On the hard problem of consciousness: Why is physics not enough?

On the hard problem of consciousness: Why is physics not enough?

Hrvoje Nikolic

I present 3 arguments that the laws of physics, by themselves, cannot explain the origin of
phenomenal consciousness. First, physics investigates the objective, while consciousness is
subjective. Second, the laws of physics are syntactical, while consciousness is semantic. Third,
the concept of consciousness cannot even be defined in terms of physics.

By further thinking about that problem I have concluded that the hard problem of consciousness is precisely the fact that consciousness is hard to define. Whatever definition I try, I either:

• Find that I must use an equally vague word (e.g. to define \consciousness" I use an equally
vague word \aware"), or
• Arrive at a definition that does not really correspond to the phenomenal subjective consciousness that I wanted to define.

Eventually I concluded that the concept of consciousness must be a primitive concept which
cannot be defined. And what cannot be defined, cannot be explained. It must be accepted
as such, as something so fundamental that it cannot be derived from something even more
fundamental.