Conscious now, conscious forever?

[Laird]

I wonder though - and I'm struggling against the limits of my own reasoning and skills at logic here, and my own assimilation of the non-duality philosophers' teachings - if what I have advanced in my post makes Laird's answer potentially problematic - does his answer also assume or presuppose something(s) in the discussion that hasn't been yet established?? Just a question. Perhaps others, including Laird, can make sense, if any, of what I'm potentially advancing.

I think I'm just making the same assumptions/presuppositions as the argument itself: that individuals are conscious, and that it is theoretically possible that an individual's consciousness lasts for only a finite duration (after which they effectively cease to exist as an individual).

I don't think that that changes in practice on non-duality, it's just that the interpretation of individual consciousness is different: it is taken to be derivative or a property of an ultimate, singular consciousness, rather than existing in its own right.

I think that what you're advancing is perhaps a different argument altogether: "the argument from apparent lack of limitation of consciousness", or something like that.

There's also the whole question of time, of whether it's a human construct, and in that sense is debating "now" vs "forever" already in itself problematic?

This human wishes he could construct the time (more like head space) to contemplate that whole question right now!

The possibility you go on to outline is essentially a restating of the original argument though, so the same critique applies. Take this in particular:


Yep, but merely from the fact of your being conscious now you have no way of knowing whether or not you were conscious at other times (unless, as few if any of us seem to, you remember endless past lives), so there's no way of differentiating between the two scenarios merely from that fact, and thus it is no more surprising that you are currently (capable of observing that you are) conscious on either scenario.

This would be a potentially sound argument if the materialist model predicted that you would never be conscious - in which case your being conscious now would falsify materialism - but it doesn't.

I'm inclined to think you're correct. On the other hand it seems to me the same reasoning you apply here could be applied to Bostrom's simulation argument. Bostrom's argument may of course be wrong. But I imagine his response to this sort of counterargument would emphasize that his argument appeals to differences in probability. Yes, he might say, even if just the real world has ever existed (no simulations), there would be people having conscious experiences. But, given whatever his assumptions are, among all people who ever exist, most will be in simulations, therefore, it's most likely anyone having some conscious experience is in a simulation. The reasoning is not quite the same as the eternal consciousness argument, but one gets from "I'm conscious" to "I'm in a simulation," because of the supposed abundance of simulated consciousnesses relative to original, real consciousnesses. Similarly, on the eternal consciousness argument, one gets from "I'm conscious" to "my consciousness is eternal," because of the greater abundance of consciousness in time on the eternal vs. materialist model. That during any given period of history I'm conscious is surprising on the materialist model, because it's exceptional relative to the whole course of the history of the universe, but not the eternal one.

[Laird]

The reasoning is not quite the same as the eternal consciousness argument

Yep, and because of the difference, I don't object to the simulation argument in the same way, so it's not relevant here and doesn't help to defuse my objection.

That during any given period of history I'm conscious is surprising on the materialist model, because it's exceptional relative to the whole course of the history of the universe, but not the eternal one.

Yep, but, again, from the mere fact of your currently conscious existence, you have no way of differentiating between the two scenarios. I really do think it's a fatal problem with this argument, but I've repeated myself enough and don't want to cause friction with you so I should probably leave it there!

Yep, and because of the difference, I don't object to the simulation argument in the same way, so it's not relevant here and doesn't help to defuse my objection.


Yep, but, again, from the mere fact of your currently conscious existence, you have no way of differentiating between the two scenarios. I really do think it's a fatal problem with this argument, but I've repeated myself enough and don't want to cause friction with you so I should probably leave it there!

No friction at all. Like I said, I think you're probably right. I have the intuition that there's a way to make the argument more persuasive, but I haven't articulated it yet, and don't know if I'll be able to.

I'm inclined to think you're correct. On the other hand it seems to me the same reasoning you apply here could be applied to Bostrom's simulation argument. Bostrom's argument may of course be wrong. But I imagine his response to this sort of counterargument would emphasize that his argument appeals to differences in probability. Yes, he might say, even if just the real world has ever existed (no simulations), there would be people having conscious experiences. But, given whatever his assumptions are, among all people who ever exist, most will be in simulations, therefore, it's most likely anyone having some conscious experience is in a simulation. The reasoning is not quite the same as the eternal consciousness argument, but one gets from "I'm conscious" to "I'm in a simulation," because of the supposed abundance of simulated consciousnesses relative to original, real consciousnesses. Similarly, on the eternal consciousness argument, one gets from "I'm conscious" to "my consciousness is eternal," because of the greater abundance of consciousness in time on the eternal vs. materialist model. That during any given period of history I'm conscious is surprising on the materialist model, because it's exceptional relative to the whole course of the history of the universe, but not the eternal one.

Re. the 'simulation theory' involved in this discussion, my view is that all the 'We are all programmed simulated entities in a vast universe simulation theories" including Bostrom's are fundamentally invalid, because consciousness simply fundamentally can't be generated by computers. 

Computer scientist and DI member Robert J. Marks has developed I think an excellent argument that computers no matter how powerful are fundamentally incapable of consciousness and its fundamental immaterial properties and parameters: of sentience, creativity, understanding, happiness, sadness, joy, empathy, etc. etc.  The reason for computers' total and fundamental unconsciousness is the fact that they (the computers) are fundamentally unable to do anything but compute, to compute algorithms. And consciousnness and its properties and parameters are fundamentally non-algorithmic, non-computable.

Accordingly, this argument seems to totally invalidate all the different 'simulation theories' involving the Universe being a titanic computer simulation, and as implied, humans most probably being merely programmed simulated entities.

And therefore, Bostrom's simulation argument is wrong, invalidated. Because any computer program, no matter how complex, can only compute algorithms, and human consciousness is fundamentally non-algorithmic, unsimulatable

Re. the 'simulation theory' involved in this discussion, my view is that all the 'We are all programmed simulated entities in a vast universe simulation theories" including Bostrom's are fundamentally invalid, because consciousness simply fundamentally can't be generated by computers. 

Computer scientist and DI member Robert J. Marks has developed I think an excellent argument that computers no matter how powerful are fundamentally incapable of consciousness and its fundamental immaterial properties and parameters: of sentience, creativity, understanding, happiness, sadness, joy, empathy, etc. etc.  The reason for computers' total and fundamental unconsciousness is the fact that they (the computers) are fundamentally unable to do anything but compute, to compute algorithms. And consciousnness and its properties and parameters are fundamentally non-algorithmic, non-computable.

Accordingly, this argument seems to totally invalidate all the different 'simulation theories' involving the Universe being a titanic computer simulation, and as implied, humans most probably being merely programmed simulated entities.

And therefore, Bostrom's simulation argument is wrong, invalidated. Because any computer program, no matter how complex, can only compute algorithms, and human consciousness is fundamentally non-algorithmic, unsimulatable

Yes, I don't think Bostrom's argument is successful at all. My reasons for finding it unpersuasive don't have any bearing on its relationship to the eternal consciousness argument I've tried to present here, however, I mean as far as I can tell anyway. I want to emphasize again that the eternal consciousness argument isn't mine. I know I saw something very similar to it at a minimum somewhere online. Not sure exactly where unfortunately.