The Solution to the Problem of the Freedom of the Will

But a free decision isn't causeless? That would just be causally random, something I don't personally believe in as it's just arbitrary. However it seems to me that your assumption of determinism is just as arbitrary. I mean I don't understand why we can't list the causes of an effect? Unless you're saying Everything is the cause of Everything That Happens Next? But even then I don't see what fixes the state o Everything That Happens Next?

How could we possibly determine all the causes of an event? Isn't this why counterfactual causality has been suggested? We can list some of the counterfactual causes, but not all the causes.

What is it about cause A (whatever you want to include in that set) that results in effect B? Why not effect C? Why not B sometimes and C sometimes?

I don't think we can answer this question. One reason is because we don't know if {A} is the sufficient set of causes. We can often predict the effect of a set of causes, more or less, but I wouldn't want to suggest that physical laws are the explanation. Your question is pertinent to any model of causality, right?

It seems your assumptions are it's arbitrarily consistent or inconsistent, meaning this deterministic/randomness dichotomy is just taken on faith?

I think it's more than faith, since no one can describe anything that makes it a trichotomy. That's what this whole conversation is about.

Rather than going down the same path to same conversation we've had at least once, if not more, I'd rather pin down what we're talking about when we talk about Causation.

I have nothing to offer. I'm willing to accept any sort of model. But if that model includes some piece "that we just can't understand," what's the point?

One thing we might be able to pin down: Can there be an event with no causes?

~~ Paul

P.S. I'll be incommunicado for a few days starting tomorrow. But I'll be back!

It has everything to do with consciousness. We are talking about the action of will in a conscious human being who makes a decision, whether it is free or not. This will is one of the properties of conscious awareness and intentionality, not of non-conscious mechanisms. "Will, generally, is that faculty of the mind which intentionally selects, at the moment of decision, the strongest desire from among the various desires present." (Wiki)
Decisions can also be made by non-conscious mechanisms like computers, but that isn't relevant.

Yes, that's fine. The reason I suspended the importance of consciousness is that I don't think it has much to do with the problem, which is:

How can a decision be made in a way that is not some combination of determinism and randomness (arbitrary coin flips)?

Saying "by a conscious agent" is not an answer to that question, it's just a proposal for the source of the decision.

~~ Paul

I think it's more than faith, since no one can describe anything that makes it a trichotomy. That's what this whole conversation is about.

But why would we worry about a trichotomy when it remains to be established that either determinism or randomness exist as anything more than abstractions?

That's the heart of the question AFAICTell.

Yes, that's fine. The reason I suspended the importance of consciousness is that I don't think it has much to do with the problem, which is:

How can a decision be made in a way that is not some combination of determinism and randomness (arbitrary coin flips)?

Saying "by a conscious agent" is not an answer to that question, it's just a proposal for the source of the decision.

~~ Paul

Decisions made by machines have to be either determined (a calculation however complicated) or random, or employ elements of both. We don't know how conscious apparently free will decisions are made by human beings, because we don't understand consciousness. We probably can't know. 

We do know some good reasons why consciousness is not mere mechanical calculation - it is not computable. Consciousness isn't an information process, or a material thing, at all. It seems to be in the category of fundamentals just like space and time. In fact consciousness is probably preeminent over other fundamental brute facts of reality. As a fundamental fact of reality it doesn't have to comply with human logical reasoning derived from the limitations of behavior of physical matter and energy. That we with our limited consciousness can't seem to conceive of anything other than the apparent dichotomy of either determined or arbitrary (random) is irrelevant.

I would just refer back to #37. I'm tired of this.

Decisions made by machines have to be either determined (a calculation however complicated) or random, or employ elements of both. We don't know how conscious apparently free will decisions are made by human beings, because we don't understand consciousness. We probably can't know. 

We do know some good reasons why consciousness is not mere mechanical calculation - it is not computable. Consciousness isn't an information process, or a material thing, at all. It seems to be in the category of fundamentals just like space and time. In fact consciousness is probably preeminent over other fundamental brute facts of reality. As a fundamental fact of reality it doesn't have to comply with human logical reasoning derived from the limitations of behavior of physical matter and energy. That we with our limited consciousness can't seem to conceive of anything other than the apparent dichotomy of either determined or arbitrary (random) is irrelevant.

I would just refer back to #37. I'm tired of this.

I'm not sure that everyone is part of that "we". That is to say, not everyone accepts the binary choice where there are only two possibilities, and nothing else.

I'm not sure that everyone is part of that "we". That is to say, not everyone accepts the binary choice where there are only two possibilities, and nothing else.

What I meant was that there is another alternative, but that it is probably not understandable by the limited human mind. This is closely related to the philosophical position of mysterianism.

But why would we worry about a trichotomy when it remains to be established that either determinism or randomness exist as anything more than abstractions?

That's the heart of the question AFAICTell.

Because people are claiming an abstract method of making decisions that is neither the abstract method of determinism nor the abstract method of randomness.

You can run this around in circles all you want, but it really appears that you are avoiding trying to describe the method of decision making you believe exists, be it concrete or merely an abstraction.

~~ Paul

Decisions made by machines have to be either determined (a calculation however complicated) or random, or employ elements of both. We don't know how conscious apparently free will decisions are made by human beings, because we don't understand consciousness. We probably can't know.

Then I daresay it is folly to assume there is any method for making free decisions.

We do know some good reasons why consciousness is not mere mechanical calculation - it is not computable. Consciousness isn't an information process, or a material thing, at all. It seems to be in the category of fundamentals just like space and time. In fact consciousness is probably preeminent over other fundamental brute facts of reality. As a fundamental fact of reality it doesn't have to comply with human logical reasoning derived from the limitations of behavior of physical matter and energy. That we with our limited consciousness can't seem to conceive of anything other than the apparent dichotomy of either determined or arbitrary (random) is irrelevant.

We don't actually know whether consciousness is computable.

If consciousness is immaterial but human logical reasoning cannot transcend the material and operate on the level of consciousness, then, again, I would avoid making any claims about truly free decision making.

~~ Paul

Because people are claiming an abstract method of making decisions that is neither the abstract method of determinism nor the abstract method of randomness.

You can run this around in circles all you want, but it really appears that you are avoiding trying to describe the method of decision making you believe exists, be it concrete or merely an abstraction.

~~ Paul

But the question was whether Freedom, as something fundamental, would have to be deterministic or random? An Animist or even Whitehead-inspired metaphysics would likely only have Free Will as an explanation for all causes.

You yourself have said you've no definitive explanation for causation, nor a proof for why things must be deterministic or random - why would I need to run circles around an abstraction I don't believe in? (Perhaps you now have one or both of these?)

Regardless, I already noted the Catholic theologian Feser's theistic metaphysics of the Prime Mover and Aristotle's four fold causation in the last debate as a means of explaining how free will could work. We can go over why there needs to be both a Prime Mover and Final Causation, but you seem to think when someone says "how" they have to explain in a mechanistic sense in which case you seem to be angling continuously for a proof of contradiction.

If an atheist doesn't include God in their explanation for some event, we hardly think they are running circles even if others insist God must be part of the hypothesis (yes I know the Lapace story in apocryphal  ). 

On the flip side if I don't think mechanistic materialism has any description for causation within it, my fundamental "how" isn't going to include circular definitions like "force", "energy", etc. Which is why I think a person has to have an explanation for why A is the cause of the effect B and what this really means. We can't really worry about free will until people lay on the table how they think causation works.

But the question was whether Freedom, as something fundamental, would have to be deterministic or random? An Animist or even Whitehead-inspired metaphysics would likely only have Free Will as an explanation for all causes.

I don't think that's the question anymore. I've said multiple times that I'm happy to suspend the determinism/randomness dichotomy. All I'm looking for now is some hand-waving description of how a free decision is made.

You yourself have said you've no definitive explanation for causation, nor a proof for why things must be deterministic or random - why would I need to run circles around an abstraction I don't believe in? (Perhaps you now have one or both of these?)

At this point I think your running is of your own making.

Regardless, I already noted the Catholic theologian Feser's theistic metaphysics of the Prime Mover and Aristotle's four fold causation in the last debate as a means of explaining how free will could work. We can go over why there needs to be both a Prime Mover and Final Causation, but you seem to think when someone says "how" they have to explain in a mechanistic sense in which case you seem to be angling continuously for a proof of contradiction.

As far as I can tell, Feser is only offering a source of free will, not an description of how it works. The description doesn't have to be mechanistic. It doesn't have to be concrete.

On the flip side if I don't think mechanistic materialism has any description for causation within it, my fundamental "how" isn't going to include circular definitions like "force", "energy", etc. Which is why I think a person has to have an explanation for why A is the cause of the effect B and what this really means. We can't really worry about free will until people lay on the table how they think causation works.

Go for it. Lay that groundwork and then I'll ask for a description of a free decision.

~~ Paul