Subjectivity: mind, self and soul

Need to catch up with the stuff posted here, but came across this today and thought it might be of interest:

Why read Fichte today?

Gabriel Gottlieb

...In other words, how is self-consciousness, awareness of oneself as oneself, possible? Fichte believes that all previous philosophers have run into a problem when attempting to account for our capacity for self-consciousness. Previous philosophers have relied on our reflective capacities to explain how self-consciousness is possible, however, Fichte insists that a problem arises when an explanation of self-consciousness relies on reflection. Explanations of self-consciousness that rely on reflection attempt to explain it in virtue of two distinct mental acts: the first is a consciousness of some object, such as a table; the second act is a separate act of consciousness directed at the first act. In virtue of this second, reflective act, the first act of consciousness is recognised as my own, as belonging to me, as one of which I am self-conscious.

The problem with this explanation of self-consciousness is that the second, reflective act treats the first act of consciousness as an ‘object’. However, if I am conscious of myself, it seems that I must be conscious of this second act too...

...This type of explanation naturally leads to an infinite regress of reflective acts (a fourth, fifth, etc) and will not do as an explanation of self-consciousness.

...Fichte’s own theory of self-consciousness and the self-positing I is meant to resolve this problem. For Fichte, the activity of the I, by immediately intuiting its own activity as itself, constitutes itself (or makes itself, if you will) into an I. The I, you might say, consists in a kind of pre-reflective activity that conditions any reflection or deliberation on the part of the person. Fichte’s changing philosophical discourse, then, might be attributed to his attempts to get his readers and students to appreciate his resolution of the reflection problem...

But how does Fichte’s response to the reflection problem relate to the question of freedom? Fichte’s thought is that this peculiar activity of the I, its positing itself as an I, is a spontaneous and free act that is unconditional and based in nothing beyond itself; it is not even based in the not-I, whatever stands against the activity of the I, even though the not-I serves as a check or limit on the I. It is important to remember that we are talking about a very minimal conception of the ‘the I’, that is, the essential pre-reflective activity required for self-conscious thought and action. To be clear, Fichte is not claiming here that the ‘self’ is untouched by the world within which it is situated. In fact, Fichte will insist for this reason on drawing a distinction between the self (the person as embodied, culturally, politically and morally situated) and the I as a pure activity that posits itself...

I thought I had posted this essay awhile back, but regardless it argues for why we perceive multiple invididuals when there is but One True Subject...or at least I think that's what it does...

How hyper-dimensional spacetime may explain individual identity

Bernard Carr

How can one natural consciousness appear to be many? Prof. Bernard Carr proposes that multiple dimensions of time, which can also be associated with the notion of a ‘specious present,’ can resolve the problem both rigorously and in an intuitively satisfying manner. This is a long-form essay that will demand attention and patience from the reader, and perhaps more than one read. But it is also one of the most important essays we’ve ever published, and one that handsomely rewards the effort it requires. It illustrates how fast we can advance to solutions to our basic questions regarding the nature of self and the universe when world-class cosmologists, such as Prof. Carr, approach the problem without metaphysical prejudices.

Bernardo Kastrup’s essay How Can You Be Me? has kindly mentioned my own approach to this question, but without giving many details, so this prompts me to elaborate on the topic. I should explain at the outset that I regard the problem of personal identity (1st personhood) as one the most profound questions not only in philosophy but also in science. Indeed, I will argue that the question Why Am I Me? (slightly different from, but closely related to, Bernardo’s question) is fundamentally unanswerable within the current scientific paradigm. Of course, this question not only confronts myself and Bernardo, it also applies to any conscious being, including any readers of this article.

The problem of 1st personhood is also closely related to the problem of the passage of time, which is also unanswerable within the current paradigm. Indeed, as Bernardo clearly appreciates, the question Why Am I Me? is closely related to the question Why Is It Now? Both questions have been the focus of extensive literature in philosophical circles, but I will argue that there is also a link with physics (my own professional field) and this has received rather scant attention. This is because both problems involve consciousness and this is usually regarded as going beyond the remit of physics, which is traditionally concerned with the 3rd person account of the world. However, the situation has changed in recent years and several respectable physicists have now begun to address this problem. Nevertheless, I should stress that my own proposal does not represent the mainstream view of physicists.

[Ninshub]

I guess, IMO, I am unconvinced this "awareness" divorced from the first-person even exists?

I'm just thinking about this. If I am unconvinced that "my" "awareness" is divorced from the first-person "me", isn't that the same as saying "I am unconvinced that I am not a localized, finite consciousness"?

What's bringing me back to think about this is just watching this video by non-dual teacher Francis Lucille. He's not giving a presentation but involved in an experiential teaching, by whatever name it's called. But I find it's a nice, well-articulated presentation of the self-enquiry process through different steps, or his version of it. And of the psychology of the process (doing this self-investigation chips away at our implicit assumptions that have come to make us think of ourselves as a separate consciousness or a body). Worth a listen IMO!

(Contains a nice aside too about the topic of "fancy word"-using academic philosophers that's been a subject of this forum for the last few days! )

The articulation starts at 15:30 or so, I'd suggest starting the video at 13:25 with his differentiating consciousness from mind, and explaining how "mind" is an abstract conceptual reification of mentation processes.



Please note I'm posting this for "myself" more than for anyone else!

In Claims of Past-Life Memories in Near-Death Experiences (Starts on page 5) Bruce Greyson mentions some cases of reincarnation where multiple claim to be the same person from a past life, and cases where one person seems to have memories from multiple people.

Unfortunately he doesn't go into that much detail so not sure what to make of these cases, but it does suggest the possibility that there are True Subjects with multiple PoVs, and possibly then One True Subject.

I have to admit I find this really hard to grasp, but the other alternative - that reincarnation cases are actually forms of Super Psi - also feels wrong.

edit: There's another possibility that if sub-personas are spirits (see the work of the Wicklands) it's possible more than one spirit can have memories of the same body. Admittedly this is what I would want to believe to justify my personal feelings about Survival...

In Claims of Past-Life Memories in Near-Death Experiences (Starts on page 5) Bruce Greyson mentions some cases of reincarnation where multiple claim to be the same person from a past life, and cases where one person seems to have memories from multiple people.

Unfortunately he doesn't go into that much detail so not sure what to make of these cases, but it does suggest the possibility that there are True Subjects with multiple PoVs, and possibly then One True Subject.

I have to admit I find this really hard to grasp, but the other alternative - that reincarnation cases are actually forms of Super Psi - also feels wrong.

edit: There's another possibility that if sub-personas are spirits (see the work of the Wicklands) it's possible more than one spirit can have memories of the same body. Admittedly this is what I would want to believe to justify my personal feelings about Survival...

I spend time reading posts on a past-life forum. Some people have various intuitions or memories about a past life, but not enough detail to identify any particular previous identity. Others have quite detailed recall and trace a probable previous existence as some recorded but obscure individual. All of that is kind of simple and straightforward.

But where it gets more complicated is usually in the case of more well-known figures. Sometimes a person will start posting and make a seemingly good case for having been a particular person. Again that seems ok. However - and it does seem to be focused more on the 'celebrity' type of identification, these often, over a period of time, seem to produce multiple present-day individuals all claiming the same past-life self.

What I've not really seen, perhaps it would pass by unnoticed, is cases where multiple people claim the same obscure past life. Perhaps that means nothing - not everyone will be posting on that forum so cases might pass unnoticed.

But it does for me raise questions about the legitimacy of the multiple claims to one identity, since it is associated with celebrity or well-known figures. (My views on fame or being well-known is that it is often a quirk of history as to who is known and who is forgotten, rather than something inherently different about so-called celebrity).

What I've not really seen, perhaps it would pass by unnoticed, is cases where multiple people claim the same obscure past life. Perhaps that means nothing - not everyone will be posting on that forum so cases might pass unnoticed.

But it does for me raise questions about the legitimacy of the multiple claims to one identity, since it is associated with celebrity or well-known figures. (My views on fame or being well-known is that it is often a quirk of history as to who is known and who is forgotten, rather than something inherently different about so-called celebrity).

Yeah I was reading about cases of supposed multiple incarnations of a single person. So far it seems to me these are more a matter of societal status, where people want their kids to be incarnates of someone important who passed on. There seems to be a single case with clear presenting indicators and then subsequent examples that are more coincidental but are accepted for the sake of societal cohesion.

I've not yet found any cases of a single person claiming multiple past life memories of two people who were alive at the same time. I've no doubt they exist - in the sense that someone has memories from two individuals - but I will admit to skepticism here as well.

What seems to be the case in the vast majority of cases is memories of single past individual held by a single child (or in some rare cases an adult). I suspect, but am willing to be proved wrong, that the "corner cases" here don't actually hold up and are due to some other explanation. Admittedly I'm pretty skeptical that there's One True Subject so I'm biased in this regard...

There's also the aforementioned possibility that all of us have a core personality but are attended by sub-personal entities, like the multiple soul models of Egypt, certain Hawai'ian spiritual traditions, the Daimons of the ancient world (Greece? Chaldeans?), etc. Memories could then be shared when a sub--personal entity and a core personal entity end up both entering into separate new bodies.

How can you be me? The answer is time

Bernardo Kastrup

That you believe you were your five-year-old self is grounds to believe that you can be another person, right now, while still being you, argues our executive director in this stimulating theoretical essay.

How can one universal subject be you, and me, and everybody else, at once? This is perhaps the most difficult aspect of analytic idealism to wrap one’s head around, for it implies that you are me, at the same time that you are yourself. How can this possibly be? After all, you can see the world through your eyes right now, but not through mine.

Although reference to dissociative disorders, empirically validated as they are, forces us to accept that such somehow can indeed be the case—for it is the case in severely dissociated human minds—the question of how to visualize the dissociation remains difficult. How can you visualize a process by virtue of which you are me while being yourself concurrently? How are we to get an intuitive handle on this?

Notice that what makes it so difficult is the simultaneity of being implied in the hypothesis: you can easily visualize yourself being your five-year-old self—an entity different from your present self in just about every way—because being your five-year-old self is not concurrent with being your present self: one is in the past, the other is in the present. Visualizing oneself taking two different points of view into the world does not offer any challenge to our intuition, provided that these points of view aren’t taken concurrently.

Worth a read I think, though I remain completely unconvinced there is One True Subject.

The idea that Time and Space are the same thing makes no sense to me, and I think this is deeply erroneous.