Physicalism Redux

[Laird]

Not really, though I do thank you for taking the time! 

I think there would still have to be some causal ordering that allows a Pluralist Idealist to distinguish between hallucinations and reality of external events?

Perhaps the question I should have first asked is "Are there any real world Pluralist Idealists?" because I am still unclear on what the term means and how it is distinguished from other types of Idealism.

I've defined, explained, and elaborated on what I mean by pluralistic idealism multiple times: here, here, here, here, here. If you're still unclear, I'm not sure what more I can say. 

I've defined, explained, and elaborated on what I mean by pluralistic idealism multiple times: here, here, here, here, here. If you're still unclear, I'm not sure what more I can say. 

Are there any Pluralistic Idealists out in the world, or in history?

I recall in the 90s there was a table top game called "Mage the Ascension" where it seemed belief shaped reality and the general agreement seemed to be the One was shattered into the Many...similar fictions are the only place I can think of where people are Pluralistic Idealists.

I guess what confuses me is I don't really get how Pluralistic Idealists - assuming any exist? - would explain the external world. But if none exist then probably not worth the time to worry about this type of Idealism...OTOH if they do exist I'd want to read about their views directly.

The point is really that if you were fully and directly experiencing everything that another experiencer experienced - no more and no less - including volitional experiences such as moving your/their body, then for all intents and purposes you and (s)he would be identical. There would be no way to tell you apart unless or until your experiences diverged.

Except that we can tell ourselves apart, in practice ~ the Experiencer is not their memories or experiences, correct? Thusly, I am able to experience all of these things through them, yet we each retain our own spark of individuality.

It takes a bit more for me and them to fully lose our identities ~ we have to actually focus on bringing our awarenesses fully together, beyond just the experiencing the mental contents.

So in my experience, it is rather different than you state.

It seems unlikely to me that this ever occurs, but in any case, it's beyond the point in what I'm putting to Sci, which is that:

For practical purposes, we can differentiate experiencers by their different experiences.

And in practice, this doesn't prevent one experiencer from fully experiencing through another, while retaining their unique individual perspective. Even after I pull out of their minds, I can recall their memories as if they were my own ~ because I was experiencing their memories, and I can recognize that they were theirs, and not mine, because the sensation of being them is very different to being me, per my own actual memories.

Yes, the memories have different... energetic imprints. It's hard to explain it with language.

I've defined and explained more than once what I mean by that term. I can't help you more than that.

It's still very unclear, because I've never heard of "Pluralistic Idealism" literally anywhere else. It's a very unconventional idea that I can't actually wrap my head around.

Perhaps the question I should have first asked is "Are there any real world Pluralist Idealists?" because I am still unclear on what the term means and how it is distinguished from other types of Idealism.

I never come across any. Idealism is fully recognized only ever as Monistic ontology and metaphysics. "Monistic" Idealism is entirely redundant, thusly.

I never come across any. Idealism is fully recognized only ever as Monistic ontology and metaphysics. "Monistic" Idealism is entirely redundant, thusly.

I was thinking the term refers to there only being the Many minds with no Ur Mind.

So consensus reality is based on agreements, or some fixed aspect of the Many that ensures a causal ordering for the consensus reality.

I was thinking the term refers to there only being the Many minds with no Ur Mind.

Any genuine Idealist will just tell you that even with many minds, it's still just mind that is the essential substance.

Many minds, one mind, neither or both ~ it makes no difference how you slice it. There is still just a single substance ~ mind.

So consensus reality is based on agreements, or some fixed aspect of the Many that ensures a causal ordering for the consensus reality.

This appears to me to be the case. Minds all sharing the same core nature, yet each individual mind having their own very unique expressions of that core nature, is what allows for the vast multiplicity we experience.

[Laird]

Reordering quotes:

I guess what confuses me is I don't really get how Pluralistic Idealists - assuming any exist? - would explain the external world.

Exactly my point! You do, after all, then, understand the argument you originally said you didn't, or at least you arrive at the same conclusion via a related understanding. We need pursue this no further.

Are there any Pluralistic Idealists out in the world, or in history?

I don't know, because (1) beyond Analytic Idealism and a few papers on cosmopsychism, I'm not well-read on idealism, and (2) other than for Analytic Idealism, which makes this explicit, whether any given variant of idealism truly posits that there is only a singular mind with all other minds somehow identical with it, or whether, alternatively, it allows for a true plurality of minds, seems open to interpretation. For example, in discussions with ChatGPT, I've gotten the impression that it thinks that Berkeley's subjective idealism could be interpreted either way.

[Laird]

The point is really that if you were fully and directly experiencing everything that another experiencer experienced - no more and no less - including volitional experiences such as moving your/their body, then for all intents and purposes you and (s)he would be identical. There would be no way to tell you apart unless or until your experiences diverged.

Unfortunately, I flubbed this response.

The point really is based on a distinction between an experience itself and the contents of that experience. When, then, you telepathically experience "the direct, full range of experience from the memories of [your] loong and tiger spirits", you are still having a distinct experience uniquely associated with your person even though it has the same contents as another's experience which likewise is uniquely associated with their person.

That clarified, I don't think your further response needs responding to.

I don't know, because (1) beyond Analytic Idealism and a few papers on cosmopsychism, I'm not well-read on idealism, and (2) other than for Analytic Idealism, which makes this explicit, whether any given variant of idealism truly posits that there is only a singular mind with all other minds somehow identical with it, or whether, alternatively, it allows for a true plurality of minds, seems open to interpretation. For example, in discussions with ChatGPT, I've gotten the impression that it thinks that Berkeley's subjective idealism could be interpreted either way.

The whole point of Monism is that there is a single basic substance. In Materialism, the single basic substance is matter, despite the plurality of material forms, atoms, etc. In Idealism, likewise, the basic single substance is mind, despite the plurality of mental forms, minds, psychologies, mental contents, etc. In Neutral Monism, the basic single substance is an unknown substance that has the potential to manifest as mind and matter, and possibly more.

Something all have in common is that despite the plurality of appearances, all Monisms state that every thing or existence shares a common nature, which is what implicitly allows interaction.