Consciousness as epiphenomenon

Laird, my OP does not ask about Epiphenomenalism. I looked a bit at that thread and the paper, but it does not seem to contribute to this discussion given that we all seem to agree that Epiphenomenalism fails to be consistent with our observations. Which probably explains why I haven't yet found a reference to it in my neuroscience books/textbooks that I have on hand.

Linda

[Laird]

Laird, my OP does not ask about Epiphenomenalism.

What? Are you trolling me? The title of this thread is "Consciousness as epiphenomenon", and your OP enquires into a "criticism of regarding consciousness as an epiphenomenon".

Please don't tell me that you're going to quibble over the word forms "epiphenomenon" versus "epiphenomenalism". Seriously. Just don't. The post prior to your last used the word "epiphenomenalism" even if your OP didn't. Please, try to salvage some credibility.

Epiphenomenalism fails to be consistent with our observations.

To repeat: epiphenomenalism is a philosophical position, and that it "fails to be consistent with our observations" is a key component of the argument that it is logically inconsistent - which Titus explains very clearly in his paper. That you think that his argument does not contribute to this conversation is your intellectual failing. If you care to, please explain why you think as much in the relevant thread, because I'm not going to keep this duplicate thread open for no better purpose than for you to parade your philosophical ignorance. There's already a perfectly good existing thread in which for you to ask questions, raise (counter-)arguments and satisfy your curiosity.

To be clear: I'm closing this thread, and this is a moderation decision. If anybody, including you, Linda, objects to this moderation decision, then please feel free to open a thread about it in Forum Questions, Suggestions and Announcements.

[Laird]

So, several people, both publicly and privately, have expressed dissatisfaction with the closing of this thread, and since on the other hand nobody has expressed (at least unconditional) support for the thread's closure, I'm reversing the decision. We could wait for longer to discuss it further, but I don't see much point.

This thread is now open again. Have at it, guys.

I've moved my response to this thread and will delete my other thread.

I'm used to epiphenomena in medicine, which refers to a "secondary phenomenon that occurs alongside or in parallel to a primary phenomenon" (per wikipedia). There is also a philosophical position called "Epiphenomenalism" which is near universally regarded as logically inconsistent (afaict, and neither myself nor Paul seem to disagree with that). While Wikipedia, and most any other references I found, did not treat the two as identical (for example, the ordinary use of "epiphenomenon" in medicine does not contain the provision against the epiphenomenon having its own effects), I now understand that if "epiphenomenon" is used when referring to consciousness, that it will be assumed that the user is referencing "Epiphenomenalism", regardless of their initial intention. That was where my ignorance lay, and I thank Paul for clearing that up for me.

Linda 

No. It is by definition wrong. Again, I'd encourage you to read Titus Rivas's paper to which he linked in the opening post of the existing thread on this topic to which I've already referred you, and to move this discussion over to that thread. Epiphenomenalism is a philosophical concept, not an empirically (dis)provable one whose "hidden assumptions" might be empirically relevant.

Why do you say it's not empirical when Rivas says:

"(2) Epiphenomenalism thus holds that its concept of consciousness refers to a real part of reality, namely to the (presumably) epiphenomenal but irreducible world of mental experience."

I've not heard anyone argue that epiphenomenalism is a philosophy game that has no relevance to the real world.

~~ Paul

[Laird]

Why do you say it's not empirical when Rivas says: [...]

Well, if you want to say that even though the primary argument against epiphenomenalism is philosophical, that philosophical argument is premised on the observation that we are capable of self-reflecting on the fact that we are conscious, and that that is an empirical observation, then I guess that would be reasonable enough (not that that's what you necessarily are saying - it's just a possible statement on which we can agree). I can't bring to mind any other sense in which epiphenomenalism can be either validated or invalidated empirically, but maybe I'm just not thinking hard enough.

Well, if you want to say that even though the primary argument against epiphenomenalism is philosophical, that philosophical argument is premised on the observation that we are capable of self-reflecting on the fact that we are conscious, and that that is an empirical observation, then I guess that would be reasonable enough (not that that's what you necessarily are saying - it's just a possible statement on which we can agree). I can't bring to mind any other sense in which epiphenomenalism can be either validated or invalidated empirically, but maybe I'm just not thinking hard enough.

One way to disprove epiphenomenalism is to find a mechanism in the brain where, say, a quale can have a direct effect on downstream processing.

Of course, the problem here is that we could argue that it wasn't the quale itself, but some nonconscious processing that also produced the quale as an epiphenomenal side effect. So it will be necessary for neuroscientists to convince philosophers that the quale is just as much a brain process as anything else. And so the merry-go-round continues . . .

~~ Paul

So it will be necessary for neuroscientists to convince philosophers that the quale is just as much a brain process as anything else. 

~~ Paul

Do the neuroscientists need to convince philosophers of anything? Philosophers and scientists seem to operate in two different domains and have little effect on each other, afaict. I suppose there may be exceptions. I'll have to think on this (mathematics comes to mind).

Linda

Do the neuroscientists need to convince philosophers of anything? Philosophers and scientists seem to operate in two different domains and have little effect on each other, afaict. I suppose there may be exceptions. I'll have to think on this (mathematics comes to mind).

Linda

Well, I'm assuming that philosophers are interested to learn how the brain works. I think they are. There are probably also neuroscientists who think that consciousness may be an epiphenomenon.

Note that some people use the term epiphenomenon differently from philosophers. They use it to mean a side effect of a cause but not to mean that the side effect can't have further effects.

~~ Paul