Pragmatic Metaphysics: Strategic Ontology In A Scientific World

Pragmatic Metaphysics: Strategic Ontology In A Scientific World

Joshua Fields

Though the 20th century was largely defined by a science that espoused a metaphysics of materialism, more recent developments (and lack thereof) point to the insufficiency of a substance-based, physicalist ontology to explain the nature of reality. The ‘hard’ problem of consciousness shows no signs of abating, while quantum phenomena such as the observer effect are continuing to demonstrate that mind and matter are fundamentally connected (Barad, 2007; Radin, 2006). Consequently, ontological conjectures hitherto dismissed are being given extra layers of texture, and validity, from scientific inquiry. This essay will evaluate the revival of some of these conjectures within a scientific world, and propose a suggested route forward for the re-integration of metaphysics into broader discourse. To set the context, I will begin by outlining the centuries-old decline of Western metaphysics and demonstrate why physicalism has failed in its attempts to fill our ontological void. I will then proceed to evaluate alternative ontologies to physicalism — panpsychism, relational ontologies and monistic idealism. I will argue that although a step in the right direction, panpsychism’s position as a quasi-materialist ontology cannot overcome its combination problem, while relational ontologies fail on the account of what I refer to as pragmatic metaphysics. To conclude, I argue that monistic idealism succeeds philosophically and pragmatically where other metaphysical systems fail: it is not only conceptually sound, but also scientifically congruent with regards to quantum revelations, parsimonious, intelligible, accessible and of net good for the world, factors I argue should be given more weight in metaphysical discussions as we attempt to strategically re-integrate questions of existence into the mainstream.

[Laird]

Hey Sci. Thanks for this article. I read through it, and a few issues arose for me:

Firstly, the author canvasses a variety of metaphysics, but not a pluralistic/dualistic one, which is how my own metaphysic - such as I have defined one - might be described. In other words, a plurality of conscious selves partake in a universe of energy which is graded from more "mental" and "reflexive to consciousness" (via which that plurality of selves consciously experiences) to more "physical" or in other words "not susceptible to conscious or mental experience" (via which that plurality of selves interact with one another). This seems, to me, to be a major omission, because, in my view, this metaphysic best meets his six criteria.

Secondly, whilst the author notes that "pluralistic forms of ontology as opposed to monistic appear to correspond to how most people ‘experience’ the world", he does not seem to give this observation sufficient weight, and it, too, is understated. It is not just that monism is incompatible with most people's "experience" of the world, but that it is - unless we are to adopt solipsism - logically incoherent, as Titus Rivas points out in his article, Is noetic monism tenable? - an article of which I expect you to be aware given that I posted it to Bernardo's forum not long ago in a thread I started in which you participated.

Thirdly, even if Titus's position were incorrect, by my own argument - which, again, I posted to that thread that I started - a monism which posits a "universal mind" within whose "contents" individual psyches exist is itself logically incoherent.

Finally, the author avoids mentioning another problem with monistic idealism, which is that it unnecessarily flies in the face of our common sense: we need not posit implausibly that a mind contorts itself into (the appearance of) a body when we could posit more plausibly that a mind instead experiences itself through a body, which consists in a different - even if only by gradation - substance to the mind which experiences through it.

There is probably more to say but I will leave it there for now.

Thanks again for posting.

Hey Sci. Thanks for this article. I read through it, and a few issues arose for me:

Firstly, the author canvasses a variety of metaphysics, but not a pluralistic/dualistic one, which is how my own metaphysic - such as I have defined one - might be described. In other words, a plurality of conscious selves partake in a universe of energy which is graded from more "mental" and "reflexive to consciousness" (via which that plurality of selves consciously experiences) to more "physical" or in other words "not susceptible to conscious or mental experience" (via which that plurality of selves interact with one another). This seems, to me, to be a major omission, because, in my view, this metaphysic best meets his six criteria.

Isn't this neutral monism? We share the above in common, at least to some degree.

But yes I'm aware of the varied criticisms of Bernardo's Idealism, by you, Titus, and others - it just didn't occur to me to mention them when posting this thread.

I'm not an Idealist myself, so I didn't feel any need to evaluate the philosophy here - similarly my posting of articles/papers/etc arguing for Dualism or Panpsychism aren't personal endorsements. I figure people can sample from the buffe[t] and pick what they like.

[Laird]

Isn't this neutral monism?

Maybe. I'm not very familiar with neutral monism.

But yes I'm aware of the varied criticisms of Bernardo's Idealism, by you, Titus, and others - it just didn't occur to me to mention them when posting this thread.

I'm not an Idealist myself, so I didn't feel any need to evaluate the philosophy here - similarly my posting of articles/papers/etc arguing for Dualism or Panpsychism aren't personal endorsements. I figure people can sample from the buffe[t] and pick what they like.

Yep, that's all very fair - I should have added a clarification that none of what I wrote was intended as a criticism of you, simply of the contents of the article.

Maybe. I'm not very familiar with neutral monism.


Yep, that's all very fair - I should have added a clarification that none of what I wrote was intended as a criticism of you, simply of the contents of the article.

Well there seems to be a variety of neutral monisms, but for me it is just the acceptance that there is "stuff" and it makes up "physical" objects and "mental" subjects.

It is my personal opinion that in the science of the future reality will neither be “psychic” nor “physical” but somehow both and somehow neither.
  -Wolfgang Pauli

[Laird]

Well there seems to be a variety of neutral monisms, but for me it is just the acceptance that there is "stuff" and it makes up "physical" objects and "mental" subjects.

OK, then, yes, that seems compatible with what I'm suggesting, so long as it's understood that I see the nature of this "stuff" as a (potentially punctuated) continuum - from "most mental" to "most physical", and that along with this "stuff" there are, too, "selves" and (subjective) "experience", where (subjective) "experience" is "that which occurs to or is had by a self", and is correlated with some sort of structured subset of this "stuff".

How does that fit with your own sense of things?