Consciousness as epiphenomenon

Well, I'm assuming that philosophers are interested to learn how the brain works. I think they are. There are probably also neuroscientists who think that consciousness may be an epiphenomenon.

Note that some people use the term epiphenomenon differently from philosophers. They use it to mean a side effect of a cause but not to mean that the side effect can't have further effects.

~~ Paul

I don't know what philosophers are interested in. I lost faith with them a long time ago. Although there are a few I enjoy reading.

I think just specifying what is meant when using "epiphenomenon", or substituting a less loaded term, is probably the way to go.

Linda

[Laird]

I read [Titus Rivas's] paper awhile ago but will check it out again. I'm not convinced that there are many physicalists who are also epiphenomenalists.

I'd be interested if you were to offer in that paper's thread - which, after all, is based on the claim/argument not just that epiphenomenalism is a failed physicalist theory of mind, but that all physicalist theories of mind are failures - your view as to whether there are any viable physicalist theories of mind, and, if so, what they are and how you see the sort of arguments against them that Titus and others raise being defeated. No expectations or anything - it would be of interest to me (and probably others) but no stress if you have either no interest, no time, or higher priorities.