The Plant Consciousness Wars

None of these properties of conscious awareness and thought can be measured, since they are inner experiential properties of a conscious entity.


How are you proposing the latter can somehow emerge from the former? The properties of conscious awareness (to say nothing of abstract thought for instance) can't be derived from the physics and chemical properties of the nerve structures, or from the properties of their actions in processing information.

I strongly agree that formulating what is measurable in science, should address the consciousness argument!  Methodological insight regarding data collection and an understanding of metrology is where progress can be unleashed.

 The fundamental objective of metrology is to ensure traceability as an essential precondition for the comparison of measurement results. The tasks of legal metrology are carried out by calibration of measurement standards and by testing the accuracy of measuring instruments. 

In is still normative to address "properties" of substances.  I see that as a science viewpoint that is transcended by talking about dispositions and propensity, where recordable and empirical events have outcomes.  This is the science worldview of leaving behind properties as essences and relying on the process models that can be predictive.

The outcomes of mentation (the working actions of mind) are measurable and at least quantifiable in quasi-empirical manner.  How this may be done, is at the heart of ever post I make here.

Plant mentation is observable. measurable and its activity can be modeled as clearly defined processes. 

I think that Integrated Information Theory would be useful to answer the question of plant consciousness. It doesn't depend upon any particular substrate (such as neurons), but instead looks at whether or not a particular system satisfies a set of postulates. It specifies the quality and the quantity of an "experience" in a way that doesn't depend upon neural correlates of consciousness (which comes at it from the opposite direction).

I think the "you can't get blood from a stone" is a non-starter as an analogy. You also can't get weather from the air in a balloon, life from a lump of coal, or population dynamics from a fish. But somehow we aren't forced to argue that weather, life, population dynamics, etc. are all fundamental.

Linda

Off-topic, but IIT is a textbook case of giving an interesting idea a terrible name. It sounds like something a middling tech school would name their intermediate programming course.

I strongly agree that formulating what is measurable in science, should address the consciousness argument!  Methodological insight regarding data collection and an understanding of metrology is where progress can be unleashed.


In is still normative to address "properties" of substances.  I see that as a science viewpoint that is transcended by talking about dispositions and propensity, where recordable and empirical events have outcomes.  This is the science worldview of leaving behind properties as essences and relying on the process models that can be predictive.

The outcomes of mentation (the working actions of mind) are measurable and at least quantifiable in quasi-empirical manner.  How this may be done, is at the heart of ever post I make here.

Plant mentation is observable. measurable and its activity can be modeled as clearly defined processes. 

I would disagree that the observed "intelligent" plant behavior could be considered "mentation", which is defined as "cerebration, intellection, thinking, thought process, thought". Mentation is basically thinking, a property of sentient consciousness. We don't know that this is the case with plants - all we know is that it is apparently intelligent behavior that may be reflective of some dim sort of non-sentient consciousness, or in my opinion at least, reflective only of a highly advanced stimulus/response feedback system. Also, as you note, plant intelligence can be measured, defined and modeled as various processes, processes which presumably would not require consciousness to mechanize in the plant. Whereas human sentient consciousness can't be modeled as merely advanced stimulus/response feedback systems, or modeled any other way for that matter. 

As Sciborg has observed, the only way we ever may be able to really know if there is some sort of primitive consciousness going on in plants is through some sort of psychic sensing.

I would disagree that the observed "intelligent" plant behavior could be considered "mentation", which is defined as "cerebration, intellection, thinking, thought process, thought". Mentation is basically thinking, a property of sentient consciousness. We don't know that this is the case with plants - all we know is that it is apparently intelligent behavior that may be reflective of some dim sort of non-sentient consciousness, or in my opinion at least, reflective only of a highly advanced stimulus/response feedback system. Also, as you note, plant intelligence can be measured, defined and modeled as various processes, processes which presumably would not require consciousness to mechanize in the plant. Whereas human sentient consciousness can't be modeled as merely advanced stimulus/response feedback systems, or modeled any other way for that matter.

As Sciborg has observed, the only way we ever may be able to really know if there is some sort of primitive consciousness going on in plants is through some sort of psychic sensing.

Why not?

As Sciborg has observed, the only way we ever may be able to really know if there is some sort of primitive consciousness going on in plants is through some sort of psychic sensing.

Of course, one might argue this is the only way to know anyone else is conscious besides us...

I agree that subjective experience is the crucial difference. I really can't find the words to express my conviction that subjective experience is in an entirely different category to any algorithm or programmed process. You may be able to write a program to simulate feelings but no program can feel those feelings nor can the inert materials which perform the programmed tasks.

It's admittedly a challenge to say what processes/structures associate with subjective experiences and what don't, but yeah if we start with the assumption that matter has no subjective experience and not every program has subjective experiences...why does matter moving around in accordance with a particular program have subjective experiences?

The other problem I see is what a program is about, as an "error" in calculation is either a mistake or a deliberate sabotage. The truth of the matter is the intention of the programmer. Thus it's hard to see a program actually thinking.

There are some potential Idealist-ic ways around the two issues, but ultimately outside of knowing materialism is false hard to say much more about these sorts of questions that is as certain.

OTOH, with plants we run into the same question as animals - does a plant merely move toward the Sun's light or does it [move while] thinking of the "Sun" and the "light"? And if we could make a machine the mimics plant behavior, would we accept it has consciousness?

As Sciborg has observed, the only way we ever may be able to really know if there is some sort of primitive consciousness going on in plants is through some sort of psychic sensing.

I recall that during the one Ayahuasca journey I had, I had taken a baby Aloe Vera plant with me into the space, and I noticed, during the journey, that, to my altered senses, it certainly appeared to be moving. If I focused on it, it almost seemed to be moving ever so slightly towards me. I could sense, with a dim understanding, that it was alive, and aware of me, but it seems like our consciousnesses were far too different for me to even begin understanding it even shallowly.

I would dare say that plants are indeed sentient, and perhaps even sapient, however, the minds of animals and plants are seemingly so alien, compared to one another, that understanding is a difficult thing to achieve.

If plants are naturally telepathic, to a large degree, but animals struggle with it, then it makes sense that they might be able to understand us far better than we understand them. However, they cannot even begin to communicate that understanding, as we have no common language whatsoever.

 And if we could make a machine the mimics plant behavior, would we accept it has consciousness?

IMHO, no. Simulation is not the same as actual - that's why it is called simulation (mimicry). A more difficult question is how do we define consciousness? Thinking may be a feature of consciousness but does not define consciousness so to say that a plant does not think is not to say that a plant is not conscious. Plants might process stimulation differently - without thinking but with some form of awareness. 

It could be argued that a machine equipped with sensors has "awareness" but the response to the stimulus arriving from those sensors is pre-programmed and algorithmic. I don't believe that subjectivity has any part to play in algorithmic programming (other than, perhaps, the subjectivity of the programmer) but it does, to some degree, in the behaviour of living things. To what degree and how subjectivity arises are questions I have no answers for but I am certain that a program can only simulate, not experience, subjectivity.