Kastrup: Idea of the World

[Laird]

I certainly didn't intend to defend Kastrup, his presentations leave me unmoved. As do Malfs's.

I think though that you might have missed something, which I initially missed too, having forgotten that Bernardo's idealism is the topic of this thread, and that is this:

According to Bernardo, everything is an experience, and there is only one experient. Now, as Titus Rivas has pointed out, the idea that there is only one experient is of itself incoherent (given that there is more than one stream of experience), but let's put that aside for the moment. The problem anyhow is that if one experient is experiencing experiences - qualia - then it must be experiencing the same qualia, and, as malf points out, this means that "the redness of red" must be of the same quality no matter which "psyche" is experiencing it (again, setting aside the problem that all of these psyches are actually one and the same). But, as malf argues, and which seems plausible, this quality actually varies between psyches. Thus, Bernardo's idealism is incoherent.

Exactly my point. But that is consistent with an interaction with an external reality. It seems less consistent with whirlpools of consciousness experiences in a river of consciousness experiences. If the (oft-used) "redness of red" isn't fundamental, what is?

What do you think is happening when different wavelengths of light interact with retinal cone cells? I don't think we can regard this as a neuronal correlate of consciousness... This well understood process does seem very suggestive of an "external reality".

Hmmm...I'm not an Idealist and haven't finished the latest book BK wrote, but my understanding is there is an external reality to each individual consciousness but that reality itself is a greater Mind. IIRC this is called Objective Idealism as opposed to Subjective Idealism where - again, IIRC - the unity of experiencers is all that makes up reality.

The greater Mind produces the consistency of reality. I'd suggest listening to the PhD defense and/or BK's new book World as Idea for more details on that.

According to Bernardo, everything is an experience, and there is only one experient. Now, as Titus Rivas has pointed out, the idea that there is only one experient is of itself incoherent (given that there is more than one stream of experience), but let's put that aside for the moment. The problem anyhow is that if one experient is experiencing experiences - qualia - then it must be experiencing the same qualia, and, as malf points out, this means that "the redness of red" must be of the same quality no matter which "psyche" is experiencing it (again, setting aside the problem that all of these psyches are actually one and the same). But, as malf argues, and which seems plausible, this quality actually varies between psyches. Thus, Bernardo's idealism is incoherent.

Can you give the reference where BK says there's only one experiencer? I don't doubt that there is a sense in which BK's Idealism comes [down] to one Mind, but it seems to me all his stuff about alters suggests there would have to be multiple experiencers in some sense as well?

The "Mind @ Large" (M@L) is what holds the consistent and inconsistent aspects of reality in place as I understand it.

(IMO Top Down, One -> Many Neutral Monism is the "best bet" but I don't know if it matters that much after a point.)

You're trying to understand an Idealist concept through your Physicalist lens, so of course you won't be able to understand it properly, through that perspective.

Qualia cannot be reduced to matter and physics, but that doesn't mean different consciousnesses cannot experience the same fundamental Qualia differently.

Indeed, that's how it is. We never experience a fundamental nature of Qualia ~ only a subjective interpretation of it.

But qualia - if I understand the term properly - are just the raw feels. So all we know of qualia are what each of us experience.

My understanding of Idealism is that there is Consciousness, in total, and qualia are an aspect of consciousness but not necessarily fundamental. There could arguably be fundamental qualia - the recordings made by physicists for example - as well as "accidental" qualia which would be colors that even animals don't seem to perceive the way we do.

Perhaps, however, it makes more sense to think of that which is measured by physics as more relating to Mind's mathematical/logical thoughts than the raw feels?

[Laird]

The problem anyhow is that if one experient is experiencing experiences - qualia - then it must be experiencing the same qualia, and, as malf points out, this means that "the redness of red" must be of the same quality no matter which "psyche" is experiencing it

My mistake. I remembered how Bernardo handles this after all: "the redness of red" is "out there" in mind at large, and it "enters the whirlpools" of individual psyches - who then perceive it in turn - via "ripples in the medium of mind" - so they don't need to perceive it directly as malf implied they do, and as I suggested they do. Oops.

Alas, malf - you're on your own again. ;-)

[Laird]

Hmmm...I'm not an Idealist and haven't finished the latest book BK wrote, but my understanding is there is an external reality to each individual consciousness but that reality itself is a greater Mind. IIRC this is called Objective Idealism as opposed to Subjective Idealism where - again, IIRC - the unity of experiencers is all that makes up reality.

The greater Mind produces the consistency of reality.

Yep, I'm aware that that's his position. Last night's post was partly a lapse.

I'd suggest listening to the PhD defense and/or BK's new book World as Idea for more details on that.

I might yet do that - am travelling at the moment though with limited internet access so it might not be soon.

[Laird]

Can you give the reference where BK says there's only one experiencer?

I know it's there in Why Materialism Is Baloney but whether I can find it is another question. I think the way he puts it is that there is a single subject of consciousness; or, in other words, that there is only one mind, which dissociates into psyches (though the subject of consciousness of each psyche is identical to that of all of the others).

[Laird]

Can you give the reference where BK says there's only one experiencer?

This isn't the best reference because it's in the context of something else (free will), but for a start, try page 156 of the Kindle edition of Why Materialism Is Baloney (emphasis mine):

I contend that freewill proper is the primary cause of all movements of mind; the freewill of the one subject of all existence.

Somewhat better is this quote from a few pages earlier, on page 153 (again, emphasis mine):

Since the subject of all experiences is the medium of mind itself, it too only becomes actualized in the form of experience: the one universal subject exists only insofar as the experiences it has.

And even better is this quote from page 198 (again, emphasis mine):

The conclusion of this exercise is that our inner sense of ‘I’ is fundamentally independent of any story we could dress it up with. As such, it is entirely undifferentiated and identical in every person. It is formless. This undressed, naked, ‘amorphous I’ is inherent to the membrane of mind at large, the sole subject of existence. Not only does every person have the same inner sense of ‘I,’ I contend that every conscious being has it: cats, dogs, fish, etc. At the deepest, narrative-free levels, they must all feel exactly like us.

No doubt, there is an optimal quote where this notion is introduced in the first place, but it doesn't seem to be in my highlights. Sorry about that.

[Laird]

My mistake. I remembered how Bernardo handles this after all: "the redness of red" is "out there" in mind at large, and it "enters the whirlpools" of individual psyches - who then perceive it in turn - via "ripples in the medium of mind" - so they don't need to perceive it directly as malf implied they do, and as I suggested they do. Oops.

Alas, malf - you're on your own again. ;-)

Although the idea that it is (those which I presume to be) the qualia of mind at large which can "ripple in the medium of mind" is in my view an unclear one and is arguably nonsensical, so I might still be with you, malf.

Although the idea that it is (those which I presume to be) the qualia of mind at large which can "ripple in the medium of mind" is in my view an unclear one and is arguably nonsensical, so I might still be with you, malf.

Oh, hurry up and make up your mind!