Neuroscience and free will

[Laird]

Wouldn't it be easier if you simply the quoted the parts that state that the definition of descriptive laws entails that no events can happen out of necessity?

It's not stated explicitly in that essay, it's simply implicit in that it's pretty much the point of his argument - or rather, I took it to be implicit. But here are some quotes from his book which suggest that there is a middle ground between a thoroughgoing descriptivist view and a thoroughgoing prescriptivist one which he calls "Necessitarianism". The quotes in any case seem generally relevant:

I have lived for many years with the problems I discuss in this book. I have, over those years, wrestled with and vacillated between two competing theories, Necessitarianism and Regularity. But, during the last few years, I have finally settled on the latter. In what follows, I try to defend Regularity against Necessity.

The Regularity Theory might best be thought to be a negative theory. It is the theory that there is no natural necessity, either in re or in physical laws. Regularists, that is, deny natural necessity in both its forms and under all its names: “causal,” “ontic,” “nomological,” “etiological,” or what have you.

The Regularity Theory [...] want{s} to ‘locate’ the truth-conditions of physical laws wholly in the events of the world’s unfolding history and in the states actually instanced. Again aphoristically, this may be stated by saying that physical laws are ‘descriptive’ of what is and of what happens.

The Necessitarian view, while also advertising itself as a descriptive (as opposed to prescriptive) account, assigns to physical laws a different logical-cum-ontological status. Rather than it being physical laws that take their truth from what happens, it is something of the other way around: It is the physical laws that set the bounds on what can and cannot occur. For the Necessitarian, there is some sense in which physical laws have ‘primacy’ over mere occurrences. Laws impose ‘constraints’ on the way the world is and on what occurs therein.

Necessitarianism shares with the Regularity Theory the thesis that physical laws are descriptions; but it also shares with the Prescriptivist Theory the view (just mentioned) that physical laws are irreducible to statements about what happens; physical laws are statements about what can or must occur.

Perhaps, Paul, you are a Necessitarian.

I suppose you might call those "laws," but I would tend to call them "scripts."

That's fine - as you know we've already agreed not to refer to them as "laws" but rather to encompass both under the generic term "generalised conditional descriptions of events".

That "it's possible that we could have a law that describes events that must happen a certain way in all possible worlds"? Because there may be events that follow logically and inexorably from their precursors and logic holds in all possible worlds.

For a law to be necessary, it's not logic that needs to hold in all possible worlds, it's the law itself. So, can you give me an example of a law that holds in all possible worlds? To be clear on what that means: it means that neither of us (nor anybody else) can conceive of a logically coherent world in which the law does not apply. So, let's say you pick "the law of gravity" - that would be a non-starter because I'm sure you can conceive of a world in which the law of gravity as we know it in this world did not exist, either because there was no gravity at all or perhaps because it was inversely proportional to the cube of the distance between the centres of the attracted masses rather than to the square.

So, go for it - see if you can come up with an example...

How can we possibly know that there are no such events?

For an event (whether associated with a law or not) to be necessary, again the criteria is that the event occurs in every possible world. Again, this means that no logically coherent world is conceivable in which the event does not occur. So, again - see if you can come up with an example of such an event...

I disagree. I think you are endowing the choice between prescriptive and descriptive laws with power that it does not have. We can't say "I don't think there are any events that happen out of necessity" and then assign a name to this idea and then argue that since the name means "laws just describe events" therefore there are no events that happen out of necessity. This appears to be the argument.

That's not the argument for why there aren't any events that happen out of necessity; that argument is independent of whether laws are prescriptive or descriptive, but since there seems to be a possible middle ground between the two, let's drop that discussion and focus instead on the more fundamental question: are there any necessary laws and/or events in/of the empirical world?

Your claim seems to be that there could be.

You cited a paper which claims that there are (necessary laws), but you didn't read it. I did, and its ultimate argument/claim was awful (there were a lot of good bits along the way though). Basically, the author claims that laws are necessary because... they can be defined to be. You can read the paper for yourself to see though.

But we should realize that the claim about events is a just-so claim. We have no evidence that no events happen out of necessity.

I would call that second statement a just-so claim itself...

So why don't we do that so we can continue? I will stipulate that we are operating under the Descriptive Model of the Universe and no event ever happens out of necessity.

My intention in starting this exchange wasn't for you to stipulate anything, it was for you to state whether you actually agree. You're of course not obliged to respect my intention though.

In any case, I think better is to do as I suggested above: instead consider explicitly the more fundamental question of whether there are any necessary laws and/or events in/of the empirical world.

Laws are the same things as underlying reasons only if we endow laws with some sort of magical causal abilities.

That's not a good reason for making the distinction: "underlying reasons" have no more causal ability than do "laws"...

What do you mean when you say that a descriptive law is contingent?

I mean that there is a possible world in which it does not exist/obtain.

Do you think you could write in a way that is (a) not so condescending, and (b) not so murky?

What is the point of all this? Do you think that I'm refusing to acknowledge that protein synthesis involves a code?

~~ Paul

Sorry, I have no reason to be condescending.  This discussion about free will has gone to the roots of a philosophical view of causality.  Determinism is a state of affairs (SoA) that comes from a logical arrangement, typically due to an agent.  I read post after post implying that determinism is a SoA from physical relations.  

In some cases physical relations randomly associate one or more factors into a system of events.  These factors relate in a mathematical way to produce stable processes, such as a solar system or a stable compound.  My point is that these gains in negentropy (system information) are inherently unstable over longer time periods.  This is the 2nd law of thermodynamics.

That there are complex functional communication systems of extreme complexity working to make living things active, is neither a random SoA or a determined SoA, by uses both to the max.  I think you are refusing to acknowledge that such systems DO NOT have a clear and easy bridge to be maintained by strictly physical events.  

My point is: they need mental action, such as decisions in favor of a cell worldview, an individual worldview and a social worldview, that are simply not covered by physics.  They need the ability to know things, understand context in the view of self-preservation and the ability to use negative and positive feed-back (cybernetics) to exist.  It is not a magic code from random events; life activities are born from information processing (mentation) in a separate but corresponding environment to the physical universe.

It's not stated explicitly in that essay, it's simply implicit in that it's pretty much the point of his argument - or rather, I took it to be implicit. But here are some quotes from his book which suggest that there is a middle ground between a thoroughgoing descriptivist view and a thoroughgoing prescriptivist one which he calls "Necessitarianism". The quotes in any case seem generally relevant:

Perhaps, Paul, you are a Necessitarian.

I don't think so. But I do think that there is really no way we can know whether there are any events that happen out of necessity. It appears that way, so pragmatically it's true, but I'm not making any philosophical claim. I'm happy to stipulate your version of descriptivism for purposes of further discussion.

That's fine - as you know we've already agreed not to refer to them as "laws" but rather to encompass both under the generic term "generalised conditional descriptions of events".

That's fine. But what's conditional about a description of a specific event?

For a law to be necessary, it's not logic that needs to hold in all possible worlds, it's the law itself. So, can you give me an example of a law that holds in all possible worlds? To be clear on what that means: it means that neither of us (nor anybody else) can conceive of a logically coherent world in which the law does not apply. So, let's say you pick "the law of gravity" - that would be a non-starter because I'm sure you can conceive of a world in which the law of gravity as we know it in this world did not exist, either because there was no gravity at all or perhaps because it was inversely proportional to the cube of the distance between the centres of the attracted masses rather than to the square.

Why are we worried about all possible worlds? Who is making any claims that the laws of physics, say, hold in all possible worlds?

Whether I can come up with an example depends on your answers to my quark questions. But I'm perfectly happy to move things along by agreeing that I cannot come up with an example.

For an event (whether associated with a law or not) to be necessary, again the criteria is that the event occurs in every possible world. Again, this means that no logically coherent world is conceivable in which the event does not occur. So, again - see if you can come up with an example of such an event...

Again, I don't know why other worlds matter when we are talking about the laws of physics.

That's not the argument for why there aren't any events that happen out of necessity; that argument is independent of whether laws are prescriptive or descriptive, but since there seems to be a possible middle ground between the two, let's drop that discussion and focus instead on the more fundamental question: are there any necessary laws and/or events in/of the empirical world?

Your claim seems to be that there could be.

Not if we are talking about all possible worlds. I cannot cite a descriptive or prescriptive law that would hold in all possible worlds, except the "laws" of logic.

I would call that second statement a just-so claim itself...

You believe we have evidence that absolutely no events happen out of necessity? What sort of evidence?

My intention in starting this exchange wasn't for you to stipulate anything, it was for you to state whether you actually agree. You're of course not obliged to respect my intention though.

I won't agree just on principle. We are having a conversation here, not a conversion.

In any case, I think better is to do as I suggested above: instead consider explicitly the more fundamental question of whether there are any necessary laws and/or events in/of the empirical world.

Wait, I thought we had to consider all possible worlds when talking about whether there are any events that happen out of necessity. That immediately makes the question non-empirical.

That's not a good reason for making the distinction: "underlying reasons" have no more causal ability than do "laws"...

They do if there are aspects of physics that dictate that certain events always occur. Why is such an assumption any more arbitrary than the assumption that there is something underneath physics that has an effect on the world? But anyway, it doesn't matter. I will stipulate GCDE.


~~ Paul

That there are complex functional communication systems of extreme complexity working to make living things active, is neither a random SoA or a determined SoA, by uses both to the max.  I think you are refusing to acknowledge that such systems have a clear and easy bridge to physical events.  

My point is: they need mental action, such as decisions in favor of a cell worldview, an individual worldview and a social worldview, that are simply not covered by physics.  They need the ability to know things, understand context in the view of self-preservation and the ability to use negative and positive feed-back (cybernetics) to exist.  It is not a magic code, life activities are born from information processing (mentation) in a separate but corresponding environment.

Again, I'm having trouble understanding you.

I agree that the protein synthesis system is physical. But what are you trying to say?

I have no idea why you think it requires mental action. The protein synthesis system doesn't know anything.

~~ Paul

[Laird]

For focus, I'll respond only to this:

Laird: Your claim seems to be that there could be [necessary laws and/or events in/of the empirical world].

Paul: Not if we are talking about all possible worlds. I cannot cite a descriptive or prescriptive law that would hold in all possible worlds, except the "laws" of logic.

Given the absence of a counter-example, then, we have reached the point of recognition that laws and events are not necessary (because "possible worlds" are how necessity is evaluated in (modal) logic).

You stipulated earlier in this thread that what you mean by "determinism" is:

that some set of prior events necessarily produces a downstream event

If - which is the point at which we've arrived - laws and events aren't necessary, then they can't necessitate or be necessitated, which means that on this definition, nothing is deterministic. But nor is everything random.

This is basically what I've meant by the "random versus deterministic" dichotomy being a false one.

I'm not rejecting causation, just necessitated causation.

And to the extent that "determinism" simply means "causal" (and not "necessitated"), it is no threat to free will, because, as Sci has been fleshing out in this thread (amongst other fleshing), consciousness can freely (without "necessitation") participate in its own causal processes as it responds to the causal processes of other consciousnesses and the rest of the world in general.

That's why I've made a point of challenging you on the "necessity" of laws (and events). No necessity means no solid basis on which to deny the possibility of free will.

So, perhaps now you have the answer to the question you asked way, way back near the beginning of this thread. I hope so, because unless anything especially requiring a response comes up, I think I'll leave our exchange there...

So: "Causality: Discussion Resources, Glossary, and Conceptual Summary and Synthesis".

Or is that too wordy? Are you suggesting a title of the single word, "Causality"?

Honestly, I'd be very happy for you to create this article as you seem to have a better idea of that in which it should consist than I have.

Ah I mean I have a better idea of my personal opinion but I don't want to run over your own. That said I can take a stab at a first draft if it helps center things.

For the moment, you've lost me with this, but maybe with some pondering I'll understand what you're trying to say.

Yeah I thought it might be too inchoate, wrote it late last night. The argument about interest-relative causation comes from Putnam's Renewing Philosophy.

He uses the example of not turning the release valve on a pressure cooker. Most humans would cite negligence as *the cause* if the cooker blew up but it is also fair to say - from a View From Nowhere perspective - that the lack of holes/cracks was the cause. As he states:

To be interested in something, in this sense, you have to be able to think about it-you have to be able to refer to it, in thought or in language. Fodor uses a notion which has an intentional dimension; his notion of things "causing" other things is not a notion which is simply handed to us by physics. For in fundamental physics, at least, one usually ignores the distinction between contributory causes and the cause", and tries to provide a formalism which shows how all of the factors interact to produce the final result.

You can also talk about physics' constants, the nature of Air & Water, and so on to explain the blown up pressure cooker. And that summation of causes is fine, as in most cases we can cash out all the interest-relativity and defer to the larger View from Nowwhere account of causation that takes (in theory) every factor into account and thus sums up every bit of influence everything has on everything else to see what happens in the next frame. (Again, theoretically, problems arise here as well of course...)

Where this most certainly doesn't work is in explaining the way we come to have thoughts about the world, because we need to explain how we hold disparate aspects of the world not only as discrete entities but also how we come to have thoughts about them in our minds.To try and find the causal account of intentionality is to use intentionality...but that suggests that, in some sense, Intentionality precedes our mental apprehension of causation. Why I mentioned machinery is to show that this is more than just some quirk, as our apprehension of interest-relative causes is what has given us so much dominion over our environment.

Another way of looking [at] it is reflecting back on the prior excerpt - reposting for convenience - from Tallis' On Time & Lamentation:

We have to envisage the effect (neural activity in my visual cortex) somehow being in contact with its own causal ancestry (the light from the cup), in order to “reach out to”, “to be about” the cup and to relocate the light arising from the cup back on to it. To put this another way: the causal chain in virtue of which the light “gets in” (to the eye and the brain) fits comfortably inside the world picture of physicalism; while the gaze that “looks out” most certainly does not. This is underlined by the fact that what the gaze looks at is not the ever-changing pattern of light on the object but something that we see revealed by that light: an object with a back, and an underneath, and an inside, and a future, and a past, none of which are presently exposed by the light.

Another reason for being suspicious of the causal theory of perception (and, more broadly, of a causal theory of consciousness) is that...the very idea of causation seems to presuppose consciousness. We might not agree with Hume’s psychologizing reduction of causation to an association of ideas but other accounts – probabilistic, counterfactual, manipulative, and so on – also require consciousness for causes to be picked out.

There's also the challenge of semantic determinancy - how does language center on meaning - that relates to this as well. If one examines this question of determinate meaning & accepts that there are immaterial aspects of thoughts (more on that here) one begins to see why trying to explain how the immaterial and material aspects relate makes one appreciate Idealism as it resolves the material as images/icons for the deeper reality...perhaps not completely accepting it but that's fine for me since I just can't accept it either.

I rather think of starting with "Satcitananda" as Neutral Monistic...Here is how Weiss describes it:

Because Consciousness is also Force (Chit is also Shakti), Sri Aurobindo’s metaphysics is a form of panpsychism. The category of Chit/Shakti is both consciousness (with its awareness and its choicefulness), and energy, with its dynamism and causal efficacy. Within this metaphysical framework, every movement of energy expresses an intention of consciousness, and every intention of consciousness expresses itself in a movement of energy.

So at the "God level" you start with a union of Will & Force...naturally much more to be explained but this ties into something I've been arguing for. If you look down at the level of a specific event, you are left with the question of "Why this particular resolution to this event instead of another?" - the need for possibility selection.

And as per Feynman and Penrose on indeterminism one feels compelled to talk about "decisions"....so there is a clear indicator for mental causation. Then if we note determinism is just a probability indicator, and thus without problematic "natural laws" [the term denotes] randomness of a special kind you see the need for "decision making" in every event - which is why we placed Final Cause at the effect portion of the event's description.

If you instead look to the general, you find the inadequacy of natural laws and other brute facts, which are the opposite of explanations. If you maintain the universe is Intelligible then you run up against an argument Feser makes in Can We Make Sense of the World?:

For once it is conceded that the world is at least in itself completely intelligible, it is hard to see how this could be so unless the most fundamental level of reality is something absolutely necessary – something that is not a mixture of potentiality and actuality but rather pure actuality (as the Aristotelian would say), something which is in no way whatsoever composite but absolutely metaphysically simple (as the Neo-Platonist would say), something which is not a compound of essence and existence but rather subsistent being itself (as the Thomist would say).  However one elaborates on the nature of this ultimate reality, it is not going to be identifiable with any “fundamental laws of nature” (which are contingent, and the operation of which involves the transition from potentiality to actuality within a universe of things that are in various ways composite).  One might still at this point dispute whether the ultimate reality is best described in terms of the theology of classical theism or instead in terms of some pantheistic theology.  But one will definitely be in the realm of theology – rational theology, natural theology – rather than empirical science.

So either by going down to [the] level of a single event, or up to the level of events entire, you run up against what I consider reasonable arguments for the necessity of mentality. ["decision making" becomes decision making] Why I strongly suspect all causation is mental causation as per the panentheistic argument mentioned here.

Given the absence of a counter-example, then, we have reached the point of recognition that laws and events are not necessary (because "possible worlds" are how necessity is evaluated in (modal) logic).

I still don't understand why all possible worlds are relevant. If we are talking about physics, why do other worlds matter? We aren't talking about metaphysical necessity, are we?

And to the extent that "determinism" simply means "causal" (and not "necessitated"), it is no threat to free will, because, as Sci has been fleshing out in this thread (amongst other fleshing), consciousness can freely (without "necessitation") participate in its own causal processes as it responds to the causal processes of other consciousnesses and the rest of the world in general.

How does consciousness make a decision that is causal yet not necessitated?

That's why I've made a point of challenging you on the "necessity" of laws (and events). No necessity means no solid basis on which to deny the possibility of free will.

Except I was never denying it on that basis. I was always just asking for a description of how a free decision is made. Right from the beginning I agreed to discard the deterministic/random dichotomy.

So, perhaps now you have the answer to the question you asked way, way back near the beginning of this thread. I hope so, because unless anything especially requiring a response comes up, I think I'll leave our exchange there...

I don't think you've answered my question.

Why are you abandoning the conversation?

~~ Paul

So at the "God level" you start with a union of Will & Force...naturally much more to be explained but this ties into something I've been arguing for. If you look down at the level of a specific event, you are left with the question of "Why this particular resolution to this event instead of another?" - the need for possibility selection.

If no one objects, I'll jump in here.

Yes, that is the question.

And as per Feynman and Penrose on indeterminism one feels compelled to talk about "decisions"....so there is a clear indicator for mental causation. Then if we note determinism is just a probability indicator, and thus without problematic "natural laws" [the term denotes] randomness of a special kind you see the need for "decision making" in every event - which is why we placed Final Cause at the effect portion of the event's description.

I've reviewed the past 10 or so pages. Way too much information to digest all at once. But now I can follow along in this conversation.

~~ Paul

If no one objects, I'll jump in here.

Yes, that is the question.

I'll go back and reread about Final Cause. How is Final Cause not prescriptive? Perhaps this is the same question as the one above.

~~ Paul

Well since we see change there has to be something/someone selecting among the possibilities, which I am just calling Final Cause. It could also be Inner Cause or arguably even Causal Disposition.

I mentioned to Laird I may be able to tease apart these terms - Final, Inner, and Dispositional Causes - but I need to think about exactly how to tighten the language...

For a law to be necessary, it's not logic that needs to hold in all possible worlds, it's the law itself. So, can you give me an example of a law that holds in all possible worlds? To be clear on what that means: it means that neither of us (nor anybody else) can conceive of a logically coherent world in which the law does not apply. So, let's say you pick "the law of gravity" - that would be a non-starter because I'm sure you can conceive of a world in which the law of gravity as we know it in this world did not exist, either because there was no gravity at all or perhaps because it was inversely proportional to the cube of the distance between the centres of the attracted masses rather than to the square.

If I'm understanding you here, the point is that only mental laws of logic could hold across all possible worlds?

So this is another way of saying that the determination of events has to involve, at some fundamental level, the entities involved in those events to make any possibility determinate?