Darwin Unhinged: The Bugs in Evolution

In your own words. What point are you making?

Hmm? I was answering your question. If you didn't understand my answer, then maybe you could explain what you're finding confusing about it?

If I understand your point by proxy, this is my reply.

Let's go back to where it all started.
Nbtruthman:

As has been pointed out so many times, the elements of subjective experience simply can't be reduced to matter and energy and their interactions.

Why not? 

Laird:

By virtue of the meanings of the words involved, just as we know that the statement that "the elements of sound simply can't be reduced to colours and shades and their interactions" is true in virtue of what we mean by "colour", "sound" and "reduced". Whilst some people experience chromesthesia, we understand this as an association between sound and colour rather than as a reduction of the one to the other - again, in virtue of the meanings of those same words.For sounds to really be reducible to colours we would have to revise the definitions of those words - just as, whilst we recognise an association between the two, we would have to revise the definitions of the terms for "subjective experience" to really be "reducible" to "matter and energy".

My objection to this is one can assert till the cows come home. But asserting something doesn't somehow make it truth.  How does nbtruthman know there is subjective experience without matter and energy? nbtruthman doesn't

Semantic revision still won't make an assertion truth.

Are you saying that you have proof of your position?

I am making no claims. I believe that consciousness is brain function, but there is certainly the possibility that it is not.

~~ Paul

[Laird]

My objection to this is one can assert till the cows come home.

But that shouldn't be a reason to object to my answer - it should be a reason to endorse it! Why? Because:

[A]sserting something doesn't somehow make it truth.

Exactly! One can assert "Words might be reducible to cheese" or "Numbers might be reducible to visual impressions" or "Subjective experiences might be reducible to matter and energy" but simply asserting any of these things doesn't somehow make them true - in fact, we know from their meanings that the possible reductions they suggest are strictly nonsensical.

How does nbtruthman know there is subjective experience without matter and energy?

But that wasn't what he claimed to know. He claimed simply that the former couldn't be reduced to the latter.

[Edit: Admittedly, in rereading his post, I may be reading his claim a little too narrowly and out of context, because in context it may be seen to be denying the "idealistically compatible" suggestion that Paul makes and which I've quoted and responded to below.

Edit2: But then again, viewed through the lens of the coin analogy (below), both he and Paul are correct: his reasonable position would seem to be that the one side of the coin is not identical with the other, even as Paul could reasonably assert that it is nevertheless the same coin.]

I believe that consciousness is brain function

I think it was Neil who pointed out on Skeptiko some years back that this sort of theory of mind is essentially compatible with idealism. In other words, with respect to it, one can make the same sort of suggestion that Bernardo Kastrup makes with respect to idealism: that the brain (i.e. "matter and energy and their interactions") is the external appearance of "mind" or "consciousness", which involves a corresponding internal, subjective experience. It's sort of a "two sides of the same coin" thing - the one side being the external appearance and the other being the internal experience. But in my view one couldn't then say that "one side of the coin reduces to the other". This would imply that "one side of the coin" is more fundamental than, and gives rise to, the other, which is not the case.

But that shouldn't be a reason to object to my answer - it should be a reason to endorse it! Why? Because:


Exactly! One can assert "Words might be reducible to cheese" or "Numbers might be reducible to visual impressions" or "Subjective experiences might be reducible to matter and energy" but simply asserting any of these things doesn't somehow make them true - in fact, we know from their meanings that the possible reductions they suggest are strictly nonsensical.


But that wasn't what he claimed to know. He claimed simply that the former couldn't be reduced to the latter.

[Edit: Admittedly, in rereading his post, I may be reading his claim a little too narrowly and out of context, because in context it may be seen to be denying the "idealistically compatible" suggestion that Paul makes and which I've quoted and responded to below.

Edit2: But then again, viewed through the lens of the coin analogy (below), both he and Paul are correct: his reasonable position would seem to be that the one side of the coin is not identical with the other, even as Paul could reasonably assert that it is nevertheless the same coin.]


I think it was Neil who pointed out on Skeptiko some years back that this sort of theory of mind is essentially compatible with idealism. In other words, with respect to it, one can make the same sort of suggestion that Bernardo Kastrup makes with respect to idealism: that the brain (i.e. "matter and energy and their interactions") is the external appearance of "mind" or "consciousness", which involves a corresponding internal, subjective experience. It's sort of a "two sides of the same coin" thing - the one side being the external appearance and the other being the internal experience. But in my view one couldn't then say that "one side of the coin reduces to the other". This would imply that "one side of the coin" is more fundamental than, and gives rise to, the other, which is not the case.

Steve001: My objection to this is one can assert till the cows come home.

Laird: But that shouldn't be a reason to object to my answer - it should be a reason to endorse it! Why? Because:

Steve001 Wrote: [A]sserting something doesn't somehow make it truth.

[Laird]Exactly! One can assert "Words might be reducible to cheese" or "Numbers might be reducible to visual impressions" or "Subjective experiences might be reducible to matter and energy" but simply asserting any of these things doesn't somehow make them true - in fact, we know from their meanings that the possible reductions they suggest are strictly nonsensical.

I agree to them being non-sensical. So are asserted beliefs without evidence.

Steve001: How does nbtruthman know there is subjective experience without matter and energy?

But that wasn't what he claimed to know. He claimed simply that the former couldn't be reduced to the latter.

Admittedly, in rereading his post, I may be reading his claim a little too narrowly and out of context, because in context it may be seen to be denying the "idealistically compatible" suggestion that Paul makes and which I've quoted and responded to below.

But then again, viewed through the lens of the coin analogy (below), both he and Paul are correct: his reasonable position would seem to be that the one side of the coin is not identical with the other, even as Paul could reasonably assert that it is nevertheless the same coin.

In the total context it is strongly implied subjective experience does happen without matter and energy.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos Wrote: I believe that consciousness is brain function

Laird: I think it was Neil who pointed out on Skeptiko some years back that this sort of theory of mind is essentially compatible with idealism. In other words, with respect to it, one can make the same sort of suggestion that Bernardo Kastrup makes with respect to idealism: that the brain (i.e. "matter and energy and their interactions") is the external appearance of "mind" or "consciousness", which involves a corresponding internal, subjective experience. It's sort of a "two sides of the same coin" thing - the one side being the external appearance and the other being the internal experience. But in my view one couldn't then say that "one side of the coin reduces to the other". This would imply that "one side of the coin" is more fundamental than, and gives rise to, the other, which is not the case.

Invoking philosphy is why I did not reply to Brian's post.

I think there's serious mathematical problems with the idea of brain = mind in teh form of individuation. If you're going to say everythintg comes from matter and energy you're going to have to explain how individuation occurred. Becfause as it stands, with current understanding, it simply shouldn't. Ther should either be zero consciousness or one consciousness due to all matter and energy in teh universe being intertwined.

Arguoin that somehow you can have individuation via matter and energy is like me pointing at a swimming pool and declaring that it's not all made of water but is instead made of water A and water B and water C and so on and then continuing to assert that even when it'd demonstrated that it's all just the same hydrogen and oxygen molecules throughout the whole thing.

Differences in neural connectiveness do not account for this phenomena as they too are made of the same matter and energy as everything else. You could very easily have all the functions and behaviours of the human body or any other living thing without a person being there observing it. So why don't you see that? Why can't I just jump to another persons viewpoint if I'm just part of the same interconnected system as everything else? Why am I even here observing at all? It makes zero mathematical sense and is something the materialists would need to answer. By Occams Razor, the reason you don't see it, is because that other thing is necessary because these things aren't interconnected in the top down/self contained way that is typically argued for. Whereas a bottom up, emergent system would have more explanatory power.

I think it was Neil who pointed out on Skeptiko some years back that this sort of theory of mind is essentially compatible with idealism. In other words, with respect to it, one can make the same sort of suggestion that Bernardo Kastrup makes with respect to idealism: that the brain (i.e. "matter and energy and their interactions") is the external appearance of "mind" or "consciousness", which involves a corresponding internal, subjective experience. It's sort of a "two sides of the same coin" thing - the one side being the external appearance and the other being the internal experience. But in my view one couldn't then say that "one side of the coin reduces to the other". This would imply that "one side of the coin" is more fundamental than, and gives rise to, the other, which is not the case.

Sounds like Kastrup is going for some form of dualism. Or perhaps it's a form of neutral monism, although I don't think that would be described as two sides of the same coin.

~~ Paul

I think there's serious mathematical problems with the idea of brain = mind in teh form of individuation. If you're going to say everythintg comes from matter and energy you're going to have to explain how individuation occurred. Becfause as it stands, with current understanding, it simply shouldn't. Ther should either be zero consciousness or one consciousness due to all matter and energy in teh universe being intertwined.

Why do you think all matter and energy is "intertwined"?

If that would prevent individuation of consciousness, why wouldn't it also prevent individuation of objects?

~~ Paul

[Laird]

Sounds like Kastrup is going for some form of dualism.

He's a non-dualist, but a duality of some sort is unavoidable no matter what your theory of mind, right? Even for a non-dualist, the internal (subjective experience) simply is of a different semantic category to the external (the "appearance" of the "physical" brain) even if ultimately they are one and the same thing considered from different perspectives.

Or perhaps it's a form of neutral monism, although I don't think that would be described as two sides of the same coin.

As far as I remember, he doesn't use the coin analogy - that's original to me - but I may be misremembering. He's a self-declared idealist though, not a neutral monist. I would have thought you'd have known that, as I seem to recall you've had discussions with him on Skeptiko.

Why do you think all matter and energy is "intertwined"?

If that would prevent individuation of consciousness, why wouldn't it also prevent individuation of objects?

~~ Paul

It would, I'm glad you noticed that

Examples of amazing mimicry

A moth’s wings feature two flies picking at a pile of bird droppings, Macrocilix maia/Alexey Yakovlev:
[Image: flypoopmoth.jpg]

Video of the larva of a sphinx hawk moth (Hemeroplanes triptolemus).


Of course, this just somehow happened: information transmitted by nobody at all to somebody (a moth predator). Information that happens to be false, which probably increases the complexity. An accident of natural selection, right? 

Video of an orchid with a monkey face. 


Has anyone established that these impostures “fool” any life form into avoiding the plant?

Concerning all these extraordinary examples of mimicry, has anyone done probability calculations (not rhetoric or theorizing) for purely random evolution for this, via natural selection acting on random mutation (Darwinism)?