All matter is a cognitive ‘hallucination,’ even the brain itself

Well my last post got no traction... so an alternative approach - that leads to the same outcome - is to question the assumptions in your simple thought experiment above...

1. What does it mean to say 'the trees in my yard are in the same place'

The continents are drifting, the planet is spinning on it's axis, the planet is orbiting the sun, the solar system is moving within the galaxy, the galaxy is moving in the universe. The trees roots are growing and shrinking, it's branches are thickening and lengthening, leaves or needles may be forming, or falling onto the ground etc.

What is meant by your words in the same place, for clearly, the trees in your yard are not contained in the same shape from observation to observation, nor are they in the same space from observation to observation.

2. You seem to ascribe some significance to the words 'when I go on holiday and return', as if you find there is something important in that statement, but I'm struggling to understand what it is?

3. I struggle to understand the final sentence, that the claims in your prior sentence (above) 'That has nothing to do with my being conscious of them'. If you did not observe your home, the yard, the trees, how could you ever learn about them to make any claim about them at all. If a stranger was to observe, and learn about your home, your yard, your trees, for the first time, they still could not even make the claim you have made.

Let's try a different thought experiment. Say I go away on holiday and when I return, a tree in my yard has fallen.

The change has nothing to do with consciousness, since I was not conscious of my yard while I was away. The change has nothing to do with my memories, since they include the memory of the tree standing. So what happened?

~~ Paul

The happiest of holidays to all! And here's hoping that 2025 will not be as insane as it seems it will be.

~~ Paul

Let's try a different thought experiment. Say I go away on holiday and when I return, a tree in my yard has fallen.

The change has nothing to do with consciousness, since I was not conscious of my yard while I was away. The change has nothing to do with my memories, since they include the memory of the tree standing. So what happened?

~~ Paul

I can't say my response is that different...

1. You have said that "a tree in my yard has fallen", I'm not really sure what you are asking me, when you say "So what happened?" I have no more information to add, other than what you have shared? Presumably you would have made observations, and constructed a satisfying story joining them together, to understand your experience?

2. You again seem to ascribe some significance to the words 'I go away on holiday and when I return', as if you find there is something important in that statement, but I'm still struggling to understand what it is?

3. how can "the change have nothing to do with..." experience...? If you did not observe your home, the yard, the trees, how could you ever learn about them to make any claims of 'change' about them?

Let's try a different thought experiment. Say I go away on holiday and when I return, a tree in my yard has fallen.

The change has nothing to do with consciousness, since I was not conscious of my yard while I was away. The change has nothing to do with my memories, since they include the memory of the tree standing. So what happened?

~~ Paul

I think this thought experiment overlooks the implications of Schrödinger's cat. Your argument is reminiscent of Einstein's moon argument.

I can't say my response is that different...

1. You have said that "a tree in my yard has fallen", I'm not really sure what you are asking me, when you say "So what happened?" I have no more information to add, other than what you have shared? Presumably you would have made observations, and constructed a satisfying story joining them together, to understand your experience?

2. You again seem to ascribe some significance to the words 'I go away on holiday and when I return', as if you find there is something important in that statement, but I'm still struggling to understand what it is?

3. how can "the change have nothing to do with..." experience...? If you did not observe your home, the yard, the trees, how could you ever learn about them to make any claims of 'change' about them?

We are talking about what the "external world" might be. My only point is that is not (a) something maintained by my consciousness; nor (b) something maintained by my memory. The point of including my going away and coming back is that an event occurs while I am away that is not explained by my consciousness nor by my memory. Of course, my consciousness and memory are involved in the overall experience of the event, but they do not explain the change in the tree.

~~ Paul

I think this thought experiment overlooks the implications of Schrödinger's cat. Your argument is reminiscent of Einstein's moon argument.

What does some possible superposition of states have to do with my argument? I don't perceive superposition of states. The macro state of my yard changed while I was not experiencing it. And even if all that happens is that I consider one possible state to be the current state and then change my mind about the current state after I return from holiday, I didn't do that consciously.

~~ Paul

We are talking about what the "external world" might be. My only point is that is not (a) something maintained by my consciousness; nor (b) something maintained by my memory.

The point of including my going away and coming back is that an event occurs while I am away that is not explained by my consciousness nor by my memory.

Of course, my consciousness and memory are involved in the overall experience of the event, but they do not explain the change in the tree.

I get the points you're trying to make... it's just that I don't necessarily agree with your assumptions - as I've pointed out.

There could be an isolated external world, a similar world, and Experience could be a shared representation of that world in some way we cannot yet understand, I keep that door ajar, but I'm doubting it.

Edwin Lands discoveries following years of work on colour seem like the thin end of the wedge to me, that is he showed that the experience of colour cannot be a property of any external world. How many other deeper layers of experience, (lines, edges, movement etc.) below that of colour, might also be peeled away?

I also have struggled to reconcile my own, and others anomalous experiences, the most certain conclusion I have found, is that people really do recall experiences which are not their own, and therefore that suggests to me that Experience really is a shared creation.

Lately Nima's work on scattering amplitudes has convinced me that there has to be some 1:1 biological structure/relationship, between our shared experience of the organism that appears to be having these experiences, and the Experience of the scientific/mathematical structures that this same organism appears to be finding to explain it's Experience.

I get the points you're trying to make... it's just that I don't necessarily agree with your assumptions - as I've pointed out.

There could be an isolated external world, a similar world, and Experience could be a shared representation of that world in some way we cannot yet understand, I keep that door ajar, but I'm doubting it.

Edwin Lands discoveries following years of work on colour seem like the thin end of the wedge to me, that is he showed that the experience of colour cannot be a property of any external world. How many other deeper layers of experience, (lines, edges, movement etc.) below that of colour, might also be peeled away?

I also have struggled to reconcile my own, and others anomalous experiences, the most certain conclusion I have found, is that people really do recall experiences which are not their own, and therefore that suggests to me that Experience really is a shared creation.

Lately Nima's work on scattering amplitudes has convinced me that there has to be some 1:1 biological structure/relationship, between our shared experience of the organism that appears to be having these experiences, and the Experience of the scientific/mathematical structures that this same organism appears to be finding to explain it's Experience.

Some sort of shared representation that is not physical is certainly a possibility. Though I'm not really sure how we would decide whether it's physical (in the sense of permanent and not mind) or nonphysical. At least such a model does not descend into solipsism.

~~ Paul

Water is not a liquid in and of itself? Wasn't there water on the Earth before conscious entities began to inhabit it?

~~ Paul

Liquidity is an abstract quality imposed on us by perception. It is not an inherent quality of the atoms or groups of atoms themselves.

"Gases" and "Liquids" are concepts to describe a subset of the consensus experience, and are "objective" in the sense of being 3rd person accounts.

So two gases turning into a liquid would be an objective, 3rd person description. What we'd want from this supposed "physical" stuff that comes before experience - yet is only ever known via experience - would be a description of how the 3rd person description results in the 1st person POV [of the experiencer] who has experiences.

That being said, AFAIK the reason people believe two gases can become water is because the process is known. What would be the process that takes the "physical" that supposed[ly] precedes all experience & then arranges this stuff into the brain which generates the experiencer?

“[Reductive physicalists] will have to give us some idea of how the existence of consciousness might be entailed by physical facts. While it is not fair to expect all the details, one at least needs an account of how such an entailment might possibly go.”
 - Chalmers