Free will re-redux

Kauffman says

"Neurobiologists believe the mind brain system is and must be classical physics. For many, at some complexity, consciousness arises. This could be correct but faces what I will call the Stalemate: Such a mind can at most witness the world but, due to the causal closure of classical physics, cannot act upon that world. Such a consciousness must be merely epiphenomenal."

I have absolutely no idea why he believes this to be true.

~~ Paul

You don't think he addresses this part of the introductory blurb enough in the video?

I guess I'm still not sure what part of his presentation you are taking issue with.

edit: Actually I forgot he advocates for Panpsychism, not Physicalism in the video. I'd have to check if he's kept to this as he seems to shift around.

[Laird]

Returning to this thread with a few reflections.

What might lead to an inability to conceive of the logical possibility of free choice; of a "third option" between the otherwise-purportedly exclusive dichotomy of "determinism" and "randomness"; an option which I have (reasonably, I think) supplied as that of "contingent causality"?

My sense is that it can be an enthrallment to a reductionist, bottom-up view of reality. In this state of enthrallment, the possibility of coherent conscious agents who holistically make top-down choices is denied. It is coherent, top-down agency that makes free will a sane and meaningful possibility, but it is precisely coherent, top-down agency which is denied on a view of bottom-up emergence. After all, on a bottom-up, emergent view, a conscious agent is merely a supervening abstraction, and a supervening abstraction by definition cannot exercise self-control; it can only be controlled (determined) by the parts of which it is comprised, and/or whimsically thrown around by randomness.

The path, then, to overcoming that lack of imagination which denies that which I have suggested as the "contingent causality" of free will might be to first develop the capacity to break through the strait-jacket of a reductionist, bottom-up view of supervenient emergence by imagining the possibility of coherent, top-down conscious agency. That this requires a reassessment of physicalist assumptions is not fatal since assumptions should always be amenable to reassessment.

What might this reimagining mean in practical terms? What are the potential pitfalls and objections that might occur along the way? And how - by which steps - might it be undertaken? I won't bloat this reflective post by attempting to address those questions, but I am happy to give them a go for anybody who wants to accept the challenge (hint hint)...

My sense is that it can be an enthrallment to a reductionist, bottom-up view of reality. In this state of enthrallment, the possibility of coherent conscious agents who holistically make top-down choices is denied. It is coherent, top-down agency that makes free will a sane and meaningful possibility, but it is precisely coherent, top-down agency which is denied on a view of bottom-up emergence. After all, on a bottom-up, emergent view, a conscious agent is merely a supervening abstraction, and a supervening abstraction by definition cannot exercise self-control; it can only be controlled (determined) by the parts of which it is comprised, and/or whimsically thrown around by randomness.

This part I find interesting. I'm looking (more for entertainment than in a search for answers) at Einstein's contributions to the foundation of quantum physics. Physics is a collective effort but it is often the individuals who break new ground, while others simply follow. At present I'm reassessing not how we may view physics now, with hindsight, but how it was arrived at. The 'breaking of new ground' as it were, this is where the interest lies for me.

I'm looking (more for entertainment than in a search for answers) at Einstein's contributions to the foundation of quantum physics.

I’d be interested in reading about your conclusions Typoz. If true, as it appears, that Einstein was fundamentally unsettled by QP, it would be very interesting if he nevertheless added positively to its foundation.

I’d be interested in reading about your conclusions Typoz. If true, as it appears, that Einstein was fundamentally unsettled by QP, it would be very interesting if he nevertheless added positively to its foundation.

There's no doubt that Einstein was there at the start. His Nobel prize in physics was awarded for his work on the photo-electric effect. The implications of that finding was one of the ingredients that went into the forming of a new view of physics. It is well-understood that there were a number of other significant contributors.

I'm still reading on this topic, but my hesitant (and perhaps premature?) conclusion is that the things which were most unsettling and disturbing for Einstein are very much in the same area as the primary topic of this thread. We might say, the things which disturbed him then still disturb us today.

Are we all coming back? Is that a thing?

Are we all coming back? Is that a thing?

You mean like reincarnation?

Returning to this thread with a few reflections.

What might lead to an inability to conceive of the logical possibility of free choice; of a "third option" between the otherwise-purportedly exclusive dichotomy of "determinism" and "randomness"; an option which I have (reasonably, I think) supplied as that of "contingent causality"?

My sense is that it can be an enthrallment to a reductionist, bottom-up view of reality. In this state of enthrallment, the possibility of coherent conscious agents who holistically make top-down choices is denied. It is coherent, top-down agency that makes free will a sane and meaningful possibility, but it is precisely coherent, top-down agency which is denied on a view of bottom-up emergence. After all, on a bottom-up, emergent view, a conscious agent is merely a supervening abstraction, and a supervening abstraction by definition cannot exercise self-control; it can only be controlled (determined) by the parts of which it is comprised, and/or whimsically thrown around by randomness.

The path, then, to overcoming that lack of imagination which denies that which I have suggested as the "contingent causality" of free will might be to first develop the capacity to break through the strait-jacket of a reductionist, bottom-up view of supervenient emergence by imagining the possibility of coherent, top-down conscious agency. That this requires a reassessment of physicalist assumptions is not fatal since assumptions should always be amenable to reassessment.

What might this reimagining mean in practical terms? What are the potential pitfalls and objections that might occur along the way? And how - by which steps - might it be undertaken? I won't bloat this reflective post by attempting to address those questions, but I am happy to give them a go for anybody who wants to accept the challenge (hint hint)...

This is all well and good, but it doesn't help me. You're essentially asking me just to imagine libertarian free will, damn it. But I cannot. I could write a story about it without worrying that I haven't heard a coherent description, just like I could write a story about a god. But in neither case would I think that the story was anything other than fiction.

~~ Paul

I don't think the supposed exclusiveness of the dichotomy is buttressed by reductionism, given the indeterminism at the quantum level is neither "random" nor "determined" as those terms are usually understood. And since [under reductionism] any macro determinism is grounded in that indeterminism nothing at the classical level can be used as a good argument for the dichotomy either.

Really there is just data and every claim [about what is happening causally] is a philosophical projection/interpretation of sorts onto the observations.

There is no valid metaphysical objection to freewill that follows from the current results of reductionism [that doesn't invalidate Physicalism as well].

I don't think the supposed exclusiveness of the dichotomy is buttressed by reductionism, given the indeterminism at the quantum level is neither "random" nor "determined" as those terms are usually understood. And since [under reductionism] any macro determinism is grounded in that indeterminism nothing at the classical level can be used as a good argument for the dichotomy either.

Really there is just data and every claim [about what is happening causally] is a philosophical projection/interpretation of sorts onto the observations.

There is no valid metaphysical objection to freewill that follows from the current results of reductionism [that doesn't invalidate Physicalism as well].

Going from the above -> The Kaufman video I posted goes from here into some more detail about causation, QM, and Psi. For convenience here it is again ->



Regarding a "how" picture of causality that starts with close to the Ground of Being, deeper than the atomic level, and goes all the way up to mental causation of rational agents there's the "how" recipe I posted before. Here it is out of convenience ->

The Theory of Causal Significance

Real Dispositions in the Physical World

Causal Constraint

A Powerful Theory of Causation

Causation is Not Your Enemy

Free Will and Mental Powers