Reading through Eric Wargo's Time Loops

Decided to make a new thread (the other one is here) as it seemed unfair to people wanting to discuss the work as a whole and/or retrocausation in general.


The book is here on Amazon US for $10 Kindle ver, not sure how that accessibility/price varies across nations.


As a disclaimer I followed some of the blog posts Wargo had about his ideas on Night Shirt and came away deeply skeptical of the ideas he presented as an explanation for the nature of reality but somewhat favorable toward some of the ideas he had regarding future advances in quantum biology as processes for Psi.

I figure this is a pretty loose thread, will post a summary of a particular section and people can post their thoughts. I only ask that we keep it "Mod Plus" in the sense that discussion center around the text. As necessary might make new threads for people to digress at their leisure.


And of course if no one cares at all might be done with summaries of the whole book sooner than later.

From the Introduction:

Starts out with some scifi ideas of Asimov, regarding a "precognitive" substance called Thiotimoline. Might be of interest for readers of the genre.

But then Wargo connects the idea to a 2009 study referenced as " Dixon et al., 2009; Popescu, 2009". This is a double reference which includes the study by Dixon and the subsequent commentary by Popescu:

Ultrasensitive Beam Deflection Measurement via Interferometric Weak Value Amplification

We report on the use of an interferometric weak value technique to amplify very small transverse deflections of an optical beam. By entangling the beam's transverse degrees of freedom with the which-path states of a Sagnac interferometer, it is possible to realize an optical amplifier for polarization independent deflections. The theory for the interferometric weak value amplification method is presented along with the experimental results, which are in good agreement. Of particular interest, we measured the angular deflection of a mirror down to 560 femtoradians and the linear travel of a piezo actuator down to 20 femtometers.

And

Viewpoint: Weak measurements just got stronger

Viewed from one angle, this story is all about fundamental philosophical ideas. Does the spin indeed have a value larger than 1/2 or is the result simply an error in the imprecise measuring device used? Does the spin indeed have both the x spin component and the z one well defined? And, above all, does time indeed flow in two directions in quantum mechanics? To be sure, the strange outcome of the measurement of Sπ/4 in this pre- and post-selected ensemble could indeed be obtained as an error in the measurement, an error in which the pointer of the measuring apparatus moved more than it should have. The explanation can be fully given by standard quantum mechanics, involving regular past-to-future-only flow of time. But the explanation is cumbersome and involves very intricate interference effects in the measuring device. Assuming that time flows in two directions tremendously simplifies the problem. As far as I can tell, Aharonov, Albert, and Vaidman hold the view that one should indeed accept this strange flow of time. I fully agree. Not everybody agrees though, and this is one of the most profound controversies in quantum mechanics.

That article is from 2009, yet there was a "headline grabbing" criticism of weak measurements after this:

Are Weak Values Quantum? Don't Bet On It

So this seems to be the first point of major contention - if the strength of the retrocausation in physics argument rests of weak value measurements then we have an interpretation of a type of measuring that itself could be read as not needing retrocausality. Will try to find some more discussion on these questions - possibly creating a new thread.

There is of course more to the introduction, will mention my thoughts on it in a bit...

Wargo mentions Netwon's Laws of Motion that, from his reading, codified the billiard-ball idea of causation and that the efficacy of seeing the macro-world this way is why the idea of mechanism took hold during the Enlightenment.

I'm not sure this is the full story - first to get a sense of the controversy Newtwon's idea of gravity engendered in his time see Chomsky's Science, Mind, and Limits of Understanding :

It is commonly believed that Newton showed that the world is a machine, following mechanical principles, and that we can therefore dismiss “the ghost in the machine,” the mind, with appropriate ridicule. The facts are the opposite: Newton exorcised the machine, leaving the ghost intact. The mind-body problem in its scientific form did indeed vanish as unformulable, because one of its terms, body, does not exist in any intelligible form. Newton knew this very well, and so did his great contemporaries.

Replacing the theological with a cognitive framework, David Hume agreed with these conclusions. In his history of England, Hume describes Newton as “the greatest and rarest genius that ever arose for the ornament and instruction of the species.” His most spectacular achievement was that while he “seemed to draw the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he shewed at the same time the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy; and thereby restored [Nature’s] ultimate secrets to that obscurity, in which they ever did and ever will remain.”

Beyond that, one might look to David Ray Griffith on the trade off made (as he claims) by the Church and mechanists in order to push down the "occult" ideas arising that places consciousness/life into all matter. See also the prior Aristotelian idea of causation that preceded the mechanistic ideas. This is a huge aside so don't want to get too deep into this here.


Wargo then mentions the "dogma" of the Uncertainty Principle...this is an odd way to classify something that, AFAICTell, is something that has been a staple of physics. Perhaps he means the idea that there is randomness inherent to the quantum world? He notes the "Copenhagen Interpretation" is what keeps the "dogma" of the Uncertainty Principle in place...this seems wrong to me but maybe I'm being uncharitable about what he is saying?

He then says a growing number of converts believe that instead of randomness we have retrocausality. There is no citation for this growth at this point of the book, maybe it comes later.

He mentions Bem's controversial research on retrocausation, again a huge aside to get too deep into this - plus I think a lot of discussion has already taken place both here and on Skeptiko? I'll note he does make mention of teleology here, which would tie into Aristotle's concept of causation, but then goes from there into discussion of retrocausality/precognition. I am not sure, but it seems to me teleology would provide explanations - at least at the quantum level - that would be an alternative to retrocausal explanations?

What follows are some anecdotes, where Wargo - and some who sent him anecdotes about their precog experiences - wonder if the events could've been stopped or if they are fated to happen. One case seems remiss, where we don't know if one of these precogs did try to avoid the future after contacting Wargo to see if her thinking about fate held up. Perhaps it comes up later in the book?

He also seems to clump premonitions that went unheeded and those that arguably cannot be heeded b/c of fate...this seems like an error in my book but maybe it gets elucidated later.

Finally he quotes Bergson's Creative Evolution:

In his masterpiece Creative Evolution, he used a lump of sugar in a glass of water to illustrate an altered, intuitive perception of matter in its durée, or continuous unfolding. The way the sugar presents itself at any given moment to our senses, he argued, is just a shadow of its full glory; to fully apprehend it, Bergson wrote, “I must wait until the sugar melts.”

It's odd to quote Bergson - admittedly Wargo makes note of it too - given Bergson's philosophical career had to do with an argument against the block universe and the spatialization of time. For more on that see physicist Adam Frank's article, "Was Einstein Wrong?"

The reason Wargo mentions this is to argue that the dissolution of the sugar was within the original cube, and even influenced the dissolution. But AFAIK we don't need retrocausation to explain solvency of water?

[Laird]

But AFAIK we don't need retrocausation to explain solvency of water?

Oh, the burn...

Oh, the burn...

Heh, it comes off as harsh but I do think Wargo is right that, in some sense, it can be argued that the dissolution exists within the sugar cube as potency that can become actual.

But admittedly I do think trying to bring in retrocausation into a process where (AFAIK) it is unnecessary is a mistake, especially in the intro.

Heh, it comes off as harsh but I do think Wargo is right that, in some sense, it can be argued that the dissolution exists within the sugar cube as potency that can become actual.

But admittedly I do think trying to bring in retrocausation into a process where (AFAIK) it is unnecessary is a mistake, especially in the intro.

I'm a little confused how that would even qualify as retro causation?
Would a tree that burned in a forest fire have some complicity  in the fire?

I'm a little confused how that would even qualify as retro causation?
Would a tree that burned in a forest fire have some complicity  in the fire?

I think he's talking about the retrocausal "influence" in the aforementioned Dixon 2009 paper. So because the future influences the past - under a particular interpretation of the experiment - the dissolved state of the sugar is, in part, pulling the sugar cube into that dissolved state.

But it seems that for this to be an effective argument, IMO, there should be something missing in our understanding of dissolution...which again may be true but I've never heard of anything like that...

edit: Well I suppose one could say dissolution, like call causal processes, needs some explanation for causation itself but that IMO is different than something missing from the efficient. forward time description provided by chemistry on why sugar dissolves in water.

Two links that will I believe will be relevant to the reading:

1. How Quantum Randomness Saves Relativity

Puts paid to the idea that physicists arguing for inherent randomness are doing so simply as prisoners of dogma. This is not to say the article is the "correct" argument, but merely that physicists have actually considered the nature of quantum randomness.

Wargo - at least in the intro - also ignored the number of physicists who subscribe to MWI, which is distinctly not random because the superposition collapses to all possible coordinates in different universes.

2. Is there really “retrocausation” in time-symmetric approaches to quantum mechanics?

Again it may turn out that there is retrocausation but this is an interpretation of what is happening, not something that follows directly from the data.

Two links that will I believe will be relevant to the reading:

1. How Quantum Randomness Saves Relativity

Puts paid to the idea that physicists arguing for inherent randomness are doing so simply as prisoners of dogma. This is not to say the article is the "correct" argument, but merely that physicists have actually considered the nature of quantum randomness.

Wargo - at least in the intro - also ignored the number of physicists who subscribe to MWI, which is distinctly not random because the superposition collapses to all possible coordinates in different universes.

2. Is there really “retrocausation” in time-symmetric approaches to quantum mechanics?

Again it may turn out that there is retrocausation but this is an interpretation of what is happening, not something that follows directly from the data.

I find Ruth kastner a more appealing representative  of quantum philosophy. 
She seems much more willing to consider ideas  other than her own. 
Most of this is well above my pay grade, so my  criticism is largely style over substance. 
But Eric Wago seems  a little to infatuated  with his own ideas. For my taste

I find Ruth kastner a more appealing representative  of quantum philosophy. 
She seems much more willing to consider ideas  other than her own. 
Most of this is well above my pay grade, so my  criticism is largely style over substance. 
But Eric Wago seems  a little to infatuated  with his own ideas. For my taste

I admittedly have a similar opinion, but Wargo does get into some interesting case studies that I'm excited to discuss.

I might email Kripal after I'm done, because he heavily praised this book and might know more about the evidence that could support Wargo's ideas.