The Solution to the Problem of the Freedom of the Will

I don't think that's the question anymore. I've said multiple times that I'm happy to suspend the determinism/randomness dichotomy. All I'm looking for now is some hand-waving description of how a free decision is made.

At this point I think your running is of your own making.

As far as I can tell, Feser is only offering a source of free will, not an description of how it works. The description doesn't have to be mechanistic. It doesn't have to be concrete.

Go for it. Lay that groundwork and then I'll ask for a description of a free decision.

~~ Paul

Can you start by explaining how any causal process occurs? I mean take any example and explain it, because I really don't know what you're asking for. 

You seem to be trying to force the conversation to a point where you can claim there's a proof of contradiction after having admitted you can't prove everything must be deterministic/random and being unable to explain causation.

Can you start by explaining how any causal process occurs? I mean take any example and explain it, because I really don't know what you're asking for. 

You seem to be trying to force the conversation to a point where you can claim there's a proof of contradiction after having admitted you can't prove everything must be deterministic/random and being unable to explain causation.

I'm not trying to force anything. I'm simply asking for those claiming to be able to imagine a free decision to describe how it might work.

Are you saying you have no idea how any causal process occurs? If so, then why would you make any claims about will, free or otherwise? Perhaps I'm wrong and you do have some idea of free causality, but then why won't you present it?

If none of this is describable, then we don't even have a definition of "free."

~~ Paul

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/fr...ument.html

Can you start by explaining how any causal process occurs? I mean take any example and explain it, because I really don't know what you're asking for. 

You seem to be trying to force the conversation to a point where you can claim there's a proof of contradiction after having admitted you can't prove everything must be deterministic/random and being unable to explain causation.

You kinda seem to be doing the exact same thing but substituting free will instead of determinism instead. Which is the classic god of the gaps argument. "Well we don't know for sure therefore my answer is correct."

Object T starts at State 0 and has two possibilities when moving to State 1, A or B, How does T choose either A or B without the use of an algorithm (Determinism), without randomly picking one or the other (Randomness) and without merely splitting T into T1 and T2 for A and B respectively (Predestination)?

This is as simple a causality/free will logic problem as you can get unless you can prove otherwise. If free will exists then show us how.

You kinda seem to be doing the exact same thing but substituting free will instead of determinism instead. Which is the classic god of the gaps argument. "Well we don't know for sure therefore my answer is correct."

Object T starts at State 0 and has two possibilities when moving to State 1, A or B, How does T choose either A or B without the use of an algorithm (Determinism), without randomly picking one or the other (Randomness) and without merely splitting T into T1 and T2 for A and B respectively (Predestination)?

This is as simple a causality/free will logic problem as you can get unless you can prove otherwise. If free will exists then show us how.

Except I already mentioned how over on Skeptiko months ago, via Feser's - derived from Aquinas & Aristotle -  argument for a Prime Mover who directs the final cause but then imparts this ability in a limited fashion. We can re-litigate why there needs to be a Prime Mover and Final Causes if people want.

And for the record all I've said is that free will can exist, insofar that the claim for all causation being deterministic/random is false. I just gave Feser's Classical Theist Metaphysics as an example regarding how free will works. (The other example I gave was Gregg Rosenberg's argument regarding consciousness as the carrier of causation, I think he calls it Libertarian Naturalism or somesuch.)

In any case the Object T, etc argument is assuming a lot about Causation. What does it mean to "use" an algorithm? Or "pick" something "randomly"? Forget about "choose", how does anything - lighting a match for example - happen when we go from one set of states A *causing* another state B? Why is there observable change anywhere? How does one determine the cause of something? Why is there enough regularity in reality to even determine that A -> B?

I keep saying people should start a discussion about causation but it always seems everyone wants to jump the gun and start talking about free will. But the answers one gives as to why there is causation will determine whether one thinks there is free will. Feser and Rosenberg both answer the question of causation in different ways, over the course of their respective books (Aquinas, A Beginner's Guide & A Place for Consciousness), but the metaphysics of causation they introduce negates any concern that everything must be deterministic/random.

Except I already mentioned how over on Skeptiko months ago, via Feser's - derived from Aquinas & Aristotle - argument for a Prime Mover who directs the final cause but then imparts this ability in a limited fashion. We can re-litigate why there needs to be a Prime Mover and Final Causes if people want.

Can you summarize how this Prime Mover directs the final cause?

I keep saying people should start a discussion about causation but it always seems everyone wants to jump the gun and start talking about free will. But the answers one gives as to why there is causation will determine whether one thinks there is free will. Feser and Rosenberg both answer the question of causation in different ways, over the course of their respective books (Aquinas, A Beginner's Guide & A Place for Consciousness), but the metaphysics of causation they introduce negates any concern that everything must be deterministic/random.

Could you summarize one of their metaphysics of causation? You keep asking us for one but don't seem willing to specify one yourself. I'm not able to find anything but names for the causal agent. In particular, what allows the agent to make a different decision under exactly the same circumstances?

~~ Paul

Except I already mentioned how over on Skeptiko months ago, via Feser's - derived from Aquinas & Aristotle -  argument for a Prime Mover who directs the final cause but then imparts this ability in a limited fashion. We can re-litigate why there needs to be a Prime Mover and Final Causes if people want.

And for the record all I've said is that free will can exist, insofar that the claim for all causation being deterministic/random is false. I just gave Feser's Classical Theist Metaphysics as an example regarding how free will works. (The other example I gave was Gregg Rosenberg's argument regarding consciousness as the carrier of causation, I think he calls it Libertarian Naturalism or somesuch.)

In any case the Object T, etc argument is assuming a lot about Causation. What does it mean to "use" an algorithm? Or "pick" something "randomly"? Forget about "choose", how does anything - lighting a match for example - happen when we go from one set of states A *causing* another state B? Why is there observable change anywhere? How does one determine the cause of something? Why is there enough regularity in reality to even determine that A -> B?

I keep saying people should start a discussion about causation but it always seems everyone wants to jump the gun and start talking about free will. But the answers one gives as to why there is causation will determine whether one thinks there is free will. Feser and Rosenberg both answer the question of causation in different ways, over the course of their respective books (Aquinas, A Beginner's Guide & A Place for Consciousness), but the metaphysics of causation they introduce negates any concern that everything must be deterministic/random.

You're being coy again of course since you have no argument. You really expect me to believe you don't understand the algorithm/randomness stuff? Either there's a mathematical path, randomness, or it's all going to happen anyways. The source of these things is irrelevant. Pick one or show how it can be anything else.

You're being coy again of course since you have no argument. You really expect me to believe you don't understand the algorithm/randomness stuff? Either there's a mathematical path, randomness, or it's all going to happen anyways. The source of these things is irrelevant. Pick one or show how it can be anything else.

Heh, that's an amusing combativeness - it's odd to accuse someone of having no argument after I presented links to two books that offer an argument about causation. It's rather odd to insist someone take two books, hundreds of pages long, and distill them into a single post to prove their case.

And I didn't say I didn't understand what you wrote, I said it was making assumptions about causation. Saying something is a "mathematical path", however, doesn't mean much to me. The source of why causation happens determines whether the only choices are the ones you present, and that you seem to think otherwise shows why we should be talking about causation before talking about free will.

For myself, I don't there is any real thing as determinism in the sense of causal necessity - this seems to be what you mean by a "mathematical path", in which case I would say it's just merely that - a mathematical description of reality but only an intellectual abstraction.

Heh, that's an amusing combativeness - it's odd to accuse someone of having no argument after I presented links to two books that offer an argument about causation. It's rather odd to insist someone take two books, hundreds of pages long, and distill them into a single post to prove their case.

And I didn't say I didn't understand what you wrote, I said it was making assumptions about causation. Saying something is a "mathematical path", however, doesn't mean much to me. The source of why causation happens determines whether the only choices are the ones you present, and that you seem to think otherwise shows why we should be talking about causation before talking about free will.

For myself, I don't there is any real thing as determinism in the sense of causal necessity - this seems to be what you mean by a "mathematical path", in which case I would say it's just merely that - a mathematical description of reality but only an intellectual abstraction.

Yeah, you've been doing the equivalent of going up to someone who says 2+2=4 and saying "But how do you know man? Like, what does it mean to add things? I mean... does everything really have to be something? what does it mean to be something, Y'know?"

That sort of philosophical jibber jab can be used on literally any argument and is thus insufficient. Solve the problem or prove, logically, how it's incorrect. Asking hollow epistemological but-how-do-you-know's isn't good enough. 

Your book links aren't free and so are as good as no link since I can't actually check them.

Yeah, you've been doing the equivalent of going up to someone who says 2+2=4 and saying "But how do you know man? Like, what does it mean to add things? I mean... does everything really have to be something? what does it mean to be something, Y'know?"

That sort of philosophical jibber jab can be used on literally any argument and is thus insufficient. Solve the problem or prove, logically, how it's incorrect. Asking hollow epistemological but-how-do-you-know's isn't good enough. 

Your book links aren't free and so are as good as no link since I can't actually check them.

No, 2+2 is always 4 because that is the rules of mathematics. 

I asked a very specific question - explain the how of any causal event.

It's kind of sad you would even try to make this equivalence.