Dualism or idealist monism as the best model for survival after death data

Confusing, isn't it? That's just about where I'm at!

Regarding this point, though, I don't see the problem myself. Why wouldn't God's Mind be able to encompass an infinity of different streams? I see that not being possible for ourselves, which maybe explains why it feels impossible from what we are able to conceive, but I can't theoretically or speculatively see what that wouldn't be the case for a Source.

I guess to me there would be a difference between an Ur-Mind that is connected to each person in some manner and an Ur-Mind that is experiencing multiple first-person views simultaneously.

Basically when an Idealist says there is only One True Subject I get confused because to me this seems impossible.

Here's T Rivas' paper

In this short article I wish to present basic, analytical arguments against noetic monism, and for noetic pluralism. By noetic monism, I mean the ontological theory that there is only one experient, self or Self in reality, an experient often identified with God. I'm not talking here about similar but essentially different non-duality theories, which claim everything that exists is consciousness, in an impersonal sense, and that there is no self or experient undergoing such consciousness.

By noetic pluralism, I mean the theory that there is a plurality of irreducible experients or selfs rather than just a single one. (This article is loosely inspired by some friendly correspondence with Bernardo Kastrup, but it does not intend to specifically address his particular version of noetic monism.)

[Ninshub]

Since this was based partly on correspondence with Bernardo, I'd be interested to hear his take on these arguments!

[Laird]

Since this was based partly on correspondence with Bernardo, I'd be interested to hear his take on these arguments!

And, as it so happens, I can (sort-of) provide it for you.

A while back, I started a thread ("The argument against idealism from conflicting perspectives") on Bernardo's now-defunct Metaphysical Speculations Google Group, to seek feedback on my own argument against Analytic Idealism as well as Titus's argument. The first post (mine) in that thread is here.

Bernardo responded directly to my opening post here.

I pointed out what I think were the deficiencies (irrelevancies) of his response here.

He didn't respond in turn. So, I guess, in a way, I'm not giving you his full take on these arguments, because he hasn't really provided it. I hope that this is in any case of some use to you.

[Ninshub]

Thanks Laird!

[Ninshub]

Bernardo's response in the google group that Laird shared points to an article by Shani that's behind a paywall. However Googling decomposition and combination problems I found this one that's available to read by Nagasawa and Wager, "Panpsychism and priority cosmopsychism" (also 2015).

I'm not sharp enough to completely understand it and see if the model of "priority cosmopsychism" that's presented answers Titus', and Laird's (possibly more difficult), objections, but from my naive reading it seems like it's treading similar waters. The part where I'm wondering if it addresses Laird's concern is when it addresses "heterogeneity". The relevants parts of the paper in relation to the objections are 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.

On the first account the cosmos, as an integrated whole, is heterogeneous
due to instantiating distributional properties,
For the monist, the general fact that the world is heterogeneous is due
to the world’s instantiating the determinable property of being het-
erogeneous. The specific way that the world is heterogeneous is due
to the world’s instantiating the determinate property of tracing such-
and-such a curve through physical configuration space. Thus the one
whole can be parturient. (Schaffer 2010, 260)

On the second account, the cosmos is heterogeneous due to regionalized prop-
erties. The cosmos has the monadic property of being the cosmos, yet it bears
a relation of, say, spikiness to one region and flatness to another. The third ac-
count also makes use of regionalization but instead appeals to regionalized
instantiation, where the cosmos is heterogeneous due to it, say, instantiating-
here spiky and instantiating-there flat.

There are differing views regarding the three accounts, but the important
thing is that they are consistent ways to make the move from, in concrete
terms, a cosmos that is a basic integrated whole to a derivative heterogeneity.
As a result of priority cosmopsychism sharing a parallel structure with priority
monism, we might adopt these strategies in response to the derivation prob-
lem for priority cosmopsychism. A version of all three accounts could be given
to explain the heterogeneity of the cosmic consciousness.

In parallel to the first response, priority cosmopsychists might say that the
cosmic consciousness is heterogeneous due to it instantiating the determin-
able property of being heterogeneous. According to this response the cosmic
consciousness would instantiate the distributive property of following a par-
ticular path through phenomenal configuration space (no doubt an extremely
complex path through a configuration space of many dimensions). In paral-
lel to the second response, priority cosmopsychists might say that the cosmic
consciousness is heterogeneous due to regionalized properties, where the
cosmic consciousness is a monadic property which bears a relation of redness
to one region and blueness to another region. The monadic property of being
the cosmic consciousness would demonstrate many relations among regional-
ized phenomenal properties. Finally, in parallel to the third response, priority
cosmopsychists might say that the cosmic consciousness is heterogeneous due
to regionalized instantiation of phenomenal properties, the cosmic conscious-
ness instantiates-here red and instantiates-there blue. A thorough exploration
of such possibilities is not within bounds of the present chapter but will make
for interesting future work.

Let us recap. Panpsychism faces the infinite decomposability problem be-
cause it relies on fundamentalism. Priority cosmopsychism, on the other hand,
does not face that problem as it is free from fundamentalism. Panpsychism
also faces the combination problem, which is recognized as the strongest ob-
jection to the view. Priority cosmopsychism, on the other hand, offers a satis-
factory answer to this problem. Instead of the combination problem, however,
priority cosmopsychism faces the derivation problem. Yet, as we have seen,
there are prima facie reasons to think that it can be resolved. Therefore, prior-
ity cosmopsychism seems more attractive than panpsychism.

Nagasawa has a chapter in that Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism book that contains the Chalmers chapter on idealism, which seems one more good reason for me to splurge for it!

[Ninshub]

I see Gregory Miller has very recently "answered" the Nagasawa & Wager paper however: The Decombination Problem for Cosmopsychism is not the Heterogeneity Problem for Priority Monism.

Meanwhile Petersen in Idealistic Studies (2021) proposed something else: triadism!. Non-Constitutive Cosmopsychism: Countering the Decombination Problem.

abstract:

Due to the difficulties of providing an adequate physicalist solution to the problem of consciousness, recent years have seen explora­tions of different avenues. Among these is the thesis of cosmopsychism, the view that the cosmos as a whole possesses consciousness. However, constitutive cosmopsychism is faced with the difficult problem of de­combination: how to consistently maintain the claim that individual subjects are grounded in one absolute consciousness. This paper sug­gests a solution by outlining a theoretical model of a broadly idealistic and quantitative substance-monistic character. The key idea here is a triadic rather than monistic or dualistic conception of the subject. This conception allows us to affirm that the individual subject exists while simultaneously holding that its substance component is part of the one, undivided substance. This substance is in turn the substantive component of an all-encompassing, absolute subject. Notably, this model avoids the problem of decombination

The full article can be read.

It is evident that this model presents a view on the nature of reality that is rather unconventional compared to positions more in line with the mainstream views of contemporary philosophy. Not only is it of a metaphysically idealistic and panpsychistic (even cosmopsychistic) character, but it also potentially leads to new—perhaps controversial but nevertheless of significant existential import—perspectives on a number of unsolved questions, such as the question of the subject’s continual existence after physical death. Given acceptance of this model, it seems plausible that the subject does not perish by physical death, but instead is of permanent character, since its metaphysical triadic structure is of such character. Such considerations are beyond the scope of this paper, however; the aim here has been to provide an outline of the proposed model and to argue for its capacity to avoid the troublesome decombination problem.

[Ninshub]

If I take this one sentence from the abstract above, "This conception allows us to affirm that the individual subject exists while simultaneously holding that its substance component is part of the one, undivided substance", and apply it to NDE reports instead of human life on earth, it seems to fit that data the best as I've apprehended it.

Of course there is great variability in the contents of the account, but it seems most frequent that the experiencer expericences him or herself as 1) a continuing individual subject, which is usually 2) expanded by contrast with the "physically" embodied self, but also more 3) porous, and, frequently enough, at points 4) experiencing himself or herself as part of the one, undivided consciousness (while not losing, unless perhaps "temporarily", his or her individuality).

If I take this one sentence from the abstract above, "This conception allows us to affirm that the individual subject exists while simultaneously holding that its substance component is part of the one, undivided substance", and apply it to NDE reports instead of human life on earth, it seems to fit that data the best as I've apprehended it.

Of course there is great variability in the contents of the account, but it seems most frequent that the experiencer expericences him or herself as 1) a continuing individual subject, which is usually 2) expanded by contrast with the "physically" embodied self, but also more 3) porous, and, frequently enough, at points 4) experiencing himself or herself as part of the one, undivided consciousness (while not losing, unless perhaps "temporarily", his or her individuality).

Indeed... and it confirms even further my growing belief in a hybrid of some form of idealist monism, and some form of dualism. One that explains both the fundamental Oneness of Existence, and the blindingly apparent reality of a dual existence of extremes, of subject and object, of trillions of souls, of reincarnation, NDEs / ADEs, ego-death and the subsequent reformation... and so on.

What to call it? Taoism is a nice spiritual path for me... but how do I describe such a thing to the layperson who isn't familiar with any of that? Is there such a position somewhere in the current state of metaphysics?

Neutral monism? Perhaps... except with the glaring problem that I'm left with... wondering how the non-mental, non-physical ultimate substance would be moved, as it were, to create the dualist reality we find ourselves in, where we as a subject have a fundamental, eternal existence that never dies or fades, only ever shifting its expression.

Just my stream of thoughts on this for the day...

[Ninshub]

I'm not familiar enough with this: how does Taoism involve dualistic (or dualistic-like) concepts in your view?

[Ninshub]

Maybe the position you're searching for is "dialectical monism" (the Wiki article references the Tao Te Ching).

Dialectical monism, also known as dualistic monism, is an ontological position that holds that reality is ultimately a unified whole, distinguishing itself from monism by asserting that this whole necessarily expresses itself in dualistic terms.[1] For the dialectical monist, the essential unity is that of complementary polarities, which, while opposed in the realm of experience and perception, are co-substantial in a transcendent sense.[citation needed]

I must admit this appeals to me in the light of the survival data.

To establish its premises, dialectical monism may posit a Universal Dialectic, which is seen as the fundamental principle of existence. The concept is similar to that of the Taiji or "Supreme Ultimate" in Taoism, the "Purusha-Prakriti" in Samkhya, and duality-in-unity of Shiva-Shakti in Tantra. Advocates assert that Taoism as well as some forms of Buddhism are based on an approach consistent with or identical to dialectical monism. (...)

As a monism, dialectical monism is opposed to traditional dualism despite its emphasis on "twoness." In dialectical monism, the appearance of duality is seen as arising from the mind's need to impose divisions and boundaries upon an essentially unified whole. Thus, for the dialectical monist, reality is ultimately one but can only be experienced in terms of division.
Furthermore, dialectical monism might also be termed "plural monism," for it recognizes the dependently originated existence of a multiplicity of entities, which Taoism calls "the ten thousand things." Dialectical monism does not deny that the plurality of things in existence are "real," but points out that physical reality itself is mind-dependent. (see Taoism and Zen).

I've got a book by David Loy called Nonduality which I haven't read yet, which compares the philosophies of Advaita Vedanta, Mayahana Buddhism and Taoism which possibly might be of interest here.