Physicalism Redux

That depends on one's ontology. On an idealist ontology, nothing about the incense is objective in the sense that I mean; it is only ever a subjective experience. On a dualist or materialist ontology, the incense exists objectively (independent of experience) as a physical object of some sort; a collection of sub-atomic particles or waves or fields or what have you.

The important thing to note is that whatever one's ontology, the subjective experience of the incense is not (cannot be) extended, as I've been contending. Only on dualism or materialism can the incense - as an objective entity - be extended.

So when I imagine a triangle or cube in my head it’s not extended, nor are dreams?

If I follow a scent - say of incense - to a particular room where it’s being burned…the scent itself has no extension?

Also I thought the scent’s sensual qualities were not part of the experience, but it seems now they are?  

Is my mind a virtual reality then, but the world a non-virtual reality?

An extensionless soul is just a powerless, meaningless point within existence ~ it has no dimensions, no form, cannot expand, cannot retract... it can't actually do anything, much less operate a body or interact with a physical reality ~ or do stuff like Sheldrake's point that we can feel when we are being stared at, or intuit when someone might be thinking about calling us, or the like.

How does an extensionless soul related to a physical form if the physical form is experienced as extended? What is experiencing that extension? Does the physical form somehow have sentience or awareness, that is then communicated back to the extensionless nothing? God or the like whispering in the ears of both, to do what they need to do?

Extensionless souls seem kind of... meaningless, because they cannot actually do anything that requires extension ~ but God or designers somehow just create extension by fiat... with God somehow having a mind and body... which is more confusing than elucidating.

Frankly, if we experience extension, then ergo, our minds are extensible. If we can have mystical experiences, then the godhead / our soul / what-have-you must also be extended, to feel infinite or universal.

For physical things to interact as they do, they need to be of the same nature. Same with minds and telepathy ~ same nature, so can interact and logically share thoughts memories and experiences and such quite easily, making them inter-subjective. It's why dream visitation works ~ minds interacting with the same substance as itself. It's why we can have shared dreams.

So for physical things and minds to interact, as in our body and mind, there also logically needs to be a common element between them. Both being forms of... Spirit-stuff, or whatever we want to call the substance of the spiritual realm ~ common substance accounting for interaction.

An extensionless soul is just a powerless, meaningless point within existence ~ it has no dimensions, no form, cannot expand, cannot retract...

This is part of what makes "extensionless" confusing - I'm not sure if this really means it's a "point within existence".

Can a zero dimensional point have a spatial location? What would be the difference between that point existing vs. it not existing?

Seems like the difference could only be known if the 0-D point made a difference in extended reality? But that seems to suggest that which is supposedly extensionless is extended?

This is part of what makes "extensionless" confusing - I'm not sure if this really means it's a "point within existence".

That's the idea it puts in my mind ~ a line is extended in one dimension, where a point is (by definition?) extensionless. It's theoretical ~ in that it occupies no space, and is basically imaginary. Even the dots we create in a physical or mental sense have extension by virtue of being circular.

Can a zero dimensional point have a spatial location? What would be the difference between that point existing vs. it not existing?

A zero-dimensional point isn't spatial, I think ~ it occupies no space at all. Even an electron has extension ~ it occupies space... of some amount, even if moves stupidly fast.

A point existing is merely a circle or sphere, as we always experience. An extensionless point cannot exist within space nor influence or be influenced, I think.

Seems like the difference could only be known if the 0-D point made a difference in extended reality? But that seems to suggest that which is supposedly extensionless is extended?

Indeed, it does.

A field must be spatially extensible ~ and if we can sense our body as transparently as we do, from hand to hand, back to front, head to toe, then our mind must be a field that is extended. Not a physical field, obviously, but more in the sense that perhaps Sheldrake and / or Faggin suggest.

That's the idea it puts in my mind ~ a line is extended in one dimension, where a point is (by definition?) extensionless. It's theoretical ~ in that it occupies no space, and is basically imaginary. Even the dots we create in a physical or mental sense have extension by virtue of being circular.


A zero-dimensional point isn't spatial, I think ~ it occupies no space at all. Even an electron has extension ~ it occupies space... of some amount, even if moves stupidly fast.

A point existing is merely a circle or sphere, as we always experience. An extensionless point cannot exist within space nor influence or be influenced, I think.


Indeed, it does.

A field must be spatially extensible ~ and if we can sense our body as transparently as we do, from hand to hand, back to front, head to toe, then our mind must be a field that is extended. Not a physical field, obviously, but more in the sense that perhaps Sheldrake and / or Faggin suggest.

Yeah Brady, in that Monadology essay, warns us about thinking "simple" means an infinitely small point:

... monads cannot have any shape, and thus have no size, teeny-tiny or otherwise. Why? If a monad had a shape (which it would need to have in order for it to have a relative size to other shaped things) then it would, by rights, have constituent parts — a ‘left half’ and a ‘right half’, for example, or a ‘surface’ and an ‘inside’. The problem is not that a thing with a shape is always in fact divisible into components, because this is not true, but rather that it is de jure divisible into components, and thus we can entertain the idea of ‘half a monad’ which contradicts the idea we started out with: absolute simplicity.

Of course this criticism seems to at least potentially apply to souls that are infinite in size as well.

I accept there may just not be a good way to resolve this question about Mind and Its immaterial qualities being only correlated with any structure.

This seems to almost force an acceptance of Idealism as the only valid possibility, but I can't help but feel Idealism has a variety of issues as well. I'm also not sure how even God could have thoughts about extension without experiencing genuine extension. We could say God just has all the possible experiences within Its Mind but I dislike this sort of convenience...though I suspect this sort of convenience ends up being necessary for any coherent metaphysics...

Faggin's option, if we take it as Mind + Extension = Seities, may be a solution. Though Faggin seems happy to call his solution an Idealism, a (non- or semi-constitutive) Panpsychism, or possibly even a Property Dualism. 

Another is Michael Pelczar's Phenomenalism:

In the phenomenalist worldview, there are experiences, and there are possibilities for experience—and that’s all. Later, I’ll argue that the possibilities are best understood as conditional probabilities for various experiences to occur given the occurrence of other experiences. So, in my view, reality consists of experiences, and probabilities related to experience. The probabilities are the physical part of the world.

If this sounds like an invitation to external world skepticism, that’s not how it’s intended. As I see it, once we’ve concluded that certain experiences are apt to occur in certain ways conditional on the occurrence of certain other experiences, we’ve already arrived at an external world. Physical things just are propensities for experiences to occur in certain ways. They are, as Mill puts it, “permanent possibilities of sensation."

Yeah Brady, in that Monadology essay, warns us about thinking "simple" means an infinitely small point:

... monads cannot have any shape, and thus have no size, teeny-tiny or otherwise. Why? If a monad had a shape (which it would need to have in order for it to have a relative size to other shaped things) then it would, by rights, have constituent parts — a ‘left half’ and a ‘right half’, for example, or a ‘surface’ and an ‘inside’. The problem is not that a thing with a shape is always in fact divisible into components, because this is not true, but rather that it is de jure divisible into components, and thus we can entertain the idea of ‘half a monad’ which contradicts the idea we started out with: absolute simplicity.

Makes perfect sense to me. A Monad is thus a pure existence unto itself that can optionally and temporarily take on a form of its choosing that is nonetheless not its truest nature. The Monad is the purest existence-unto-itself that remains once form has been stripped away. Perhaps it then becomes existence-in-isolation, whereby lacking form means that it is beyond perception by others. (Though I am uncertain what that means, come to think of it... can it still be sensed by other Monads in some manner?)

Of course this criticism seems to at least potentially apply to souls that are infinite in size as well.

Well... infinity is beyond size and shape, I think. It is a soul that is beyond form, thus beyond perception, as it is effectively nowhere and not correlated with anything.

I accept there may just not be a good way to resolve this question about Mind and Its immaterial qualities being only correlated with any structure.

Indeed ~ it is something that defies definition, because Mind / Soul / Monad seems to be the source of definitions.

This seems to almost force an acceptance of Idealism as the only valid possibility, but I can't help but feel Idealism has a variety of issues as well. I'm also not sure how even God could have thoughts about extension without experiencing genuine extension. We could say God just has all the possible experiences within Its Mind but I dislike this sort of convenience...though I suspect this sort of convenience ends up being necessary for any coherent metaphysics...

Indeed, perhaps so... maybe it makes more sense for "God" to the potential for the existence of qualities, including Minds / Souls / Monads / thoughts / extension / etc, etc. In that sense, "God" does "have" thoughts ~ in being the source of that quality of potential within the Monad, along with being the source of all Monads as well.

It makes no sense for there to be a "God" with thoughts, extension or a body in the same sense as a Monad ~ else that isn't the true "God", just another Monad. Taoism actually puts something like this in the very first chapter of the Tao Te Ching: https://www.wussu.com/laotzu/laotzu01.html

Tao Te Ching - Lao Tzu - chapter 1

The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao.
The name that can be named is not the eternal name.
The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth.
The named is the mother of ten thousand things.
Ever desireless, one can see the mystery.
Ever desiring, one can see the manifestations.
These two spring from the same source but differ in name;
this appears as darkness.
Darkness within darkness.
The gate to all mystery.

That is to say, any description we give to Infinity cannot be of Infinity proper ~ it is but our finite conceptualization of something infinitely beyond our comprehension.

Faggin's option, if we take it as Mind + Extension = Seities, may be a solution. Though Faggin seems happy to call his solution an Idealism, a (non- or semi-constitutive) Panpsychism, or possibly even a Property Dualism. 

Just goes to show that our metaphysics and ontologies are all just blind guesses ~ there's no clear-cut definitions to things, only the definitions we individually comprehend. If Faggin himself cannot decide on one or the other, then perhaps Faggin is in want of a new ontological or metaphysical stance that is distinct from Idealism, Panpsychism and Dualism proper.

Faggin's option doesn't quite seem to fit the definition we often associate with "mind". It seems more primal than that, from what I can gather.

Another is Michael Pelczar's Phenomenalism:

In the phenomenalist worldview, there are experiences, and there are possibilities for experience—and that’s all. Later, I’ll argue that the possibilities are best understood as conditional probabilities for various experiences to occur given the occurrence of other experiences. So, in my view, reality consists of experiences, and probabilities related to experience. The probabilities are the physical part of the world.

If this sounds like an invitation to external world skepticism, that’s not how it’s intended. As I see it, once we’ve concluded that certain experiences are apt to occur in certain ways conditional on the occurrence of certain other experiences, we’ve already arrived at an external world. Physical things just are propensities for experiences to occur in certain ways. They are, as Mill puts it, “permanent possibilities of sensation."

Very interesting ~ everything within experience is indeed phenomenal... but that also brings to mind Kant's noumena.

As for “permanent possibilities of sensation", eh... it's not so permanent when this physical realm is but temporary for us. It's not continuous, given that we must sleep ~ even dreams aren't physical, so they don't count. Unless he means something different, but uses it to refer to physicality for convenience of understanding by the possible Physicalist or Dualist.

Makes perfect sense to me. A Monad is thus a pure existence unto itself that can optionally and temporarily take on a form of its choosing that is nonetheless not its truest nature. The Monad is the purest existence-unto-itself that remains once form has been stripped away. Perhaps it then becomes existence-in-isolation, whereby lacking form means that it is beyond perception by others. (Though I am uncertain what that means, come to think of it... can it still be sensed by other Monads in some manner?)

What does existence-in-isolation mean without extension though? That the causal efficacy of the Monad is temporarily inert, and that it cannot be perceived?

I do wonder about "lacking form". Does a field have a form? Perhaps if it has a point of origin like the gravitational field of a planet...but what if the field is just omni-extended across all reality?

Well... infinity is beyond size and shape, I think. It is a soul that is beyond form, thus beyond perception, as it is effectively nowhere and not correlated with anything.

Does this field-like Mind have any real structure or form? Or is it simply Everywhere? It does seem like we can divide infinite space into a "left side" and "right side", or at least conceive of a gap where the field-like Mind doesn't exist...but is that enough to say the Monad has lost its simplicity?

Indeed ~ it is something that defies definition, because Mind / Soul / Monad seems to be the source of definitions.

Which makes it even more challenging that the experience of extension is why we think the world has to be extended...

Indeed, perhaps so... maybe it makes more sense for "God" to the potential for the existence of qualities, including Minds / Souls / Monads / thoughts / extension / etc, etc. In that sense, "God" does "have" thoughts ~ in being the source of that quality of potential within the Monad, along with being the source of all Monads as well
.
It makes no sense for there to be a "God" with thoughts, extension or a body in the same sense as a Monad ~ else that isn't the true "God", just another Monad. Taoism actually puts something like this in the very first chapter of the Tao Te Ching: https://www.wussu.com/laotzu/laotzu01.html

That is to say, any description we give to Infinity cannot be of Infinity proper ~ it is but our finite conceptualization of something infinitely beyond our comprehension.

Which then leads on[e] to ask why we should believe in Infinity, if there's no way to grasp it?

Perhaps because the Absolute - whether a personal God or Platonic Principle or whatever - seems to be necessary to fill in some missing piece of a metaphysics?

Just goes to show that our metaphysics and ontologies are all just blind guesses ~ there's no clear-cut definitions to things, only the definitions we individually comprehend. If Faggin himself cannot decide on one or the other, then perhaps Faggin is in want of a new ontological or metaphysical stance that is distinct from Idealism, Panpsychism and Dualism proper.

Faggin's option doesn't quite seem to fit the definition we often associate with "mind". It seems more primal than that, from what I can gather.

Well I don't know if Faggin himself has ever claimed his view fits any ontology, just that he's accepted others have put these labels on his ideas.

Very interesting ~ everything within experience is indeed phenomenal... but that also brings to mind Kant's noumena.

As for “permanent possibilities of sensation", eh... it's not so permanent when this physical realm is but temporary for us. It's not continuous, given that we must sleep ~ even dreams aren't physical, so they don't count. Unless he means something different, but uses it to refer to physicality for convenience of understanding by the possible Physicalist or Dualist.

Well the possibilities, as I understand it, would remain out there. They are continuous in that they form a seamless collection of chains of possible experiences that can be actualized.

Admittedly that's from the introduction to an approximately 300 page book, Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience, so I don't claim in any way to be an expert...

[Laird]

So when I imagine a triangle or cube in my head it’s not extended

Not actually; only as imagined. Only an embodied triangle or cube, in an actually extended (physical or otherwise "stuff"-like) reality, could actually be extended.

What I'm trying to point out is that the objective aspect of an experience - to the extent that such an aspect even exists - does not take on the subjective qualities of that experience. When you imagine a triangle, nobody outside of you can point to the triangular shape of your experience as an objective phenomenon - that would be absurd. Nor is there some hidden triangular-shaped objective aspect to your experience that somebody could otherwise have pointed to.

nor are dreams?

Insofar as it is an experience, a dream experience is no different in this respect than any other experience, so, that's right: while the (imagined) objects as subjectively experienced in a dream may have an (imagined) extension, the experience itself (as an objective phenomenon) does not.

That's independent of whatever the true nature of a dream is; I'm not assuming anything particular about it, and it might even vary between dreams.

If I follow a scent - say of incense - to a particular room where it’s being burned…the scent itself has no extension?

Of course not. That would be the case even assuming that scents could exist independently of experience: even on that assumption, to impute extension to a scent would be to commit a category error.

Also I thought the scent’s sensual qualities were not part of the experience, but it seems now they are?  

Here's what I wrote earlier. It doesn't contradict the post to which you're responding:

The smell (of incense) is a quality of experience as a subjective phenomenon. The experience as an objective - or, if you prefer, inter-subjective - phenomenon has no such quality.

In other words, just as one person can't point to the triangularity of another person's experience, one person can't "smell" another person's experience - that would be absurd. Experience as an objective phenomenon (to the extent it even exists as such) does not have that quality, just as experience as an objective phenomenon does not have the attribute of (real) extension.

Is my mind a virtual reality then, but the world a non-virtual reality?

I don't think that "virtual" and "non-virtual" are the most useful words here. I prefer "subjective" and "objective" (respectively).

Also, I am not saying that your mind itself is a subjective reality; rather, its experience is.

What does existence-in-isolation mean without extension though? That the causal efficacy of the Monad is temporarily inert, and that it cannot be perceived?

That is what I would consider a truly extensionless Monad. I'm not sure whether it would be inert in casual efficacy, but might not be perceivable... though, then again, I am uncertain what a Monad would be with everything temporary stripped away. Maybe it could be perceived by other Monads, but be... dormant or still or something.

I do wonder about "lacking form". Does a field have a form? Perhaps if it has a point of origin like the gravitational field of a planet...but what if the field is just omni-extended across all reality?

A field is perhaps a form, as it has extension and is limited in scope? Fields don't really have points of origin, as far as I am aware ~ maybe physical fields do, but with mental fields, the origin seems to encompass all of it. As for being omni-extended across all of reality... it would cease to be a perceivable field, and perhaps no longer a field at all. It would just be one with all of reality, perhaps?

Does this field-like Mind have any real structure or form? Or is it simply Everywhere? It does seem like we can divide infinite space into a "left side" and "right side", or at least conceive of a gap where the field-like Mind doesn't exist...but is that enough to say the Monad has lost its simplicity?

Well... minds do have structures within them. Even we take our own mind for examples. It has structures, though they are entirely unlike physical structures in quality. As for souls ~ I guess they choose their structures and forms, according to their whims and interests, probably able to choose any structures or forms they desire.

As for being everywhere... well... maybe nowhere in particular? But I'm not sure whether that makes it any clearer... actually, it would require knowing more about the nature of the more fundamental reality, spiritual or otherwise.

I think a Monad is still indivisible ~ it can just do anything within itself that it wishes, while simply being the space within which it can all happen. A sort of... Pluralism within the Monism that is the Monad / Soul / Mind, where everything is just composed of that Monad's essence.

Which makes it even more challenging that the experience of extension is why we think the world has to be extended...

We experience an apparently external world that appears extended, so we perhaps project those qualities on the perceived external world?

Which then leads on[e] to ask why we should believe in Infinity, if there's no way to grasp it?

Perhaps because the Absolute - whether a personal God or Platonic Principle or whatever - seems to be necessary to fill in some missing piece of a metaphysics?

So it would seem... maybe we have an intuitive understanding that there is something incomprehensibly vast and unknowable that simply appears infinite, so we end up all just believing in it in one sense or another?

Well I don't know if Faggin himself has ever claimed his view fits any ontology, just that he's accepted others have put these labels on his ideas.

That makes sense.

Well the possibilities, as I understand it, would remain out there. They are continuous in that they form a seamless collection of chains of possible experiences that can be actualized.

Ah... sounds similar to Kant's noumena, which in turn sound rather similar to Jung's Archetypes and Plato's Forms. Which does seem to imply that despite the names we give to these primal, unknowable forces, they have an existence beyond our comprehension. We just know of them indirectly. Perhaps it is the stuff of the Designers / Souls / Seities / etc. Stuff that is at the very basis of Creation itself that is simply far too rich in detail and potential to even begin to comprehend. They would appear also infinite ~ to manifest certain potential? In the sense that the incarnate mind, the Jungian psyche, can have near infinite variation, but still follows very clear themes and definitions.

Admittedly that's from the introduction to an approximately 300 page book, Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience, so I don't claim in any way to be an expert...

Worth a read at some point. Cheers.

Not actually; only as imagined. Only an embodied triangle or cube, in an actually extended (physical or otherwise "stuff"-like) reality, could actually be extended.

What I'm trying to point out is that the objective aspect of an experience - to the extent that such an aspect even exists - does not take on the subjective qualities of that experience. When you imagine a triangle, nobody outside of you can point to the triangular shape of your experience as an objective phenomenon - that would be absurd. Nor is there some hidden triangular-shaped objective aspect to your experience that somebody could otherwise have pointed to.

Insofar as it is an experience, a dream experience is no different in this respect than any other experience, so, that's right: while the (imagined) objects as subjectively experienced in a dream may have an (imagined) extension, the experience itself (as an objective phenomenon) does not.

That's independent of whatever the true nature of a dream is; I'm not assuming anything particular about it, and it might even vary between dreams.


Of course not. That would be the case even assuming that scents could exist independently of experience: even on that assumption, to impute extension to a scent would be to commit a category error.


Here's what I wrote earlier. It doesn't contradict the post to which you're responding:


In other words, just as one person can't point to the triangularity of another person's experience, one person can't "smell" another person's experience - that would be absurd. Experience as an objective phenomenon (to the extent it even exists as such) does not have that quality, just as experience as an objective phenomenon does not have the attribute of (real) extension.


I don't think that "virtual" and "non-virtual" are the most useful words here. I prefer "subjective" and "objective" (respectively).

Also, I am not saying that your mind itself is a subjective reality; rather, its experience is.

So if I understand this correctly, the mind is objective and the experiences, thoughts, and so on it has are subjective.

And by objective - to put it in as metaphysically neutral terms as possible - we mean there is agreement about what is experienced, and additionally there’s some expectation of causality - that the objective can also produce new experiences that will also be part of the consensus.

So then what is subjective is what is not agreed upon by the consensus & cannot directly produce these new experiences within the consensus. 

I would agree that you cannot smell my experience of smell….but I am not sure this means that the smell of incense is not within my experience. Perhaps what is objective is - to put it in phenomenologist terms - the possibility to provide the experience I have when one smells incense?