even come up with a vague description of how such a cause would work, let alone find an example.

Yes, there is a relation between proton/neutron ratios and half-lives. Is there a deterministic cause and effect between the two? Or is it just a static behavior that we can describe with a law? Or is there a nondeterministic cause? This is certainly an interesting topic for conversation, but I just don't see any reason to go with a nondeterministic cause without some evidence. No one may have said things are all deterministic and/or random, but neither did they introduce any evidence for something else.

~~ Paul

Hurm didn't say there's no explanation, he said there's no mechanistic explanation.

We already know mechanistic thinking is bad thinking.

But note that we are waiting for any vague notion at all of how it might work.

~~ Paul

But note that we are waiting for any vague notion at all of how it might work.

~~ Paul

Oh I think it's the other way around. There have been over the years plenty of metaphysical pictures - some even combined with models of the brain like Neil's quantum IIT ideas on Skeptiko.

What's vague is what the criteria for conceivability are. If you think randomness is conceivable, and Physicalism is conceivable, then it seems you willingly accept things happening for no explainable reason.

Right now it seems to me there are no real reasons to think free will is incoherent other than having faith in the Randomness/Determined dichotomy. Which in turn has no proof so it only seems like a problem if one is adhering to Physicalism.

But even there are at least two problems relating to causation right off the bat ->

1. There isn't a single shred of evidence that gives reason to think a brain made of mindless matter can cause consciousness to be produced. This I think is just obvious, but anyone who thinks Physicalism is viable can introduce some potential evidence suggesting a brain can be the cause of consciousness.

2. The physical world itself, underpinned by quantum phenomena, is best described as being neither determined nor random. Something I'll continue to argue for by replying to your posts above later this week.

Just thought I'd say, 45 pages. We're getting there boys

Well I think there's a few things different about this trip to the Dark Tower ->

1. Thomas Nail's argument that even in materialism matter (and I presume all the other physical "stuff") is moving in ways that are neither random nor determined.

2. Confirmation that the supposed "how" problem with free will extends to this depiction of matter. Now all this "dichotomy is dropped but I still can't conceive of something being neither random nor determined" confusion can be moved past.

Now that we know that we can just look at quantum phenomena and see the best interpretation of motion aligns with Nail's arguments.

I mean we can get into the role of consciousness later, but that feels more like mopping up than address this problem Paul has.

Of course I still don't quite get what  it means to satisfy the " How can i conceive of free will?" question. Especially if one can claim they can "conceive" of Randomness and "conceive" of matter with no mental aspects being able to hold the representations necessary for our thoughts to be about something.

Once I have set criteria for "conceive" I suspect it might be QED on this issue.

You should believe in it if you believe new things happen.

I think I agree with you but if you could elaborate for the rest of the class. ;-)

Oh I think it's the other way around. There have been over the years plenty of metaphysical pictures - some even combined with models of the brain like Neil's quantum IIT ideas on Skeptiko.

Then why won't some of you present a short summary of one or more of these pictures?

What's vague is what the criteria for conceivability are. If you think randomness is conceivable, and Physicalism is conceivable, then it seems you willingly accept things happening for no explainable reason.

But, as I've said a dozen times, there are models and evidence and descriptions of both determinism and randomness. Look at a computer. Look at particle decay. I am not accepting these two ideas just over shrimp and a beer.

Right now it seems to me there are no real reasons to think free will is incoherent other than having faith in the Randomness/Determined dichotomy. Which in turn has no proof so it only seems like a problem if one is adhering to Physicalism.

Again, there is no mathematical proof, but there is everything else. For indeterministic, nonrandom decisions I have nothing except a name.

But even there are at least two problems relating to causation right off the bat ->

1. There isn't a single shred of evidence that gives reason to think a brain made of mindless matter can cause consciousness to be produced. This I think is just obvious, but anyone who thinks Physicalism is viable can introduce some potential evidence suggesting a brain can be the cause of consciousness.

2. The physical world itself, underpinned by quantum phenomena, is best described as being neither determined nor random. Something I'll continue to argue for by replying to your posts above later this week.

It's best described as a combination of both. There is no aspect of the description that calls on nonrandom indeterminism. You might say that stochastic processes are neither, but that gets you nowhere in the search for free will.



I don't think it's "just obvious" that consciousness cannot exist under physicalism, though I agree it's a bitch of a problem.



~~ Paul

Then why won't some of you present a short summary of one or more of these pictures?

This has been so many times, only for you to say the mysterious "how" remains unsolved.

[Now we know the first part of the criteria is establishing that there are events even in matter that are neither determined nor random. What are the other criteria?]

But, as I've said a dozen times, there are models and evidence and descriptions of both determinism and randomness. Look at a computer. Look at particle decay. I am not accepting these two ideas just over shrimp and a beer.

What models are there, besides mathematics which is limited by its own nature to descriptions that are deterministic or stochastic. But mathematics cannot explain qualitative phenomenon nor explain anything about causation - it can only observe the latter.

A computer is predictable, [but] as you yourself agreed it really falls under the quantum indeterminism underlying all physical reality. Particle decay is neither determined nor random - if it were the latter there would be no calculable half-lives. But as I said I'll get deeper into this.

It's not so much shrimp and a beer - though if we ever meet I'd be curious if you have a good spot for both! - rather that there seems to be nothing more than a philosophical insistence that something that isn't determined must be random whereas the evidence indicates otherwise.

Again, there is no mathematical proof, but there is everything else. For indeterministic, nonrandom decisions I have nothing except a name.

I'd say it's the other way around, we know determinism is just adequate determinism as noted by Bob Doyle ->

There is actually no strict determinism at any "level" of the physical world. Determinism is an abstract theoretical ideal that simplifies physical systems to allow the use of logical and mathematical methods like differential equations. The macroscopic statistical "determinism" we see is the consequence of averaging over extremely large numbers of microscopic particles. Statistical determinism is a corollary of the probabilistic "law of large numbers" when dealing with a great many independent events.

Adequate determinism is the determinism of Newtonian physics, capable of sending men to the moon and back with astonishing accuracy. It is the determinism of those physiologists who think that quantum uncertainty is insignificant in the macromolecular structures of cell biology.

(The rest of this about free will I am not sure about, but I think his description of the physical world is apt [save for that part about cell biology given recent advances].)

As for Randomness, it's hard to see where anything is "random" as in there's no causal reason at all for something to happen. This would have to be something that stands in no relation to the prior states of the physical universe. Quantum phenomena are, on the other, undetermined but still resolvable to behaviors that be modeled stochastically.

It's best described as a combination of both. There is no aspect of the description that calls on nonrandom indeterminism. You might say that stochastic processes are neither, but that gets you nowhere in the search for free will.

Oh I'd disagree on that last part. Once one recognizes that something is neither determined nor random there is a wide space "in between" the two extremes where free will can find a home.

I don't think it's "just obvious" that consciousness cannot exist under physicalism, though I agree it's a bitch of a problem.

But is there more than faith to this possibility of Physicalism, any evidence that might suggest consciousness can be produced by a brain?

This has been so many times, only for you to say the mysterious "how" remains unsolved.

[Now we know the first part of the criteria is establishing that there are events even in matter that are neither determined nor random. What are the other criteria?]

I really don't think it has been done, at least not in this thread. There are suggestions for the source of the decisions, but no description of how they occur. Heck, we just got through discussing that describing how they occur is impossible. I'm not looking for the criteria. I'm looking for a description of the way in which a free decision is made.

What models are there, besides mathematics which is limited by its own nature to descriptions that are deterministic or stochastic. But mathematics cannot explain qualitative phenomenon nor explain anything about causation - it can only observe the latter.

I don't need a model. I just need a hand-wave.

A computer is predictable, [but] as you yourself agreed it really falls under the quantum indeterminism underlying all physical reality. Particle decay is neither determined nor random - if it were the latter there would be no calculable half-lives. But as I said I'll get deeper into this.

It could be both determined and random. I'm not sure I'd use particle decay to invent some sort of causal but nondeterministic mechanism.

It's not so much shrimp and a beer - though if we ever meet I'd be curious if you have a good spot for both! - rather that there seems to be nothing more than a philosophical insistence that something that isn't determined must be random whereas the evidence indicates otherwise.

I have an excellent spot for both. I hope someday to meet you there. I don't see what evidence indicates otherwise, unless when you say "random" you mean "uniformly random."

Oh I'd disagree on that last part. Once one recognizes that something is neither determined nor random there is a wide space "in between" the two extremes where free will can find a home.

And yet it is impossible to describe that home.

But is there more than faith to this possibility of Physicalism, any evidence that might suggest consciousness can be produced by a brain?

No, just as there is no evidence that consciousness can be produced some other way. But since we have not discovered any other way, I'm tempted to stick with physicalism until evidence for the other way turns up. But it's not worth much concern, since surely the question of consciousness is empirical.

~~ Paul