An excellent concise and accurate statement of the interactive dualism theory of mind

I do hope I end up in one of the more interesting afterlives, and not the mundane ones...including one where I recall people need to keep working in the afterlife to sustain their new existence.

Though that is better than ending up in one of the supposed Hells, though I am not sure how much stock I put into the idea of Hell...

hmmmm    non-physical vocations?     in an informational context of interacting information objects, it would the meaningful output of like minds flowing where they would matter.  In the environment of real-world probabilities thinking about things results in plans.   

Is that what Angels do?

hmmmm    non-physical vocations?     in an informational context of information objects, it would the meaningful output of minds flowing where they would matter. in the environment of real-world probabilities.

Is that what Angels do?

I'd have to find the account, but apparently it's more getting a plain old 9-5 in some city.

I'd have to find the account, but apparently it's more getting a plain old 9-5 in some city.

If the "structures" of heavens are found in an informational environment existing as coherent and wave-like probabilities - then I guess the hours are more flexible.

If the "structures" of heavens are found in an informational environment existing as coherent and wave-like probabilities - then I guess the hours are more flexible.

 

Every blade of grass has an angel that bends over it and whispers, 'Grow, grow'
 -Folk saying, inspired [by a passage] from the Talmud

[Laird]

I would have hoped that you wouldn't misrepresent my theory...

Since you think I'm misrepresenting it, I'll try in this post to learn more about it by asking questions or prompting you. I hope you participate. For ease of responding in case you do choose to participate, I've coloured all explicit, non-rhetorical questions in green.

but then, you seem almost blinded by a lens of Dualism. You look at the world with a very logical sense, whereas I've been seeking through an intuitive one.

Working with intuition is fine, but its outcome needs to stand up to rational scrutiny. You criticise dualism on what you seem to intend to be a rational basis, so it's only fair that you equally accept rationally-based criticism of your own theory.

There is no... "origin story" in my theory, so much as seeking a logical end conclusion, starting from this reality that I'm most familiar with, working my way bottom-up, and then top-down.

Could it though be fair to say then that it is an origin story but in a logical sense rather than a causal one: that logically prior to actual, finite forms is an infinite, formless potential? If so, does this have any particular explanatory power or other theoretical value? Can it not be simply discarded as redundant?

I have stated that I perfectly content with an observed Interactive Dualism ~ but that an Interactive Dualism with two ultimate substances simply makes no logical sense, as design by fiat is just waving a magic wand, and saying God-as-person can do whatever because... the method of interaction left entirely void. It is a very jarring notion that conflicts with my current experiences of reality, of spirits, of the imaginal, of Shamanism.

So, how to square that circle? Logic versus intuition... theory versus inexplicable experience.

Firstly: Dualism doesn't entail God; the two just complement each other well. It's possible that minds (plural) and matter are the preexistents rather than a singular Mind.

Secondly: The assertion that two substances can't interact is arbitrary and in that respect in itself makes no logical sense.

Thirdly: God-as-person can create (and design as part of that creativity) because creativity is one of the definitive attributes of God in this context. There's nothing illogical about a creator creating.

Fourthly: When you get down to the basic level, all methods of interaction are left entirely void. All we can do is observe the rules that seem to apply to interactions; we have no deep understanding as to why they apply. This objection is, then, an empty one. It's worse than that though, in that "because a creative agent designed it that way" is a lot more explanatory than "because an infinite, formless potential is logically prior to the finite, actual forms of a neutral substance".

Fifthly: The jarring could be because you caricature dualism as more impoverished than it need be (for more on this see below).

Sixthly: If you reject the notion that minds (persons aka souls aka consciousnesses) are substances distinct from the substance of matter (broadly conceived), then you need to explain what a mind is in relation to this neutral substance. For an explicit question on this, see further below.

Finally: You seem to be indulging in something of a double standard: critiquing others based on logic, but defending yourself based on intuition.

Neutral Monism doesn't "conflate" anything ~ it seeks to explain how and why mind and matter can interact so seamlessly by offering a common medium, a common substance, a common language, as it were, if "energy" and "vibration" are a common language as it were.

OK, so, again (you ignored my last prompt to clarify), is the infinite, formless potential the putative neutral substance, or does that neutral substance have some other identity or nature?

Your unsubstantiated presumption is in the... demanding insistence that mind and matter must, by definition, be radically distinct.

I address this implicitly via my questions re the neutral substance below.

Again, you are allowing pure logic to get in the way of getting to the meat of the matter.

So, is the meat of the matter not logical? On what basis do you suggest we (those to whom you are presenting it) evaluate it if not a rational one?

Matter isn't really a substance of its own ~ it is entirely phenomenal, and doesn't exist independently outside of that perceptual state.

If, though, matter is entirely phenomenal and doesn't exist independently outside of a perceptual state, then this entails idealism, not neutral monism. The SEP entry on neutral monism warns about this under 7.2 The Mentalism Suspicion. The defence described there does not seem to apply to your contention, or, at least, we'd more details about your theory to know whether it could, given that "There is no quick way to adjudicate this dispute. A careful assessment of each case is required."

Mind-as-we-know-it isn't a substance of its own, either ~ compared to soul proper, it is crushingly limited in scope and potential.

I think that, like Sci has in the past (although I think he understands better now), you present a caricature of substance dualism, because, while substance dualism distinguishes at the fundamental level between minds (which experience) and the "stuff" within which they experience and into which they incarnate, it doesn't limit the richness and variety of those minds (including their properties and capacities) nor of that stuff, which might vary from "dense" physical matter to the astral and ethereal to the "vibration-energy-form-stuff" that you reference later in your post.

In Neutral Monism, the neutral substance has the potential qualities of both mind and matter, allowing both to be derived.

By mind or matter being "derived" from this neutral substance, do you mean that that substance transmutes into mind or matter? If not, what do you mean by mind or matter being "derived" from it?

In any case, under which conditions is mind derived from this neutral substance, and under which conditions is matter derived?

Note in particular that your explanation has to account for the capacity of minds to experience. This is important and I will return to it later.

So it allows for not only Dualism

Dualism is by definition strictly incompatible with neutral monism. I understand though that you mean that your neutral monist theory allows for an apparent dualism, but that's not saying anything meaningful, because dualism is apparent on any ontology (with perhaps rare exceptions such as eliminativist materialism).

but also Parallelism, with the neutral substance as the interactive medium, the fabric.

At first I assumed that by this you meant psychophysical parallelism, but later in your post you qualify "Parallelism" with "Interactive", which is oxymoronic: by definition, on parallelism, there is no interaction.

Can you please explain, then, how you differentiate "Dualism" (which is interactive) from "Parallelism" (which you also seem to say is interactive, even though that's not standard usage)? (Not a facetious or rhetorical question: I genuinely don't understand the supposed difference).

This is what I mean by "substance": https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/

As I've made clear, I, too, am using the philosophical meaning.

On my understanding, experience is not a substance: although it is irreducible, it is also contingent (on the experiencer). True substances can't be contingent.

Now, that in itself doesn't invalidate neutral monism, because, on neutral monism, experience doesn't have to be a substance either, merely in some sense derivative of "the" (neutral) substance.

The real problems though that I see here for neutral monism as you're defending it are those properties of experience that I've just mentioned, in particular its being irreducible: experience simply is what it is, and can't be reduced to anything logically prior, let alone a prior substance. How could it be that, say, the redness of red, a quale as experienced by a conscious subject, is derived from anything? I'm not talking about the quale in an abstract sense, I'm talking about it as an experience; that is, as undergone by an experiencer. To put it another way, it makes no sense that experiencing-as-a-verb could ultimately be anything other than what it actually is.

The contingency is important too: experience logically entails an experiencer. Before considering that more directly, consider that, further, aside from experiencer and experience, you need to explain that which is experienced, much of which is that to which we conventionally refer as "matter". Recall that unless your position reduces to idealism, that matter has to be mind-independent. What, on your theory of neutral monism, is the distinction between (experiencer-independent) matter and (experiencer-contingent) experience?

Concerning contingency more directly: how does neutral monism explain this contingency (of experience on experiencer)? How can a single, neutral substance both undergo experience as well as be experience? This relates to my question above as to under which conditions mind (the experiencer) derives from the neutral substance.

Most importantly, how does your theory explain the capacity of this experiencer to experience in the first place if all that an experiencer consists in is a neutral substance that - lest your theory devolve into idealism - at least in some instances (as "matter") does not experience? I have assumed in that question that the experiencer consists in this neutral substance, but maybe that's not what you think. Is it? If not, how do you account for experiencers on your neutral monist theory?

Summing up: this neutral substance has to be capable of manifesting firstly as undergone experience contingent on an experiencer, secondly as non-experiential matter independent of any experiencer, and thirdly also as the experiencer (who has not just the capacity to experience but who also actually - versus "matter", which does not - experiences) themself. How does it do these three very distinct things as a single substance?

If this post in its entirety is way too overwhelming for you to respond to, then please simply focus on this section and these questions. They are the most relevant and crucial to your defence of neutral monism.

As for how existence is actualized out of infinite pure potential... well, it's no less mysterious than how God-as-person can just wave their hands and make two base substances, mind and matter, pop out of nowhere, separate from God-as-person, and interact in a way that has never been logically or intuitively explained.

Actually, it's not just more mysterious, but logically incoherent. Pure potential by definition has no capacity to actualise anything. You need an actual existent in order to actualise potential.

There is nothing incoherent about a creator creating.

Of course, the creator's existence is not explained, but the lack of an ultimate explanation as to why anything exists at all is a problem for every metaphysic of which I'm aware.

Your theory of infinite, formless, pure potential cannot be that ultimate explanation given that it is incoherent as I've just explained. Hence, aside from its being incoherent, it seems to serve no purpose, hence my asking near the start of this reply whether it is redundant and can simply be discarded.

Does God act as the messenger?

That's theoretically possible, but I don't see a need for it, and it unnecessarily complicates things.

How is the "simpler" than just having a common medium by which two derivative existences are able to interact by simply having similar natures?

Because the contortions to which the purported common medium would seem to need to go through - if they are even possible, which seems unlikely - to serve the three required roles (experiencer, experience, and experienced-as-matter) that I pointed out above would be avoided.

There is a significant difference... matter as known ~ even if you want to define it as being quantum stuff ~ simply has no purpose as a base substance, logically or intuitively. It doesn't exist at the higher level of reality that my loong spirit inhabits ~ it's just... vibration-energy-form-stuff up there. And if that was weird, I have a loong spirit that complains and is annoyed at how ridiculously complicated biology is, and how the energies can be a real nightmare to figure out with how fine-grained they can get in purpose and connection to other energies in my field, aura... whatever it is.

So there are far more complexities at play than Interactive Dualism can answer. It's why Idealism has ceased to be interesting, because it accounts less and less for my very shamanic experiences.

See above re your having caricatured dualism.

There is no evidence for this... odd notion.

You're literally on a board on which we discuss NDEs, which often enough feature encounters with a being understood to be the personal God.

You might have reasons to dismiss it, but it is evidence, and there are other types of experiential evidence of God too; the story of a prisoner in his cell to whom God appeared, transforming his life, in particular comes to mind.

The mystics never experience the godhead as a "Person".

Some certainly do. For example, The Desert Fathers, St. Teresa of Ávila, St. John of the Cross, and St. Francis of Assisi. If they're too Western for you, consider Sri Ramakrishna, who wrote that the Supreme Being when active is the Personal God, who is no different from the Impersonal God when inactive. There are other examples of similarly ambivalent mystical understandings of God, such as those who experience God as both transcendent and immanent. They can't be dismissed as wholly "impersonal" experiences of God.

Not even the Buddhists have such an experience.

It's interesting that you dismiss the relevance of institutionalised religion except for one of the rare exceptions that supports your view.

Maybe, though, you count Buddhism as a spiritual tradition rather than an institutionalised religion, but in that case, surely Hinduism counts too, in which case: you must have heard of the supreme personal being Krishna. A quick bit of googling turns up plenty of accounts of personal experiences with this personal God.

Psychedelic users who experience profound ego-death and a merging with the universe also never report this.

Probably because that's a totally different experience. Plenty of psychedelic users do experience a personal God.

The furtherest I have gone in my... psychedelic / sober shamanic experiences is of some midway point towards my soul, which is still categorically me, though a far more expansive existence that includes me ~ I mean, something fundamental to it feels like me...

Fine, but a sample size of one isn't much to go by.

But "God"? No Western spiritual tradition outside of religion recognizes God-as-person

A couple of quickly-researched counter-examples (thanks, ChatGPT): Theosophy and New Age Spirituality.

nor does any Eastern spiritual tradition.

Some more quickly-researched counter-examples: Bhakti Spirituality, Sufism, Neo-Vedanta, and some variants of Tantra.

It is only institutionalized religion that seems to enforce this weird idea of personhood and human-like personality onto "God", including the even more bizarre idea of separating into Creator and Creation, a very artificial and forced distinction that serves only a priesthood.

That's very declaratively and definitively expressed, but the above proves it false.

Because explaining interaction between entirely distinct substances is baffling. There is no common ground

This is merely an argument from personal incredulity. It carries no logical weight.

and no causal explanation provided.

It hasn't been scientifically investigated yet as far as I know - if it even could be - so it seems premature to expect a causal explanation.

Just "they interact because divine fiat"... uh, cool, but it answers nothing, except to handwave.

Again, it isn't necessarily due to divine fiat. It might be a brute fact about reality, just as some would say that the causal interaction by which mass attracts mass is a brute fact about reality.

Causal interaction doesn't happen *within* minds or matter ~ that is what you do not comprehend.

I don't know what you mean by this, but it anyway seems like semantic quibbling.

[Skipping the rest of your post given that I've either more or less addressed it already, or it would otherwise bloat this already long response too much to address.]

[Laird]

This [that on monism, experiencer and experienced are the same substance --Laird] isn't a fair statement to make ~ all Monisms derive entities distinct from one another, so saying they're the same substance is... oddly reductionist, in a way.

What are you talking about? The definition of monism in this context (ontology) is literally that there is only one substance, or at least only one type of substance. Hence, experiencer and experience must be the same (type of) substance.

"Mostly different" doesn't make much sense. Experiencer and experienced must be entirely distinct in a pure Dualism [...] Even the spirits I interact with... I have never experienced them as experiencer.

It seems like a bit of a quibble and as I was anyway only qualifying in an incidental, minor way I won't pursue this. There seem to be different ways of looking at it. I brought up telepathy and psi in general as one way in which one experiencer might directly experience another experiencer, but if you don't like or accept that, then that's fine.

Point being is that Dualism utterly fails to take anything in account that isn't the material and mind-as-we-know-it. It presents a miserably simplistic view of reality that simply doesn't mesh with reported experiences from multiple angles.

See my immediately prior post re this being a caricature of dualism.

I'd have to find the account, but apparently it's more getting a plain old 9-5 in some city.

If it's from Newton's collection of nonsense, then that might explain it... never heard that sort of thing from anywhere else. Not yet...

If it's from Newton's collection of nonsense, then that might explain it... never heard that sort of thing from anywhere else. Not yet...

IIRC it was about a dead comedian who communicated the afterlife to a medium.

IIRC it was about a dead comedian who communicated the afterlife to a medium.

Possibly this one...
https://psiencequest.net/forums/thread-o...8#pid59508

This idea was mentioned:

one experiencer might directly experience another experiencer

This is something which has happened to me so I consider it a valid (and perhaps rather ordinary) idea.